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Environmental Protection Agency v. EME Homer City Generation*
12-1182
Ruling Below: EME Homer City Generation v. Environmental Protection Agency, 696 F.3d 7,
(D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 2013 WL 1283839 (U.S. 2013).
Various States, local governments, industry groups, and labor organizations petitioned for review
of the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Transport Rule. The rule sets limits on
nitrogen oxides and sulfur dioxide from coal-fired power plants in 28 upwind states in the
eastern part of the country. The D.C. Circuit Court held that the EPA exceeded its statutory
authority under the “good neighbor” provision of the Clean Air Act in implementing the
Transport Rule, and that the EPA could not issue Federal Implementation Plans without giving
States an initial opportunity to implement the required reductions through State Implementation
Plans (SIP) or SIP revisions.
Questions Presented: (1) Whether the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider the
challenges on which it granted relief; (2) whether the states are excused from adopting SIPs
prohibiting emissions that “contribute significantly” to air pollution problems in other States
until after the EPA has adopted a rule quantifying each State’s interstate pollution obligations;
and (3) whether the EPA permissibly interpreted the statutory term “contribute significantly” so
as to define each upwind State’s “significant” interstate air pollution contributions in light of the
cost-effective emission reductions it can make to improve air quality in polluted downwind
areas, or whether the Act instead unambiguously requires the EPA to consider only each upwind
State’s physically proportionate responsibility for each downwind air quality problem.
*Consolidated with American Lung Association v. EME Homer City

EME HOMER CITY GENERATION, L.P., Petitioner
v.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, et al., Respondents
San Miguel Electric Cooperative, et al., Intervenors.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit
Decided on August 21, 2012
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge
Some emissions of air pollutants affect air
quality in the States where the pollutants are

emitted. Some emissions of air pollutants
travel across State boundaries and affect air
quality in downwind States. To deal with
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that complex regulatory challenge ...
Congress set up a federalism-based system
of air pollution control... The Federal
Government sets air quality standards for
pollutants. The States have the primary
responsibility for determining how to meet
those standards and regulating sources
within their borders.
...[U]pwind States must prevent sources
within their borders from emitting federally
determined “amounts” of pollution that
travel across State lines and “contribute
significantly” to a downwind State's
“nonattainment” of federal air quality
standards. That requirement is sometimes
called the “good neighbor” provision.
...[T]o implement the statutory good
neighbor requirement, EPA promulgated the
rule at issue in this case, the Transport Rule,
also known as the Cross–State Air Pollution
Rule. The Transport Rule defines emissions
reduction responsibilities for 28 upwind
States based on those States' contributions to
downwind States' air quality problems. The
Rule limits emissions from upwind States'
coal- and natural gas-fired power plants,
among other sources. Those power plants
generate the majority of electricity used in
the United States, but they also emit
pollutants that affect air quality. The
Transport Rule targets two of those
pollutants, sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen
oxides (NOx).
Various States, local governments, industry
groups, and labor organizations have
petitioned for review of the Transport Rule.
Although the facts here are complicated, the
legal principles that govern this case are

straightforward: Absent a claim of
constitutional authority (and there is none
here), executive agencies may exercise only
the authority conferred by statute, and
agencies may not transgress statutory limits
on that authority.
Here, EPA's Transport Rule exceeds the
agency's statutory authority in two
independent respects. First, the statutory
text grants EPA authority to require upwind
States to reduce only their own significant
contributions to a downwind State's
nonattainment. But under the Transport
Rule, upwind States may be required to
reduce emissions by more than their own
significant contributions to a downwind
State's nonattainment. EPA has used the
good neighbor provision to impose massive
emissions reduction requirements on upwind
States without regard to the limits imposed
by the statutory text. Whatever its merits as
a policy matter, EPA's Transport Rule
violates the statute. Second, the Clean Air
Act affords States the initial opportunity to
implement reductions required by EPA
under the good neighbor provision. But here,
when EPA quantified States' good neighbor
obligations, it did not allow the States the
initial opportunity to implement the required
reductions with respect to sources within
their borders. Instead, EPA quantified States'
good
neighbor
obligations
and simultaneously set
forth
EPAdesigned Federal Implementation Plans, or
FIPs, to implement those obligations at the
State level. By doing so, EPA departed from
its
consistent
prior
approach
to
implementing the good neighbor provision
and violated the Act.

169

For each of those two independent reasons,
EPA's Transport Rule violates federal law.
Therefore, the Rule must be vacated.

of a SIP. The good neighbor provision
requires that SIPs:
(D) contain adequate provisions—

... Congress could well decide to alter the
statute to permit or require EPA's preferred
approach to the good neighbor issue. Unless
and until Congress does so, we must apply
and enforce the statute as it's now written....
I
A
...
The Clean Air Act charges EPA with setting
National Ambient Air Quality Standards, or
NAAQS, which prescribe the maximum
permissible levels of common pollutants in
the ambient air. EPA must choose levels
which, “allowing an adequate margin of
safety, are requisite to protect the public
health.”
... EPA designates “nonattainment” areas—
that is, areas within each State where the
level of the pollutant exceeds the NAAQS.
Once EPA sets a NAAQS and designates
nonattainment areas within the States, the
lead role shifts to the States. The States
implement the NAAQS within their borders
through State Implementation Plans, or
SIPs. … In their SIPs, States choose which
individual sources within the State must
reduce emissions, and by how much. …
States must submit SIPs to EPA within three
years of each new or revised NAAQS....
...[T]he “good neighbor” provision at issue
in this case, is one of the required elements

(i) prohibiting, consistent with the
provisions of this subchapter, any source or
other type of emissions activity within the
State from emitting any air pollutant in
amounts which will—
(I) contribute significantly to nonattainment
in, or interfere with maintenance by, any
other State with respect to any such national
primary or secondary ambient air quality
standard....
The good neighbor provision recognizes that
emissions “from ‘upwind’ regions may
pollute ‘downwind’ regions.” … By placing
the good neighbor requirement in Section
110(a)(2), Congress established the upwind
State's SIP as the vehicle for implementing
the upwind State's good neighbor
obligation.... EPA plays the critical role in
gathering information about air quality in
the downwind States, calculating each
upwind State's good neighbor obligation,
and transmitting that information to the
upwind State. …
After EPA quantifies a State's good
neighbor obligation, if a State does not
timely submit an adequate SIP (or an
adequate SIP revision) to take account of the
good neighbor obligation as defined by
EPA, responsibility shifts back to the
Federal Government. Within two years of
disapproving a State's SIP submission or SIP
revision, or determining that a State has
failed to submit a SIP, EPA must
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promulgate a Federal Implementation Plan
to implement the NAAQS within that State.
B
...In Michigan v. EPA, we considered a
challenge to EPA's 1998 NOx Rule,
commonly referred to as the NOx SIP Call,
which quantified the good neighbor
obligations of 22 States with respect to the
1997 ozone NAAQS....
[T]he Michigan Court found no “clear
congressional
intent
to
preclude
consideration of cost.” The Court thus held
that EPA… could use cost considerations to
lower an upwind State's obligations under
the good neighbor provision.
In North Carolina v. EPA, we considered a
challenge to EPA's 2005 Clean Air Interstate
Rule, or CAIR. The decision held that the
formulas
went
beyond Michigan's authorization to use cost
and that the formulas therefore exceeded
EPA's statutory authority. EPA may use cost
to “require termination of only a subset of
each state's contribution,” the Court
explained, but “EPA can't just pick a cost for
a region, and deem ‘significant’ any
emissions that sources can eliminate more
cheaply.”
North Carolina thus articulated an important
caveat to Michigan's approval of cost
considerations…. Put simply, the statute
requires every upwind State to clean up at
most its own share of the air pollution in a
downwind State—not other States' shares.
C

...The Transport Rule is EPA's attempt to
develop a rule that is consistent with our
opinion in North Carolina. … The Transport
Rule addresses States' good neighbor
obligations with respect to three NAAQS:
the 1997 annual PM2.5 NAAQS, the 1997
ozone NAAQS, and the 2006 24–hour
PM2.5 NAAQS.
The Transport Rule contains two basic
components. First, the Rule defines each
State's emissions reduction obligations
under the good neighbor provision. Second,
the Rule prescribes Federal Implementation
Plans to implement those obligations at the
State level....
EPA began by quantifying the “amounts” of
pollution that each State must prohibit under
the good neighbor provision—that is,
“amounts
which
will...
contribute
significantly to nonattainment” or “interfere
with maintenance” of the three NAAQS in
other States.
EPA used a two-stage approach to quantify
each State's obligations under the good
neighbor provision.
In the first stage, EPA determined whether a
State emits “amounts which will ...
contribute significantly” to a downwind
State's nonattainment of any of the three
NAAQS....
For annual PM2.5, a total of 18
States exceeded the threshold and were
therefore deemed “significant contributors.”
For 24–hour PM2.5, a total of 22
States7 exceeded the threshold. Those States
were thus included in the Rule's reduction
programs for SO2 and annual NOx,
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pollutants
that
contribute
to
PM2.5 formation. For ozone, a total of 26
States exceeded the threshold. Those States
were thus included in the Rule's reduction
program for ozone-season NOx which
contributes to ozone formation.
...[A]t stage two, EPA used a cost-based
standard: EPA determined how much
pollution each upwind State's power plants
could eliminate if the upwind State's plants
applied all controls available at or below
a given cost per ton of pollution reduced.…
[H]ow much pollution each upwind State
was required to eliminate was not tied to
how much the upwind State contributed to
downwind States' air pollution problems.
EPA predicted how far emissions would fall
if power plants throughout the State were
required to install controls available at or
below various cost levels....
EPA then added up the emissions from all of
the covered States to yield total regionwide
emissions figures for each pollutant, at each
cost threshold. The higher the cost level
selected, the greater the reduction of
emissions, but also the greater the costs and
burdens imposed on sources within the
States.…
EPA determined the amount of SO2, annual
NOx or ozone-season NOx that each covered
State could eliminate if its power plants
installed all cost-effective emissions
controls—that is, those controls available at
or below the applicable cost-per-ton
thresholds. EPA then used those figures to
generate 2012, 2013, and 2014 emissions

“budgets” for each upwind State, for each
pollutant for which that State was covered....
...EPA simultaneously promulgated Federal
Implementation Plans, or FIPs.
...The FIPs convert each State's emissions
budget into “allowances,” which are
allocated among power plants in the State.
Under the FIPs, it is EPA, and not the States,
that decides how to distribute the allowances
among the power plants in each State.
The Rule retains a limited, secondary role
for SIPs. States have the option of
submitting SIPs that modify some elements
of the FIPs.... States may also seek to
replace the FIPs wholesale, as long as the
SIP prohibits the amounts of NOx and
SO2 emissions that EPA specified. EPA
says it would “review such a SIP on a caseby-case basis.” But, importantly, the States
do not have a post-Rule opportunity to avoid
FIPs by submitting a SIP or SIP revision:
The FIPs “remain fully in place in each
covered state until a state's SIP is submitted
and approved by EPA to revise or replace a
FIP.” ...
D
...In Part II of this opinion, we address
whether the Rule exceeds EPA's authority to
order upwind States to reduce “amounts
which will ... contribute significantly to
nonattainment” in downwind States. In Part
III, we address whether the statute permits
EPA to issue FIPs without giving the States
an initial opportunity to implement the
required reductions through SIPs or SIP
revisions. In Part IV, we consider the
remedy.
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II
...Under the statute, EPA is limited to
ordering upwind States to reduce “amounts
which will ... contribute significantly to
nonattainment” in downwind States.
A
The Transport Rule defines States'
obligations under Section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I)
of the Clean Air Act, a provision sometimes
described as the “good neighbor”
provision. The good neighbor provision
requires that a State Implementation Plan, or
SIP:
(D) contain adequate provisions—
(i) prohibiting, consistent with the
provisions of this subchapter, any source or
other type of emissions activity within the
State from emitting any air pollutant in
amounts which will—
(I) contribute significantly to nonattainment
in, or interfere with maintenance by, any
other State with respect to any such national
primary or secondary ambient air quality
standard....
The good neighbor provision recognizes that
not all air pollution is locally generated.
Although the statute grants EPA significant
discretion to implement the good neighbor
provision, the statute's text and this Court's
decisions
in Michigan and North
Carolina establish several red lines that
cabin EPA's authority....
First, and most obviously, the text of
Section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) tells us that the

“amounts which will ... contribute” to a
downwind State's nonattainment are at most
those amounts that travel beyond an upwind
State's borders and end up in a downwind
State's nonattainment area. The statute is not
a blank check for EPA to address interstate
pollution on a regional basis without regard
to an individual upwind State's actual
contribution to downwind air quality.
Moreover, the statutory text and this Court's
decision
in North
Carolina
v.
EPA demonstrate that EPA may not force a
State to eliminate more than its own
“significant ” contribution to a downwind
State's nonattainment area...
Second, under the terms of the statute and as
we explained in North Carolina, the portion
of an upwind State's contribution to a
downwind State... depends on the relative
contributions of that upwind State, of other
upwind State contributors, and of the
downwind State itself. Each upwind State
may be required to eliminate only its own
“amounts which will ... contribute
significantly” to a downwind State's
“nonattainment.” As explained in North
Carolina, EPA may not require any upwind
State to “share the burden of reducing other
upwind states' emissions.” In other words,
the statutory text... contains not just an
absolute component (meaning that an
upwind State's insignificant amounts are not
covered) but also a relative component
(meaning that each State's relative
contribution to the downwind State's
nonattainment must be considered).
Moreover, the end goal of the statute is
attainment in the downwind State. EPA's
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authority to force reductions on upwind
States ends at the point where the affected
downwind State achieves attainment.
...Each upwind State must bear its own fair
share. Therefore, the “significance” of each
upwind State's contribution cannot be
measured in a vacuum, divorced from the
impact of the other upwind States. Rather,
the collective burden must be allocated
among the upwind States in proportion to
the size of their contributions to the
downwind State's nonattainment....
In
addition,
our
decisions
in Michigan and North
Carolina establish
that EPA may consider cost, but only to
further lower an individual State's
obligations....
Third, to conform to the text of the statute,
EPA must also ensure that the combined
obligations of the various upwind States, as
aggregated, do not produce more than
necessary “over-control” in the downwind
States—that is, that the obligations do not go
beyond what is necessary for the downwind
States to achieve the NAAQS.
Even when EPA carefully conforms to the
above limits on its authority, the possibility
of over-control in downwind States still
arises because multiple upwind States may
affect a single downwind State and,
conversely, a single upwind State may affect
multiple downwind States.... EPA may
require only those reductions that are
necessary for downwind States to attain the
NAAQS. The good neighbor provision is
not a free-standing tool for EPA to seek to
achieve air quality levels in downwind

States that are well below the NAAQS.
Therefore, if modeling shows that a given
slate of upwind reductions would yield more
downwind air quality benefits than
necessary for downwind areas to attain the
NAAQS, EPA must attempt to ratchet back
the upwind States' obligations to the level of
reductions necessary and sufficient to
produce attainment in the downwind States.
To be sure, as even petitioners acknowledge,
there may be some truly unavoidable overcontrol in some downwind States that occurs
as a byproduct of the necessity of reducing
upwind States' emissions enough to meet the
NAAQS in other downwind States. For
those reasons, EPA must have some
discretion about how to reasonably avoid
such over-control. Moreover, because
multiple upwind States may affect a single
downwind State, and because a single
upwind State may affect multiple downwind
States, it may not be possible to accomplish
the ratcheting back in an entirely
proportional manner among the upwind
States. Our cases recognize as much. But
the point remains: EPA must avoid using the
good neighbor provision in a manner that
would result in unnecessary over-control in
the downwind States. Otherwise, EPA
would be exceeding its statutory authority,
which is expressly tied to achieving
attainment in the downwind States.
B
We now apply those principles to the EPA
Transport Rule. “It is axiomatic that an
administrative agency's power to promulgate
legislative regulations is limited to the
authority delegated by Congress.” An
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agency may not exceed a statute's
authorization or violate a statute's limits. If a
statute is ambiguous, an agency that
administers the statute may choose a
reasonable
interpretation
of
that
ambiguity—but the agency's interpretation
must still stay within the boundaries of the
statutory text....
We perceive at least three independent but
intertwined legal flaws in EPA's approach to
the good neighbor provision....
First, and most fundamentally, the Transport
Rule is flawed because the requirement that
EPA imposed on upwind States was not
based on the “amounts” from upwind States
that
“contribute
significantly
to
nonattainment” in downwind States, as
required by the statute and our decision
in North Carolina.
Petitioners claim that the initial stage of
EPA's analysis—the numerical air quality
thresholds, which used a bright-line test for
whether a State's downwind emissions
“contribute significantly”—created a “
‘floor’ below which any contribution is, by
definition, viewed as insignificant.” ...
...The Transport Rule includes or excludes
an upwind State based on the amount of that
upwind State's significant contribution to a
nonattainment area in a downwind State.
That much is fine. But under the Rule, a
State then may be required to reduce its
emissions by an amount greater than the
“significant contribution” that brought it into
the program in the first place. That much is
not fine.

Put more plainly, EPA determined that a
State was subject to the good neighbor
provision if it contributed at least a certain
threshold amount to air pollution in a
downwind State. But EPA then imposed
restrictions based on region-wide air quality
modeling projections; those restrictions
could require upwind States to reduce
emissions by more than the amount of that
contribution.
EPA's approach poses a fundamental legal
problem—one that derives from the text of
the statute and from our precedents....
By using a numerical threshold at the initial
stage—and thereby creating a floor below
which “amounts” of downwind pollution
were not significant—EPA defined the
“mark,” to use the term employed in North
Carolina. EPA could not then ignore that
mark and redefine each State's “significant
contribution” in such a way that an upwind
State's
required
reductions
could
be more than its own significant contribution
to a downwind State....
In short, EPA used the air quality thresholds
to establish a floor below which “amounts”
of air pollution do not “contribute
significantly.” The statute requires a State to
prohibit at most those “amounts” which will
“contribute significantly”—and no more. If
amounts below a numerical threshold do not
contribute significantly to a downwind
State's nonattainment, EPA may not require
an upwind State to do more. The Transport
Rule does not adhere to that basic
requirement of the statutory text and our
precedents.
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Second, EPA's Transport Rule also runs
afoul of the statute's proportionality
requirement as described in our decision
in North Carolina....
Here, EPA's Transport Rule violated the
statute because it made no attempt to
calculate upwind States' required reductions
on a proportional basis that took into
account contributions of other upwind States
to the downwind States' nonattainment
problems.
In the same vein, EPA's Transport Rule
failed to take into account the downwind
State's own fair share of the amount by
which it exceeds the NAAQS....
Third, and relatedly, EPA also failed to
ensure that the collective obligations of the
various upwind States, when aggregated, did
not produce unnecessary over-control in the
downwind States.... EPA may not require
upwind States to do more than necessary for
the downwind States to achieve the
NAAQS. Here, EPA did not try to take steps
to avoid such over-control.
In sum, EPA's authority derives from the
statute and is limited by the statutory
text. EPA's
reading
of
Section
110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I)—a
narrow
and
limited provision—reaches far beyond what
the text will bear.
...It seems inconceivable that Congress
buried in Section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I)—the
good neighbor provision—an open-ended
authorization for EPA to effectively force
every power plant in the upwind States to
install every emissions control technology
EPA deems “cost-effective.” Such a reading

would transform the narrow good neighbor
provision into a “broad and unusual
authority” that would overtake other core
provisions of the Act. We “are confident
that Congress could not have intended to
delegate a decision of such economic and
political significance to an agency in so
cryptic a fashion.” ...
III
There is a second, entirely independent
problem with the Transport Rule.... Instead,
in an unprecedented application of the good
neighbor
provision,
EPA
also
simultaneously
issued
Federal
Implementation Plans, or FIPs, to implement
those obligations on sources in the States.
EPA did so without giving the States an
initial opportunity to implement the
obligations themselves through their State
Implementation Plans, or SIPs.
...EPA's approach punishes the States for
failing to meet a standard that EPA had not
yet announced and the States did not yet
know.
Under the Act, EPA has authority to set
standards, but the statute reserves the firstimplementer role for the States. That
division of labor applies not just to the
NAAQS but also to the good neighbor
provision, Section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I), as
EPA itself has recognized several times in
the past....
A
...The [Clean Air] Act sets forth a basic
division of labor: The Federal Government
establishes air quality standards, but States
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have primary responsibility for attaining
those standards within their borders.

Implementation Plans, without giving the
States a first opportunity to comply.

...This Court has described the Train–
Virginia line of cases as erecting a statutory
“federalism bar” under Section 110 of the
Act. That statutory federalism bar prohibits
EPA from using the SIP process to force
States to adopt specific control measures.

We begin by briefly describing the set of
statutory provisions on which EPA relies
here.

In Train, the Supreme Court invoked that
statutory division of labor in holding that the
Clean Air Act gives EPA “no authority to
question the wisdom of a State's choices of
emission limitations,” so long as the State's
SIP submission would result in “compliance
with the national standards for ambient air.”
...
Similarly, in Virginia, this Court held that
EPA had no authority under Section 110 to
condition its approval of northeastern States'
SIPs on the States' adoption of California's
vehicle emission control measures. ...
In sum, Title I of the Act establishes a
“partnership between EPA and the
states.” The terms of that partnership are
clear: EPA sets the standards, but the States
“bear primary responsibility for attaining,
maintaining,
and
enforcing
these
standards.”
B
With that basic structure in mind, we
consider the question presented here:
whether EPA may use its rulemaking
authority to quantify States' obligations
under
Section
110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I)
and simultaneously issue
Federal

EPA is the first mover in regulating ambient
air pollution in Title I of the Clean Air
Act....
Section 110 governs State Implementation
Plans. Section 110(a)(1) requires States to
submit SIPs to implement each new or
revised NAAQS. Section 110(a)(2) lists
many elements.... The good neighbor
provision... is one of those required
elements.
Section 110(c)(1) creates a federal backstop
if the States fail to submit adequate SIPs.
When EPA finds that a State “has failed to
make
a
required
submission”
or
“disapproves a State implementation plan
submission in whole or in part” because of a
SIP “deficiency,” EPA must “promulgate a
Federal implementation plan” within two
years, “unless the State corrects the
deficiency”.... In essence, the issue here is
whether a State's implementation of its good
neighbor obligation can be considered part
of the State's “required submission” in its
SIP (or whether the SIP can be deficient for
failing to implement the good neighbor
obligation) even before EPA quantifies the
State's good neighbor obligation. We think
not.... [O]nce EPA defines or quantifies a
State's good neighbor obligation, the State
must have a reasonable time to implement
that requirement with respect to sources
within the State.
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In short, the triggers for a FIP are EPA's
finding that the SIP fails to contain a
“required
submission”
or
EPA's
disapproving a SIP because of a
“deficiency.” But logically, a SIP cannot be
deemed to lack a required submission or be
deemed deficient for failing to implement
the good neighbor obligation until after EPA
has defined the State's good neighbor
obligation. Once it defines the obligation,
then States may be forced to revise SIPs
under Section 110(k)(5) or to submit new
SIPs under Section 110(a)(1). Only if that
revised or new SIP is properly deemed to
lack a required submission or is properly
deemed deficient may EPA resort to a FIP
for the State's good neighbor obligation.
C
1
...Title I's core two-step process is that the
Federal Government sets end goals and the
States choose the means to attain those
goals. EPA's theory—that EPA can define
the end goals for the good neighbor
provision and simultaneously issue federal
plans to implement them—upends that
process and places the Federal Government
firmly in the driver's seat at both steps. The
FIP-first approach is incompatible with the
basic text and structure of the Clean Air Act.
In our view, determining the level of
reductions
required
under
Section
110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) is analogous to setting a
NAAQS. And determining the level of
reductions under the good neighbor
provision triggers a period during which
States may submit appropriate SIPs under

Section 110(a)(1) or SIP revisions under
Section 110(k)(5).
That approach fits comfortably within the
statutory text and structure. In both
situations—setting a NAAQS and defining
States' good neighbor obligations—EPA sets
the numerical end goal. And in both cases,
once the standards are set, “determining the
particular mix of controls among individual
sources to attain those standards” remains “a
State responsibility.”
2
Other contextual and structural factors also
support our conclusion...
Section 110's particular function in the
statutory scheme is to give the States the
first opportunity to implement the national
standards EPA sets under Title I. The good
neighbor requirement's placement in Section
110(a)—a provision calling for State-level
regulation—strongly suggests that Congress
intended States to implement the obligations
set forth in Section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I)....
Moreover, Title I contains a separate
provision, Section 126, that explicitly
contemplates direct EPA regulation of
specific sources that generate interstate
pollution. Section 126(b) permits a State to
petition EPA for a finding that a source in a
neighboring State emits pollution in
violation of Section 110(a)(2)(D)(i). Section
126(c) gives EPA discretion to impose
severe sanctions, including “emission
limitations and compliance schedules,” on a
source for which a finding has been
made. The fact that Congress explicitly
authorized EPA to use direct federal
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regulation to address interstate pollution
suggests it did not contemplate direct
Federal
regulation
in
Section
110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I)....

Like the 1998 NOx Rule, the 2005 Clean Air
Interstate Rule gave States the first crack at
implementing the reductions required by
EPA.

In sum, the text and context of the statute,
and the precedents of the Supreme Court
and this Court, establish the States' firstimplementer role under Section 110....

When EPA issued CAIR FIPs in April 2006,
about a year after it promulgated CAIR, it
clarified that it intended the FIPs to serve as
a “Federal backstop” to the ongoing SIP
process, and did not intend to “take any
other steps to implement FIP requirements
that could impact a State's ability to regulate
their sources in a different manner” until “a
year after the CAIR SIP submission
deadline.” ...

3
...In the past, EPA has applied the good
neighbor provision in the States-first way we
have outlined here.
The 1998 NOx Rule (which we addressed
in Michigan ) quantified each State's good
neighbor obligation but then gave the States
12 months to submit SIPs to implement the
required reductions. Indeed, EPA explicitly
assured States that the Rule did not intrude
on their authority to choose the means to
achieve the EPA-defined end goal:
...Thus, in general, it is reasonable to assume
that EPA may be in a better position to
determine the appropriate goal, or budget,
for the contributing States, while leaving [it]
to the contributing States' discretion to
determine the mix of controls to make the
necessary reductions.
In Michigan, this Court held that the 1998
Rule did not transgress the Train–
Virginia federalism bar.... We said: “EPA
does not tell the states how to achieve SIP
compliance. Rather, EPA looks to section
110(a)(2)(D) and merely provides the levels
to be achieved by state-determined
compliance mechanisms.” ...

EPA's own past practice and statements
illustrate the anomaly of its new FIP-first
approach.
D
On a separate tack, EPA does not concede
that it denied the States their rightful chance
to implement their good neighbor
obligations. It contends States did have an
opportunity to submit SIPs....
In effect, EPA claims the statute requires
each State to take its own stab in the dark at
defining “amounts which will ... contribute
significantly” to a downwind State's
nonattainment. The State would then have to
apply that homemade definition using its
own homemade methodology.
Of course, once a State takes its stab, EPA
could disapprove it—especially if the State
defined its own obligation to be less than
what EPA deemed it to be.... Petitioners
point out that every Transport Rule State
that submitted a good neighbor SIP for the
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2006
24–hour
disapproved.

PM2.5 NAAQS

was

...EPA itself has recognized that having each
State independently guess at its own good
neighbor obligations is not a plausible
solution to interstate pollution: “It is most
efficient—indeed
necessary—for
the
Federal government to establish the overall
emissions levels for the various States.”
Yet EPA now encourages us to suspend
disbelief and conclude that under the statute,
a State's only chance to avoid FIPs is to
make a successful stab in the dark—a feat
that not one Transport Rule State managed
to accomplish. EPA clearly does not believe
the stab-in-the-dark approach would really
permit States to avoid FIPs—its own past
statements show that....
When EPA quantifies States' good neighbor
obligations, it must give the States a
reasonable first opportunity to implement
those obligations. That approach reads
Section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) in harmony with
the rest of Section 110. It preserves Title I's
Federal–State division of labor—a division
repeatedly reinforced by the Supreme Court
and this Court. And it accords with the
commonsense notion that Congress did not
design the good neighbor provision to set
the States up to fail.
IV
The decision whether to vacate a flawed rule
“depends on the seriousness of the order's
deficiencies (and thus the extent of doubt
whether the agency chose correctly) and the
disruptive consequences of an interim
change that may itself be changed.”

Here, we have no doubt that the agency
chose incorrectly. The Transport Rule stands
on an unsound foundation—including EPA's
flawed construction of the statutory term
“amounts which will ... contribute
significantly to nonattainment.” ... [T]he
Transport Rule's “fundamental flaws
foreclose EPA from promulgating the same
standards on remand.” EPA's chosen
manner of implementing the Rule—issuing
FIPs without giving the States a post-Rule
opportunity to submit SIPs—also rests on a
misreading of the statute.
We therefore vacate the Transport Rule
rulemaking action and FIPs, and remand to
EPA.
The remaining question is the status of
CAIR....
In accordance with our Order granting the
motions to stay the Transport Rule, EPA has
continued to administer CAIR. Vacating
CAIR now would have the same
consequences that moved the North
Carolina Court to stay its hand—and indeed
might be more severe now, in light of the
reliance interests accumulated over the
intervening four years. We therefore
conclude, as did the Court in North
Carolina, that the appropriate course is for
EPA to continue to administer CAIR
pending its development of a valid
replacement....
So ordered.
ROGERS, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
To vacate the Transport Rule, the court
disregards limits Congress placed on its
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jurisdiction, the plain text of the Clean Air
Act (“CAA”), and this court's settled
precedent interpreting the same statutory
provisions at issue today....
Congress has limited the availability of
judicial review of challenges to final rules
promulgated by the EPA in two ways that
are relevant here. Under CAA section
307(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1), petitions
for judicial review must be filed within sixty
days of promulgation of a final rule, and
under CAA section 307(d)(7)(B), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7607(d)(7)(B), “[o]nly an objection to a
rule or procedure which was raised with
reasonable specificity during the period for
public comment... may be raised during
judicial review.” The court has, until today,
strictly enforced these requirements, which
exist for two important reasons: to enforce
repose so that the rulemaking process is not
crippled by surprise challenges to matters
that were rightfully presumed settled, and to
guarantee an agency's expert consideration
and possible correction of any flaws in its
rules before the matter reaches a court....

contribution” under the “good neighbor”
requirement in section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I), a
State “may be required to reduce its
emissions by an amount greater than the
‘significant contribution’ that brought it into
the program in the first place.” ...
The court's remaining reasons for vacatur
lack merit. First, the court concludes EPA
violated the “good neighbor” provision's
“proportionality” requirement.... On the
merits,
the
court's
“proportionality”
conclusion contradicts the court's opposite
conclusion in North Carolina that EPA's
measurement of a State's “significant
contribution” did not have to correlate
directly with its air quality impact “relative
to other upwind states.” Similarly, the
court's holding that EPA failed to consider
the effect of in-state emissions is likewise
premised on the sub-threshold argument.
Further, the court's “in-State emissions” and
its
“over-control”
conclusions
are
contradicted by the Transport Rule
administrative record.
I.

As one basis underlying its vacatur of the
Transport Rule, the court permits a collateral
attack on prior final rules in which EPA
disapproved state implementation plan
(“SIP”) submissions... or found States failed
to submit such a SIP at all.... States may not
collaterally attack the propriety of those
Final SIP Rules now.... The court therefore
lacks jurisdiction under section 307(b)(1) to
consider States' belated challenge....
As another ground to vacate the Transport
Rule, the court concludes that, under EPA's
two-step approach to defining “significant

Section 307(b)(1) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. §
7607(b)(1), requires a petition for judicial
review of EPA final actions to be filed
within sixty days of publication in the
Federal Register. “The filing period in the
Clean Air Act ‘is jurisdictional in nature’; if
the petitioners have failed to comply with it,
we are powerless to address their claim.”
The Supreme Court has explained that
“judicial review provisions are jurisdictional
in nature and must be construed with strict
fidelity to their terms....
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Accordingly, in Medical Waste this court
dismissed a challenge to a final rule for lack
of jurisdiction where petitioners failed to
seek judicial review when EPA “first
use[d] ” its statutory approach....
...Over a year prior to promulgating the
Transport Rule, EPA promulgated Final SIP
Rules publishing findings that twenty-nine
States and territories had failed to submit
SIPs with the required “good neighbor”
provisions
for
the
2006
24–hour
PM2.5 NAAQS. In these Final SIP Rules,
EPA stated:
This finding establishes a 2–year deadline
for promulgation by EPA of a FIP...
The Final SIP Rules further state that the
findings of failure to submit were of
nationwide scope and effect.... No State filed
a petition for judicial review.
... Only Georgia, Kansas, and Ohio filed
petitions for judicial review of EPA's
disapproval action and their petitions are not
consolidated with the petitions now under
review, as they challenge different final
rules.
A.
Now that EPA has, as it warned,
promulgated FIPs for States covered by the
Transport Rule, State petitioners contend
that EPA lacked authority to do so for the
2006 24–hour PM2.5 NAAQS because “a
FIP can cure a deficiency only in
a required submission, and States were not
required to include SIP provisions to
eliminate ‘significant contributions' not yet
defined by EPA legislative rule.” If a State

wished to object that under section 110(a) it
had no obligation to include “good
neighbor” provisions in its SIP until EPA
quantified its “significant contribution” in
emission reduction budgets, then the CAA
required it do so at the time EPA found it
had not met its SIP “good neighbor”
obligation....
...[T]he court reaches the merits of this issue
despite its lack of jurisdiction. In the Final
SIP Rules finding States had failed to submit
“good neighbor” SIPs, EPA put covered
States on unambiguously “sufficient notice”
that it interpreted the CAA as placing an
independent obligation on each State.... In
alerting States to the judicial review
deadline, EPA reiterated that States had
sixty days to file “any petitions for
review... Not having sought judicial review
of the Final SIP Rules determining that they
failed to submit required “good neighbor”
SIPs, States may not now object that they
were not
required to
submit
“good
neighbor” SIPs until EPA first quantified
their reduction obligations....
...[N]either Alabama nor Indiana petitioned
for judicial review of EPA's disapproval of
their SIP submissions. In the Final SIP Rule
disapproving Alabama's SIP submission,
EPA quotes one commenter as stating:
EPA has not stated the amount of reduction
they believe is needed to satisfy the
transport requirements....
EPA responded that “the state obligation
stems from the CAA itself.... States had an
opportunity to conduct their own analyses
regarding interstate transport.” ... [N]either
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Alabama nor Indiana sought judicial review
of EPA's Final SIP Rules disapproving their
SIP submissions, and their attempt now to
collaterally attack those Final SIP Rules is
barred.
Given EPA's clear statements in its Final
SIP Rules disapproving States' SIP
submissions and finding they failed to
submit required “good neighbor” SIPs, there
is no basis to conclude that State petitioners
might not have perceived a substantial risk
that EPA meant what it said.... EPA
promulgated Final SIP Rules in which it
made its interpretation clear; judicial
challenge to those rules is the proper forum
to decide the question.
Section 110(c) provides that:
(1) The Administrator shall promulgate a
Federal
implementation
plan at
any
time within
2
years
after the
Administrator—
(A) finds that a State has failed to make a
required submission ... or
(B) disapproves a State implementation plan
submission in whole or in part;
unless the State corrects the deficiency, and
the Administrator approves the plan or plan
revision, before the
Administrator
promulgates such Federal implementation
plan.
EPA's FIP obligation is therefore not
triggered, without more, by a State's mere
failure to submit a SIP required by section
110(a), but instead by an explicit EPA Final
Rule finding that the State either failed to

submit a required SIP or an adequate SIP. A
challenge to EPA's interpretation of section
110(a) must therefore be brought as a
petition for judicial review...
The plain text of section 110(c)(1) obligates
EPA to promulgate a FIP “at any time”
within two years of disapproving a SIP
submission or finding a State failed to
submit a SIP. Moreover, nothing in section
110(c) requires EPA to reveal to States
the content (i.e., the emission reduction
budgets) it intends to include in its
FIP prior to proposing a FIP. Although the
CAA allows States to submit SIPs to
“correct[ ] the deficiency,” they must do so
“before” EPA's promulgation of a FIP,
which may occur “at any time” within two
years....
B.
Even if the court had jurisdiction over State
petitioners' challenge to their independent
obligation to submit “good neighbor” SIPs
under CAA section 110(a), its statutory
analysis proceeds with no regard for the
plain text and structure of the CAA or for
the deference owed to permissible agency
interpretations of statutes they administer
where Congress has left a gap for the agency
to fill or the statute is ambiguous.
...[U]nder Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, the first step in statutory
interpretation requires a determination of
“whether Congress has directly spoken to
the precise question at issue. If the intent of
Congress is clear, that is the end of the
matter; for the court, as well as the agency,
must give effect to the unambiguously
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expressed intent of Congress.” If, after
applying traditional tools of statutory
construction, the court determines “the
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to
the specific issue,” then, under step two, the
court will defer to an agency's statutory
interpretation if it “is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.”
The questions regarding States' obligations
to submit “good neighbor” SIPs are
straightforward: (1) Do States have an
independent obligation to submit SIPs with
adequate “good neighbor” provisions; (2) if
so, what triggers that obligation; (3) if there
is an obligation, what is the deadline for the
SIP submission; and (4) must EPA
prospectively quantify each States' amount
of “significant contribution” to downwind
nonattainment? The plain text of the statute
provides equally straightforward answers:
(1) Yes; (2) promulgation of a NAAQS; (3)
within three years of promulgation of a
NAAQS (unless the EPA Administrator
prescribes a shorter deadline); and (4) no,
but EPA may do so if it chooses.
Section 109 of the CAA requires EPA to
promulgate NAAQS, a national health-based
standard. Section 110, in turn, provides that
(a)(1) Each State shall ... adopt and submit
to the Administrator, within 3 years (or such
shorter period as the Administrator may
prescribe) after the promulgation of a
national primary air quality standard (or
any revision thereof) ... a plan which
provides for implementation, maintenance,
and enforcement of such [ ] standard ...
within such State.

(2) Each implementation plan submitted by
a State under this chapter ... shall
...
(D) contain adequate provisions—
(i) prohibiting, consistent with the
provisions of this subchapter, any source or
other type of emissions activity within the
State from emitting any air pollutant in
amounts which will—
(I) contribute significantly to nonattainment
in, or interfere with maintenance by, any
other State with respect to any such
[NAAQS].
The plain text requires that within three
years of EPA's promulgation of a NAAQS,
States shall submit
SIPs,
and
those
SIPs shall include adequate “good
neighbor” provisions.... EPA has the first
duty to set the NAAQS, and then States
have series of follow-up duties.... Among
the duties clearly assigned to States is the
inclusion in SIPs of adequate “good
neighbor” provisions.
...The court's “role is ‘not to ‘correct’ the
text so that it better serves the statute's
purposes'; nor under Chevron may [the
court] ‘avoid the Congressional intent
clearly expressed in the text simply by
asserting that [the court's] preferred
approach would be better policy. The
Congress has spoken plainly....”
The court's rationale for rewriting the CAA's
plain text is its own conclusion that “the
upwind
State's
obligation
remains impossible for the upwind State to
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determine until EPA defines it.” .... Indeed,
as this court has recognized, States are
charged with operating air quality
monitors.... The air quality monitoring data
collected by the States is publically available
.... State air quality divisions are no
strangers to complex air quality and
meteorological modeling of interstate
transport of emissions.
...[T]heir reason for not doing so appears to
stem from insistence (supported by industry
sources) that their reduction of emissions not
be one iota greater than is necessary for
downwind States to attain and maintain
NAAQS and that it is easier (and
presumably less costly) for EPA to figure
this out than it is for the individual States to
do so, working cooperatively and using any
EPA guidance. This may be so but it does
not demonstrate that Congress's scheme,
protecting States' choices about how to meet
NAAQS requirements, in part by
independently determining ways to meet
their “good neighbor” obligation as the
States argued in Michigan, is absurd.
... [I]n two previous “good neighbor”
rulemakings EPA afforded States the
opportunity to submit SIPs after announcing
emission reduction budgets. But an agency
is not forever restricted to its previous policy
choices or statutory interpretations.... The
discretion agencies enjoy in modifying their
policy approaches is particularly expansive
where the agency declines to exercise
its discretionary rulemaking authority, as
EPA did here.
Here, EPA acknowledged its previous
approach, and explained its decision in

response to comments requesting States be
given time to submit SIPs before EPA
imposed the Transport Rule FIPs....
EPA's decision to adhere to the plain text of
the statute, and not to exercise its
discretionary
general
rulemaking
authority, was thus well-explained by the
time pressures imposed by this court.
Inasmuch as those time pressures were
animated as well by concern for the public
health and welfare—Congress required that
attainment with the NAAQS occur “as
expeditiously as practicable.”
Given that the court “will overturn an
agency's decision not to initiate a
rulemaking only for compelling cause,” and
one of those few compelling reasons is when
the decision declining to promulgate a rule
exacerbates “grave health and safety
problems for the intended beneficiaries of
the statutory scheme,” it hardly makes sense
for the court to require EPA to promulgate a
rule when the effect will be to delay health
benefits....
In sum, the court's conclusion that it would
have been a “homemade” “stab in the dark”
for the States to submit adequate “good
neighbor” SIPs prior to promulgation of the
Transport Rule lacks a basis in fact, and the
court's speculation that EPA would have
inevitably disapproved such submissions, is
just that—speculation.... [T]he court is
bound, in view of the host of responsibilities
placed on States in the CAA, to enforce the
statute as Congress wrote it in plain terms,
to give deference to EPA's permissible
interpretations where the CAA is silent or
ambiguous, and to adhere to the court's
interpretation
of
EPA's
authority
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in Michigan, as well as acknowledge, as the
expert agency has advised without
contradiction, that States have demonstrated
competence to satisfy their plain statutory
“good neighbor” obligations.

Notably on point, in Cement Kiln the court
held that comments stating a policy
preference to EPA were insufficient to
preserve for judicial review objections that
the preferred approach was statutorily
required.

II.
The court also is without jurisdiction to hold
that EPA lacked statutory authority to use a
different
measure
of
“significant
contribution” for setting emission reduction
budgets, unrelated to its measure of
“significance” for purposes of threshold
inclusion of individual States in the
Transport Rule.... Because no objection was
made
during
the
transport
rule
administrative proceedings to EPA's
statutory authority to adopt its two-step
approach, the court thus lacks jurisdiction to
decide this issue....
A.
Section 307(d)(7)(B) of the CAA provides
that “[o]nly an objection to a rule or
procedure which was raised with reasonable
specificity during the period for public
comment ... may be raised during judicial
review.” The court also has made clear that
“[r]easonable specificity requires something
more than a general challenge to EPA's
approach.” The court's enforcement of this
requirement has been most strict in the
context of statutory authority objections....
Consistently, until now, the court has held
that failure to object specifically to EPA's
lack of statutory authority is grounds for
dismissal of such objections in this court.

...Petitioners rely on two comments in an
attempt to show a challenge to EPA's
statutory authority to the approach it adopted
was presented during the Transport Rule
administrative proceedings. Neither is
sufficient. Tennessee commented that “[a]
lower cost threshold should be considered
for any State that can reduce their
contribution below 1% significance using
cost thresholds below the maximum values
($2,000/ton for SO2 and $500/ton for NOx),
if applicable.” But this comment does not
suggest that EPA is statutorily barred from
following its approach.... [T]he only thing
Tennessee commented on with “reasonable
specificity” was that EPA consider not using
a uniform cost threshold for all States.
Wisconsin's comment also does not
demonstrate
the
statutory
authority
challenge now advanced by petitioners in
this court was preserved....
Wisconsin nowhere suggested that EPA is
statutorily required to use the one percent
inclusion threshold as a floor for emission
reductions; it simply urged that EPA
“should” put a “greater emphasis” on air
quality
impacts
at
the individual
EGU level....
Consequently, neither Tennessee's nor
Wisconsin's comments argued “with
reasonable specificity” that EPA was
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statutorily required to treat the threshold
inclusion level in its two-step approach to
defining “significant contribution” as a floor
in
calculating
emission
reduction
requirements....
All that [petitioner] had to do was draft one
sentence that specifically challenged EPA's
decision. It did not, and that specific
challenge is thus not preserved.
...
None of the comments during the Transport
Rule administrative proceedings approaches
the level of “reasonable specificity” required
for this court to have jurisdiction over
petitioners'
new
statutory
authority
argument.
B.
Acknowledging this, the court nonetheless
concludes that it has jurisdiction to address
this new issue because “EPA was on notice
that its disregard of the significance floor
was a potential legal infirmity in its
approach.” None of the three reasons the
court offers for its conclusion that there need
not be objections raised “with reasonable
specificity during the period for public
comment,” is convincing.
First, the court states that EPA was required
“to craft a new rule consistent with [North
Carolina ],” and thus should have been
alerted to petitioners' new objection, raised
for the first time now in this court. But
in North Carolina the court specifically
permitted the exact same approach in CAIR.
...

There is no basis to conclude that EPA acted
inconsistently
with North
Carolina by
replicating the approach the court left
undisturbed....
...EPA was entitled, in the absence of
objection
in
the
Transport
Rule
administrative proceedings, to rely in
promulgating the Transport Rule upon the
court's decision not to disturb its approach.
And the fact that after North Carolina no
comment
in
the
Transport
Rule
administrative proceedings objected that
EPA was exceeding its statutory authority in
adopting its approach underscores the fact
that EPA was not acting inconsistently
with North Carolina in light of a few
sentences about fuel factors plucked out of
context.
Second, ...the court points to a comment
submitted during the CAIR rulemaking that
it deems sufficient, when combined with the
holding in North Carolina, to “show that
EPA ‘had notice of this issue and could, or
should have, taken it into account.’ ” The
CAIR comment stated “that the threshold
contribution level selected by EPA should
be considered a floor, so that upwind States
should be obliged to reduce their emissions
only to the level at which their contribution
to downwind nonattainment does not exceed
that threshold level.” This comment...
cannot carry the weight the court assigns to
it, particularly in light of the holding
in North Carolina.
...[T]he cited CAIR comment is insufficient
to establish that the issue of EPA's statutory
authority was properly preserved for the
court to have jurisdiction to address it.
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Although the CAIR comment communicates
a policy preference, this court has
distinguished between comments presenting
policy preferences and those presenting
statutory authority objections, and technical
and policy arguments are insufficient to
preserve objections to EPA's statutory
authority....

combination. “[Z]ero plus zero [plus zero]
equals zero.”

Third, the court concludes that “EPA's
statements at the proposal stage indicated
EPA was not open to reconsidering CAIR's
earlier rejection of petitioners' argument,”
and that because EPA had dismissed “the
two air quality-only approaches it
considered,” the comments of Tennessee,
Wisconsin, and Delaware were “
‘reasonable’ under the circumstances.”...
EPA's rejection of two alternative air
quality-only approaches has no bearing on
whether EPA would have been willing to
entertain an objection during the Transport
Rule administrative proceedings that the
“good neighbor” provision required it to use
the threshold level for a State's inclusion in
the Transport Rule as a floor for emission
reduction obligations.

First, the court concludes that EPA violated
the CAA by not calculating the required
emission reductions “on a proportional basis
that took into account contributions of other
upwind States to the downwind States'
nonattainment problems.” This is so, the
court says, because in Michigan the court
only permitted cost to be considered as a
way “to allow some upwind States to
do less than their full fair share,” not
more.... This challenge is limited to the
asserted arbitrariness of how certain States
were categorized for one pollutant's budget
for one year. The court lacks jurisdiction to
consider sua sponte an objection to EPA's
statutory authority not raised by petitioners
within the sixty day period....

...The court does not acknowledge this
court's precedent setting a strict standard for
preservation
of
statutory
authority
objections,
which
demonstrates
the
inconsistency of the court's exercise of
jurisdiction today.
...
None of the court's proffered reasons for
ignoring section 307(d)(7)(B)'s jurisdictional
limitations has merit on its own, nor in

III.
The court's remaining reasons for vacating
the Transport Rule are also either beyond its
jurisdiction or unpersuasive.

Second, even if petitioners had raised a
“proportionality”
statutory
authority
objection, this objection and the court's
conclusion are premised on the speculative
possibility that the Transport Rule might
require States to reduce emissions to a level
below the one percent of NAAQS inclusion
threshold of EPA's two-step approach to
defining “signification contribution,” and
thus more than their statutory fair share—an
argument over which the court also lacks
jurisdiction.... Without jurisdiction to reach
an argument on whether the Transport Rule
requires States to reduce more than their
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statutory fair share, Michigan requires the
conclusion that EPA's choice of cost
thresholds in the Transport Rule was
permissible.
Next, the court concludes that EPA failed to
consider the effect of in-State emissions of
downwind
States
on
their
own
nonattainment and interference with
maintenance problems. Even if the court had
jurisdiction to address it, the court's
conclusion is unsupported by the record.
EPA examined the various cost threshold for
each State, and in so doing considered how
much air quality improvement in downwind
states result[ed] from upwind state emission
reductions....
EPA thus in fact examined the contribution
of downwind States to their own
nonattainment problems.
Finally, the court concludes that EPA “did
not try to take steps to avoid”
collective over-control. This conclusion too
is unsupported by the record. The Transport
Rule was not projected to achieve attainment
of all downwind nonattainment and
maintenance problems attributed to upwind
States....
IV.
The Transport Rule, as EPA observes,
represents “the culmination of decades of
Congressional, administrative, and judicial
efforts
to
fashion
a
workable,
comprehensive regulatory approach to
interstate air pollution issues that have huge
public health implications.” The legislative
history to amendments of the CAA
documents Congress's frustration with the

upwind States' historic failure to take
effective action on their own to curtail their
contributions to problems of pollution in
downwind States, leading to amendments to
strengthen EPA's hand. The court ignores
Congress's limitations on the court's
jurisdiction and decades of precedent strictly
enforcing those limitations and proceeds to
do violence to the plain text of the CAA and
EPA's permissible interpretations of the
CAA, all while claiming to be “apply[ing]
and enforc[ing] the statute as it's now
written.” The result is the endorsement of a
“maximum delay” strategy for regulated
entities, rewarding States and industry for
cloaking their objections throughout years of
administrative rulemaking procedures and
blindsiding the agency with both a collateral
attack on its interpretation of section 110(a)
and an objection raised for the first time in
this court, despite the court's previous
decisions declining to disturb the approach
EPA adopted in the Transport Rule.
To reach the result... the court does several
remarkable things. It seizes jurisdiction over
the issue of States' independent “good
neighbor” obligation by allowing States to
pursue a collateral attack on Final SIP Rules
from which they either failed timely to file
petitions for review or their petitions
challenging those rules have not been
consolidated with the petitions challenging
the Transport Rule that are before this threejudge panel. It asserts jurisdiction over
industry's challenge to EPA's two-step
approach
to
defining
“significant
contribution” by excusing industry from its
failure to preserve the issue by first
presenting it to EPA and then resting
jurisdiction on a comment in another
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rulemaking that was first cited by industry
in rebuttal oral argument and cannot bear
the weight the court assigns to it because it
did not challenge EPA's statutory authority
to adopt its two-step approach. All this is
contrary to Congress's limitations on the
court's jurisdiction and this court's precedent
enforcing those limitations. The rest of the
court's analysis recalibrates Congress's
statutory scheme and vision of cooperative
federalism in the CAA. Along the way, the
court abandons any consideration that an
agency is entitled to repose, absent objection
during its administrative proceedings, when
a court, here on two occasion, expressly
leaves undisturbed its two-step approach to
enforcing a statute it administers and no
objection is raised during the Transport Rule
administrative proceedings. Then, in dictum,
the court offers suggestions as to how EPA
might fix the problems the court has created
upon rewriting the CAA and trampling on

this court's precedent in North Carolina and
Michigan.
None of this is to suggest that EPA should
be excused from the statutory limits on its
authority or any material procedural
missteps under the CAA or the APA. But
neither can the court ignore jurisdictional
limits or substantive provisions that
Congress wrote in clear terms and EPA's
permissible interpretations of the CAA in
addressing
statutory
silence
or
ambiguity. Rather it underscores why, as a
programmatic and public health matter,
Congress concluded there are important
reasons for jurisdictional limits and
administrative exhaustion that this court
heretofore has steadfastly acknowledged in
recognizing both the limits of its jurisdiction
and of its role in enforcing the CAA as
Congress wrote it.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
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“Supreme Court to Review EPA Rule on Air Pollution Across State Lines
EPA”
Wall Street Journal
Brent Kendall & Ryan Tracy
June 24, 2013
The U.S. Supreme Court said Monday it
would
consider
the
Environmental
Protection Agency's bid to save a clean-air
regulation
that
limited
power-plant
emissions blowing across state lines.

rather than forcing each state to clean up
power plants within its borders. The judges
ordered the EPA to rewrite the rule, but also
to enforce it in the meantime so as to
achieve at least some pollution reduction.

A federal appeals court in Washington
invalidated the EPA's effort last year,
handing a significant defeat to the Obama
administration's regulatory approach. The
regulation required cuts in emissions of
nitrogen oxide and sulfur dioxide, both
associated with higher rates of heart attacks
and respiratory illnesses.

The Obama administration's approach would
have taken effect in early 2012, requiring
steeper pollution cuts than the Bush rule and
forcing some older power plants to close
immediately or burn less coal. For now, the
Bush rule remains in force and those plants
may be able to keep operating until at least
2015, when a stricter EPA rule curbing
mercury emissions begins to take effect.

The EPA's Cross-State Air Pollution Rule,
issued in 2011, sought to set pollution
reductions for 28 upwind states whose
emissions of soot- and smog-forming air
pollution degrade the air quality of states
downwind.
The regulation would have affected about
1,000 power plants in the eastern half of the
U.S. To comply, companies with older coalfired plants would have had to burn less
coal, shut the plants down or pay for credits
to offset pollution.
The cross-state rule was to replace a Bushera rule that the appeals court sent back to
the EPA in 2008. The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit faulted
the Bush rule for allowing states to comply
by paying other states to reduce pollution,

Several states, including Ohio, Michigan
and Texas, along with coal-fired power plant
owners American Electric Power Co. (AEP),
Southern Co. (SO), Xcel Energy Inc. (EXC),
and others, challenged the EPA's efforts on
several grounds.
Environmentalists
and
other
states,
including New York and Massachusetts,
backed the EPA, as did companies seeking
to turn a profit by replacing coal-fired power
plants, a group that includes natural gasplant owner Calpine Corp. (CPN) and
Exelon Corp., owner of the largest U.S.
nuclear fleet.
In a divided ruling last summer, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit said that while the Bush-
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era rule didn't go far enough to cut pollution,
the Obama administration rule went too far
and exceeded the EPA's powers under the
Clean Air Act.
The court said the EPA wrongly required
some states to reduce more than their fair
share of air pollution. It said the agency
prematurely imposed federal pollutionreduction requirements without first giving
states a sufficient chance to reduce pollution
on their own terms.
A dissenting judge said the appeals court's
ruling trampled on previous court precedent
and allowed the challengers to make
arguments they had never raised with the
EPA.

would "gravely undermine" the EPA's cleanair enforcement.
Analysts have said the cross-state rule would
have
accelerated
some
coal-plant
shutdowns, but the plants' days are still
numbered because low natural-gas prices are
making coal a less attractive fuel source and
because the upcoming EPA mercury rule
will force plants to cut toxic emissions so
much that it will be cheaper to mothball
them than to install pollution-control
equipment.
The court will consider the case during its
next term, which begins in October, with a
decision expected by July 2014.

In the Obama administration's appeal to the
Supreme Court, U.S. Solicitor General
Donald Verrilli said the lower court ruling

192

“Obama’s EPA Gets Supreme Court Hearing on Coal Pollution”
Bloomberg
Greg Stohr
June 24, 2013
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to consider
reviving an Environmental Protection
Agency rule that would curb emissions from
coal-fired power plants, in a clash over the
Obama administration’s biggest air-quality
effort.
A federal appeals court threw out the crossstate air pollution rule last year, saying the
EPA had gone beyond its powers under
federal law. That decision was a victory for
coal companies and utilities, which called
the measure one of the costliest ever issued
under the Clean Air Act.
The administration is seeking to reinstate a
rule it says would prevent up to 34,000
premature deaths and produce as much as
$280 billion a year in economic benefits.
The rule, which has never taken effect, caps
emissions of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen
oxides in 28 states whose pollution blows
into neighboring jurisdictions. All are in the
eastern two-thirds of the country.
“The U.S. Supreme Court is likely taking
this case in order to reverse the D.C. Circuit
panel’s decision that is contrary to law and
would further delay long-needed clean air
standards necessary to protect our public
health,” Howard Lerner, executive director
of the Environmental Law and Policy
Center, said today in an e-mailed statement.
14 States

The justices will hear arguments and rule
during the nine-month term that starts in
October.
Attorneys general from 14 states, led
by Texas, are challenging the rule
alongside American Electric Power Co.
(AEP), Entergy
Corp.
(ETR), Edison
International (EIX), Peabody Energy Corp.
(BTU), Southern Co. (SO) and the United
Mine Workers of America. They urged the
court not to hear the case.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit voted 2-1 to strike down the rule,
saying it was too strict and that the EPA
didn’t give states a chance to put in place
their own pollution-reduction plans before
imposing a nationwide standard.
EPA’s rule would “impose massive
emissions reductions without regard to the
limits imposed by the statutory text,”
Judge Brett Kavanaugh wrote for the court.
2005 Measure
The court ordered the agency to continue to
enforce a 2005 measure known as the Clean
Air Interstate Rule until a viable
replacement to the cross-state regulation can
be issued -- a process the Obama
administration said could take years.
Given that the lower court had thrown out
the standard adopted during the Bush
administrationas insufficient, and the
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Obama-era standard as too stringent, “it was
confusing to say the least,” Janice Nolen,
assistant vice president of the American
Lung Association, said in an interview. “We
are very pleased that they may clarify this.”
The justices also will consider a procedural
question -- whether the lower court had
power to hear the challenge to the rule. The
administration contends the appeals court
reached its conclusion only by improperly
invalidating other rules that weren’t directly
before the court.

combined threats of increasing federal
regulation and low natural-gas prices.
The EPA rule targets sulfur dioxide, which
can lead to acid rain and soot harmful to
humans and ecosystems, and nitrogen oxide,
a component of ground-level ozone and a
main ingredient of smog.
The cases are U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency v. EME Homer City
Generation, 12-1182, and American Lung
Association v. EME Homer City, 12-1183.

The lower court decision was a reprieve for
coal-dependent power generators facing the
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“D.C. Circuit Upholds EPA Rules on Limiting Greenhouse Gas Emissions”
Legal Newline
Jessica M. Karmasek
July 30, 2013
A federal appeals court ruled last week that
a coalition of states and industry groups
lacked standing to challenge the federal
government’s rules related to greenhouse
gas permitting requirements.
In a 2-1 ruling Friday, a panel of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit ruled against the coalition
— including Texas, Wyoming, the Utility
Air Regulatory Group and the National
Mining Association.
The cases, which were consolidated in the
D.C. Circuit’s ruling, challenged the rules
promulgated by the federal Environmental
Protection Agency in response to a 2007
U.S. Supreme Court holding that greenhouse
gases qualify as an “air pollutant” under the
federal Clean Air Act.
Last year, the D.C. Circuit upheld the
agency’s regulation in the so-called “tailpipe
rule” of greenhouse gases emitted by cars
and light trucks under Title II of the CAA.
The court in Coalition for Responsible
Regulation Inc. v. EPA also upheld the
agency’s determination that the rule
triggered permitting requirements for new
major stationary sources of greenhouse
gases under Part C of Title I of the CAA.
The D.C. Circuit also dismissed for lack of
standing challenges by states and industry
groups to “timing and tailoring rules” that

ameliorated the burden of Part C permitting
for greenhouse gases.
At issue this time around is implementation
of the Part C permitting requirements in
states without implementation plans for
greenhouse gases as of Jan. 2, 2011, when
the emission standards in the tailpipe rule
took effect.
Texas, Wyoming and the industry groups
petitioned the D.C. Circuit for review of five
rules, all of which are designed to ensure
that a permitting authority existed to issue
the required greenhouse gas permits.
They contend the rules are based on an
“impermissible interpretation” of the Part C
Prevention of Significant Deterioration
Program, and violate the CAA’s “orderly
process”
for
revision
of state
implementation plans, or SIPs.
“The court on more than one occasion has
interpreted CAA § 165(a) unambiguously to
prohibit construction or modification of a
major emitting facility without a Part C
permit that meets the statutory requirements
with regard to each pollutant subject to
regulation under the Act,” Judge Judith
Rogers wrote for the D.C. Circuit.
“Because we now hold that under the plain
text of CAA § 165(a) and § 167 the
permitting requirements are self-executing
without regard to previously approved SIPs,
industry petitioners fail to show how they
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have been injured in fact by rules enabling
issuance of the necessary permits.”

to challenge the rules, we dismiss the
petitions for lack of jurisdiction.”

She continued in the 36-page ruling, “State
petitioners likewise fail, in the face of
Congress’s mandate in CAA § 165(a), to
show how vacating the rules would redress
their purported injuries. Accordingly,
because petitioners lack Article III standing

Judge David Tatel joined Rogers in the
opinion. Judge Brett Kavanaugh filed a
dissent.
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“Supreme Court Should Block EPA’s Attempt to Regulate Greenhouse
Gases”
The Daily Caller
Karen Harned
June 25, 2013
In the wake of the country’s worst economic
downturn since the Great Depression, there
are some signs that the economy is
recovering — housing prices are up almost
11% from last year and consumer
confidence is at a five-year high.
Unfortunately, the Obama administration is
making mistakes that threaten to stifle the
recovery. One example is its decision to
introduce disastrous new regulations on
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. President
Obama
mentioned
those
proposed
regulations in his climate speech on
Tuesday.
In December 2009, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) unilaterally
determined that certain GHGs threaten the
public health and welfare and therefore must
be regulated under the Clean Air Act. That
determination effectively allows the EPA to
circumvent Congress and enact new
regulations on businesses and individuals
that Congress never intended.
These new regulations, if they’re allowed to
take effect, will brand hundreds of
thousands of small farms, restaurants,
manufacturers and even commercial offices
as “stationary sources” of pollution,
meaning that they will be required to
complete costly and time-consuming permit
applications. This will cost consumers —
including hundreds of thousands of small
businesses — billions of dollars per year in

higher energy bills. As a result, some
businesses won’t be able to expand, others
will have to lay off workers and still others
will have to shut their doors.
The administration’s decision to impose
these costly mandates also sends a terrible
message to entrepreneurs and those looking
to innovate.
Because the Clean Air Act doesn’t actually
empower the federal government to regulate
GHGs, the EPA’s actions have no legal
basis. That’s why the National Federation of
Independent Business, which represents
350,000 small businesses, has joined other
organizations in asking the Supreme Court
to rule that the EPA has misinterpreted the
Clean Air Act in order to justify its policies
and effectively rewrite the law. We are
hopeful that the Court will see that the
president’s attempt to use the EPA as a
political tool will impact almost every sector
of the economy, including universities,
schools and hospitals — institutions that are
hardly thought of as “polluters.”
We all want clean air, water and energy —
and a safe environment for our children. Yet
we are troubled by the president’s decision
to bypass Congress and implement an
agenda that Congress and the American
people have rejected in the past. Climate
change policies should be debated, not
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imposed through agency fiat in a way that
will cripple our economy. The Supreme
Court should recognize that the federal
government has greatly overstepped its

bounds, reject this new practice and help
America move forward again.
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“Supreme Court to Review Decision Critical to Cleaning up America's Air”
Environmental Defense Fund
Graham McCahan
July 1, 2013
On June 24, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court
decided to review the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals’ decision in a case called EME
Homer City Generation. To anyone
concerned about the quality of the nation’s
air, this was very big news. Here’s why.
In EME Homer City, which the D.C. Circuit
decided last summer, a divided court
overturned the Cross-State Air Pollution
Rule, one of the Environmental Protection
Agency’s most important (and costeffective) clean air programs. In their filing
asking the Supreme Court to hear the case,
the Environmental Protection Agency
argued that “the court of appeals committed
a series of fundamental errors that, if left
undisturbed, will gravely undermine the
EPA’s enforcement of the Clean Air Act.”
The stakes are high. Every year, the CrossState Rule, if only it can be applied, will
save up to 34,000 lives and $110 to
$280 billion in net health benefits. Without
it, millions of people and entire communities
will remain exposed to dangerous levels of
pollution.
EPA issued the Cross-State Rule in 2011
under the Clean Air Act’s “good neighbor”
provision, which directs states to “prohibit”
emissions that are carried downwind and
contribute to unhealthy air pollution in
neighboring states. If states do not live up to
their good neighbor obligations, then the

Clean Air Act requires EPA to step in.
According to 2011 estimates, air pollution
from neighboring states accounted for more
than three-quarters of local air pollution in
many areas struggling to comply with
EPA’s health-based standards. As this data
shows, millions of Americans are breathing
unhealthy air that originates in neighboring
states.
The Cross-State Rule helps address this
problem by reducing harmful smokestack
pollution from power plants, which can drift
for hundreds of miles and adversely affect
distant communities. Despite its enormous
health benefits and relatively small
compliance
costs,
numerous
power
companies and several states challenged the
Cross-State Rule in the D.C. Circuit.
Numerous parties then joined the case in
support of EPA and the Cross-State Rule,
including: several states and cities that are
adversely affected by interstate pollution;
three major power companies; and EDF,
along with some of its public health and
environmental allies.
After the D.C. Circuit struck down the
Cross-State Rule, Environmental Defense
Fund, along with the American Lung
Association, Clean Air Council, Natural
Resources Defense Council, and Sierra Club
filed a petition seeking Supreme Court
review, which the Supreme Court granted
along with EPA’s petition.

199

The Supreme Court, we believe, should
reverse the decision of the D.C. Circuit and
restore the clean air safeguards of the CrossState Rule.
This will safeguard the air quality of
millions of Americans who depend on EPA

to protect them from pollution that comes
from beyond the borders of their own states.
No wonder, when EPA called for the
Supreme Court to review EME Homer City,
they warned that, should the decision stand,
it would “seriously impede the EPA’s ability
to deal with a grave public health problem.”
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Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg
12-462
Ruling Below: Ginsberg v. Northwest, Inc., 695 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2012), cert granted, 133
S.Ct. 2387 (2013).
Member of airline's frequent flier program brought action against airline, alleging breach of
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing after it revoked his membership. The United
States District Court for the Southern District of California entered order granting airline's
motion to dismiss, and member appealed. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Airline
Deregulation Act (ADA) did not preempt member's claim.
Question Presented: Whether the court of appeals erred in holding, in contrast with the
decisions of other circuits, that respondent’s implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was
not preempted under the Airline Deregulation Act because such claims are categorically
unrelated to a price, route, or service, notwithstanding that respondent’s claim arises out of a
frequent-flyer program (the precise context of American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens ) and manifestly
enlarged the terms of the parties’ undertakings, which allowed termination in Northwest’s sole
discretion.

S. Binyomin GINSBERG, Rabbi, an individual and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff–Appellant,
v.
NORTHWEST, INC., a Minnesota corporation and a wholly-owned subsidiary of Delta
Air Lines, Inc.; Delta Air Lines, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Defendants–Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
Decided on July 13, 2012
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
BEEZER, Circuit Judge
Plaintiff brought suit against an airline
alleging a common law breach of contract
under the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. The district court held that
Plaintiff's claim was preempted by the
Airline Deregulation Act (“ADA”), and
dismissed
the
claim
pursuant

to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). We conclude that
the ADA does not preempt this common law
contract claim, and reverse the district court.
When Congress passed the ADA, it
dismantled a federal regulatory structure that
had existed since 1958. By including a
preemption clause, Congress intended to
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ensure that the States would not undo the
deregulation with regulation of their own.
Congress's “manifest purpose” was to make
the airline industry more efficient by
unleashing
the
market
forces
of
competition—it was not to immunize the
airline industry from liability for common
law contract claims. Congress did not intend
to convert airlines into quasi-government
agencies,
complete
with
sovereign
immunity.
The purpose, history, and language of the
ADA, along with Supreme Court and Ninth
Circuit precedent, lead us to conclude that
the ADA does not preempt a contract claim
based on the doctrine of good faith and fair
dealing.
Background
Plaintiff S. Binyomin Ginsberg was an
active member of “WorldPerks,” a
frequent flier program offered by Defendant
Northwest Airlines, Inc. (“Northwest”).
Ginsberg began his WorldPerks membership
in 1999, and by 2005 he had obtained
Platinum Elite Status. Northwest revoked
Ginsberg's WorldPerks membership on June
27, 2008. Ginsberg attempted several times
to clarify the reasons behind Northwest's
decision to revoke his membership.
Ginsberg alleges that Northwest revoked his
membership
arbitrarily
because
he
complained too frequently about the
services. Northwest sent Ginsberg an email
on November 20, 2008, detailing the basis
for Northwest's decision to revoke
Ginsberg's membership. In that email the
Northwest representative quotes from
Paragraph 7 of the General Terms and

Conditions of the WorldPerks Program,
which provides that Northwest may
determine “in its sole judgment” whether a
passenger has abused the program, and that
abuse “may result in cancellation of the
member's
account
and
future
disqualification from program participation,
forfeiture of all mileage accrued and
cancellation of previously issued but unused
awards.”
Ginsberg initially filed suit on January 8,
2009, asserting four causes of action: (1)
breach of contract; (2) breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (3)
negligent misrepresentation; and (4)
intentional misrepresentation. Northwest
moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant
to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), arguing that the
ADA preempted the claims. The district
court dismissed, with prejudice, Ginsberg's
claims for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, negligent
misrepresentation,
and
intentional
misrepresentation, concluding that the ADA
preempted them “ ‘because they relate to
airline prices and services.’ ” The district
court also dismissed the general breach of
contract claim without prejudice, finding
that the claim was not preempted, but that
Ginsberg had failed to allege facts sufficient
to show a material breach.
Ginsberg only appeals the district court's
conclusion that the ADA preempts a claim
for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.
Standard of Review
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“Dismissals under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim are reviewed de
novo.”
Analysis
Based on our case law, Supreme Court
precedent, and the ADA's legislative history
and statutory text, we conclude that the
ADA does not preempt state-based common
law contract claims, such as the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Although Ginsberg's claim may still fail on
the merits, the district court erred when it
dismissed the claim under the preemption
doctrine. Doing so was a misapplication of
the law because the ADA was never
designed to preempt these types of disputes.
A. Preemption Doctrine
The key to understanding the scope of the
ADA's preemption clause is to determine
what Congress intended to achieve when it
enacted the ADA. “Preemption may be
either express or implied, and is compelled
whether Congress' command is explicitly
stated in the statute's language or implicitly
contained in its structure and purpose.” This
inquiry “begin[s] with the language
employed by Congress and the assumption
that the ordinary meaning of that language
accurately
expresses
the
legislative
purpose.”
In Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, the Supreme
Court advised that preemption provisions
ought to be narrowly construed for two
reasons:
First, because the States are independent
sovereigns in our federal system, we have

long presumed that Congress does not
cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of
action.... Second, our analysis of the scope
of the statute's pre-emption is guided by our
oft-repeated comment ... that the purpose of
Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every
pre-emption case.
Indeed, preemption analysis “must be
guided by respect for the separate spheres of
governmental authority preserved in our
federalist system.” When the question of
preemption implicates “a field which the
States have traditionally occupied, we start
with the assumption that the historic police
powers of the States were not to be
superseded by the Federal Act unless that
was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.”
To determine what Congress's “manifest
purpose” was, we must first consider the
ADA's unique history. Under the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, the Civil Aeronautics
Board (“CAB”) had regulatory authority
over interstate air transportation. But the
Board's power in this field was not
exclusive, for the statute also contained a
“savings clause,” clarifying that “[n]othing
... in this chapter shall in any way abridge or
alter the remedies now existing at common
law or by statute, but the provisions of this
chapter are in addition to such remedies.”
Because the 1958 Act did not expressly
preempt state law, this clause allowed states
to regulate airlines, leading to economic
distortions.
By 1978 Congress had concluded that stateby-state regulation was inefficient and that
deregulation, along with market forces,
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could better promote efficiency, variety, and
quality in the airline industry. But seeing
that states could just as easily “undo federal
deregulation with regulation of their
own,” Congress included a preemption
clause in former section 1305(a)(1), which
now reads as follows:
[A] State, political subdivision of a State,
or political authority of at least 2 States
may not enact or enforce a law,
regulation, or other provision having the
force and effect of law related to a price,
route, or service of an air carrier that may
provide air transportation under this
subpart.
At the same time, Congress retained the
“savings clause,” thereby preserving
common law and statutory remedies.
Since 1978, the scope of this preemption
clause has been hotly debated, but never
fully resolved.
B. Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit
Precedent
The Supreme Court has encountered the
ADA's preemption clause at least three
times since 1990. In Morales, the Court
considered whether the ADA preempted the
States “from prohibiting allegedly deceptive
airline
fare
advertisements
through
enforcement of their general consumer
protection statutes.” The Court concluded
that because advertising has such a direct
link to pricing and rates, the ADA
preempted restrictions against deceptive
advertising. The Court therefore reasoned
that the advertising restrictions at issue had
the “forbidden significant effect” on rates,
routes, or services. Because the regulations

were inconsistent with the ADA's
deregulatory purpose, they were preempted
under former § 1305(a)(1). But in the next
breath the Court cabined its holding to those
laws that actually have a direct effect on
rates, routes, or services.
The Court went to great lengths to make
clear that its holding was narrow, and that
the ADA only preempts laws that have a
direct effect on pricing:
In concluding that the ... advertising
guidelines are pre-empted, we do not ... set
out on a road that leads to pre-emption of
state laws against gambling and prostitution
as applied to airlines. Nor need we address
whether state regulation of the nonprice
aspects of fare advertising (for example,
state laws preventing obscene depictions)
would similarly “relate to” rates; the
connection would obviously be far more
tenuous.... [S]ome state actions may affect
airline fares in too tenuous, remote, or
peripheral a manner to have a preemptive
effect.
We echoed this view in Air Transport
Association of America v. City & County of
San Francisco, where we concluded that
Congress did not intend for the ADA to
preempt state laws forbidding employment
discrimination, even if these laws have an
economic effect, because employment
discrimination laws are not directly related
to pricing, routes, or services.
The Court considered the ADA's preemption
clause for a second time in American
Airlines, Inc., v. Wolens. In a fact pattern
similar to this case, the plaintiffs
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in Wolens were members of a frequent flyer
program and brought suit against an airline.
The plaintiffs challenged certain program
modifications that devalued credits the
members had already earned, and claimed
that the devaluation constituted a breach of
contract and a violation of Illinois's
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business
Practices Act. The court concluded that §
1305(a)(1) clearly preempted the consumer
fraud claim because it was a state-imposed
regulation that related to the price, routes, or
services of air carriers. But the Court
allowed the breach of contract claim to go
forward, making clear that the ADA “allows
room for court enforcement of contract
terms set by the parties themselves.” “In so
doing, the Court held that Congress did not
intend to preempt common law contract
claims.”
The Court in Wolens drew a clear distinction
between the consumer fraud claim, which
was based on a proscriptive law targeting
primary conduct, and actions that “simply
give effect to bargains offered by the airlines
and
accepted
by
airline
customers.” Because this distinction—
between state laws that regulate airlines and
state enforcement of contract disputes—is
crucial, we quote the Court at length:
We do not read the ADA's preemption
clause, however, to shelter airlines from
suits alleging no violation of stateimposed obligations, but seeking
recovery solely for the airline's alleged
breach of its own, self-imposed
undertakings. As persuasively argued by
the United States, terms and conditions
airlines offer and passengers accept
are privately ordered obligations “and

thus do not amount to a State's
‘enact[ment] or enforce[ment] [of] any
law, rule, regulation, standard, or other
provision having the force and effect of
law’ within the meaning of [§
]1305(a)(1).”
The ADA, as we recognized in Morales ...
was designed to promote “maximum
reliance on competitive market forces.” ...
Market efficiency requires effective means
to enforce private agreements. As stated by
the United States: “The stability and
efficiency
of
the
market
depend
fundamentally on the enforcement of
agreements freely made, based on the needs
perceived by the contracting parties at the
time.” That reality is key to sensible
construction of the ADA.
In sum, the Court concluded that a state does
not “enact or enforce any law” when it uses
its contract laws to enforce private
agreements.
After drawing this distinction, the Court
then pointed out institutional limitations that
demonstrate the ADA cannot preempt
breach of contract claims, including those
based on common law principles such as
good faith and fair dealing. In particular, the
Department of Transportation is not
equipped to adjudicate these types of claims.
First, the DOT's own regulations
“contemplate that ... contracts ordinarily
would be enforceable under ‘the contract
law of the States.’ ” Second, the DOT is not
equipped with either “the authority [or] the
apparatus required to superintend a contract
dispute resolution regime.” Although before
1978 the CAB adjudicated contract disputes,
when Congress deregulated the airline

205

industry it dismantled this apparatus and
never replaced it. Therefore, if common law
contract claims were preempted by the
ADA, a plaintiff literally would have no
recourse because state courts would have no
jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim, and the
DOT would have no ability to do so.
Effectively, the airlines would be
immunized from suit—a result that
Congress never intended. This also means
that “the lawmakers indicated no intention to
establish,
simultaneously,
a
new
administrative process for DOT adjudication
of private contract disputes.” Consequently,
the Court flatly refused to “foist on the DOT
work Congress has neither instructed nor
funded the Department to do.” We agree.
The Supreme Court considered § 1305(a)(1)
for a third time in Rowe v. New Hampshire
Motor Transport Ass'n. In Rowe a group of
transport carrier associations challenged a
Maine statute that regulated the shipment of
tobacco into the state. The Court concluded
that the ADA preempted Maine's statute
because the latter “produces the very effect
that the federal law sought to avoid; namely,
a State's direct substitution of its own
governmental commands for ‘competitive
market forces.’ ” Invoking Morales, the
Court emphasized that “state enforcement
actions having a connection with, or
reference to carrier ‘rates, routes, or
service,’ are pre-empted.” Indeed, compared
to
either Wolens or Morales, the
link
in Rowe was more directly related to
“routes, rates, or services” because it
regulated primary activity that fell under the
ADA, thereby frustrating Congress's
“manifest purpose” to deregulate the
industry.

And finally, we addressed a similar question
in West v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. There,
the plaintiff brought suit against Northwest
for breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing under Montana law. The district
court granted summary judgment to
Northwest, stating that the claim was
preempted by the ADA. On appeal we
reversed, concluding that a claim for breach
of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing was “too tenuously connected to
airline regulation to trigger preemption
under the ADA.” Although this case was
pre-Wolens, we conclude it is still good law.
Indeed, in Charas, a post-Wolens decision,
we emphasized that Congress's “clear and
manifest purpose” in enacting airline
deregulation “was to achieve just that—the
economic deregulation of the airline
industry.” The only purpose of the
preemption clause is to prevent state
interference
with
the mandate of
deregulation.
Additionally, that Congress did not intend
for § 1305(a)(1) to preempt state common
law contract claims is evident from another
provision: the savings clause, which
preserves common law remedies. Because
the ADA's preemption clause does not
explicitly preempt common law breach of
contract claims, we turn to the rest of the
statute's language to “ ‘ascertain and give
effect to the plain meaning of the language
used,’ but must be careful not to read the
preemption clause's language in such a way
as to render another provision superfluous.”
In Charas we concluded that, taken together,
the savings clause and preemption clause
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“evidence[ ] congressional intent to prohibit
states from regulating the airlines while
preserving state tort remedies that already
existed at common law, providing that such
remedies do not significantly impact federal
deregulation.” Similar logic would apply to
state contract remedies that already existed
at common law, such as the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Moreover, we also may look to “the
pervasiveness of the regulations enacted
pursuant to the relevant statute to find
preemptive intent.” As the Supreme Court
pointed out in Wolens, the DOT is not
equipped to handle contract disputes, and its
regulations suggest that Congress did not
intend to occupy this particular field of law.
This stands in contrast, for example, to
airline safety, where agency regulations
demonstrate “an intent to occupy
exclusively the entire field of aviation
safety.” A claim for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing does
not interfere with the deregulatory mandate.
Although Northwest argues that a common
law breach of contract claim, like one based
on the doctrine of “good faith and fair
dealing,” would enlarge the contract's
terms—savings clause, notwithstanding—
the Supreme Court rejected this argument
in Wolens. There, the Court explicitly
allowed “state-law-based” claims to go
forward because that was the purpose of
retaining the savings clause. The Supreme
Court reasoned that state-law-based contract
claims would not frustrate the ADA's
manifest purpose: “[b]ecause contract law is
not at its core ‘diverse, nonuniform, and
confusing,’ we see no large risk of
nonuniform adjudication inherent in ‘state-

court enforcement of the terms of a uniform
agreement prepared by an airline and
entered
into
with
its
passengers
nationwide.’”
As we pointed out in Air Transport
Association of America v. City and County
of San Francisco, “[w]hat the Airlines are
truly complaining about are free market
forces and their own competitive decisions.”
In upholding a local law forbidding
employment discrimination, the Ninth
Circuit reasoned that “[i]n this deregulated
environment, airlines can decide whether or
not to make large economic investments at
the San Francisco airport.... That economic
decision may mean the Airlines will have to
agree to abide by the [city's antidiscrimination] Ordinance[ ].” Similarly,
here, Northwest is free to invest in a
frequent flier program; however, that
economic decision means that the airline has
to abide by its contractual obligations,
within this deregulated context, pursuant to
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Like the ordinance at issue in Air Transport
Association, state enforcement of the
covenant is not “to force the Airlines to
adopt or change their prices, routes or
services—the prerequisite for ADA
preemption.”
C. The Implied Covenant of Good Faith
and Fair Dealing Does Not “Relate to”
Prices, Routes, or Services
Finally, the district court concluded that the
ADA preempts Ginsberg's claim for breach
of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing because the claim would “relate to”
both “prices” and “services.” We disagree.
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First, the district court uses an overly broad
definition of what relates to “prices.”
In Wolens all the justices—including the
dissenters—agreed that the ADA does not
preempt common law tort claims such as
personal injury and wrongful death, even
though airline costs and fares would be
affected by how restrictive a particular
state's law may be. Similarly, here, the link
is far too tenuous, and effectively would
subsume all breach of contract claims.
Second, the district court's broad
understanding of the “relating to” language
is also inconsistent with the ADA's
legislative history. In 1977, the CAB's
proposed preemption language stated that
“[n]o State ... shall enact any law ... relating
to rates, routes, or services in air
transportation.” In its explanatory testimony
the CAB's representatives never suggested
that the “relating to” language created a
broad scope for preemption. Rather, the
CAB explained that the preemption clause
was “added to make clear that no state or
political subdivision may defeat the
purposes of the bill by regulating interstate
air transportation. This provision represents
simply a codification of existing law and
leaves unimpaired the states' authority over
intrastate matters.”
The “relating to” language that Congress
eventually enacted came from the House
version of the bill. But in its Committee
Report, the House also made clear that the
preemption provision simply “provid[ed]

that when a carrier operates under authority
granted pursuant to title IV of the Federal
Aviation Act, no State may regulate that
carrier's routes, rates, or services.” This
understanding is more narrow than the
district court's conclusion. And, in fact, the
Senate's version did not even contain the
“relating to” language at all. The Senate
Report clarified that this section “prohibits
States from exercising economic regulatory
control over interstate airlines.” Finally, the
Conference Report adopted the House bill
and its explanation, which it described in
narrow terms. This history suggest that
Congress intended the preemption language
only to apply to state laws directly
“regulating rates, routes, or services.” The
district court's broad reading of the statute's
language simply finds no support in the
legislative history.
Conclusion
Nothing in the ADA's language, history, or
subsequent regulatory scaffolding suggests
that Congress had a “clear and manifest
purpose” to displace State common law
contract claims that do not affect
deregulation in more than a “peripheral ...
manner.” We conclude that a claim for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing is not preempted by the
ADA.
Accordingly, we REVERSE and REMAND
to the district court to reconsider the merits
of plaintiff's claim.
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“Supreme Court to Hear Case of Disgruntled Frequent Flyer”
Reuters
Lawrence Hurley
May 20, 2013
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed on Monday
to weigh whether federal law prevented a
customer from suing an airline for kicking
him out of its frequent flyer program for
allegedly complaining too frequently about
the service.
Rabbi
Binyomin
Ginsberg
sued
Northwest Airlines Corp, which ceased
operations in 2010 after merging with Delta
Air Lines Inc, for breach of contract after
the airline said he had abused the program.
Ginsberg, who is from Minnesota, said he
and his wife were thrown out in 2008 for
filing too many service complaints.
He said the airline told him it took action in
part because he
allegedly sought
compensation after booking reservations on
full flights, knowing he would be bumped to
another flight.
Ginsberg said his complaints involved only
a small proportion of the flights he took on
Northwest and were limited to such issues as
long waits for luggage and not being

notified
about
flight
cancellations.
Northwest said he filed 24 complaints.
A federal judge in California dismissed
Ginsberg's lawsuit, which he filed as a
possible class action on behalf of others who
might have been treated the same way. The
judge said Ginsberg's claims were
foreclosed because of a federal aviation law,
the Airline Deregulation Act. The law says
states cannot pass laws that address price,
route or service of an air carrier.
The San Francisco-based 9th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals disagreed with the judge,
reviving the lawsuit on the basis that
Ginsberg's contractual claim based on
Minnesota state law was not related to the
price, route or service.
At least four of the nine justices must agree
to hear a case before the Supreme Court will
accept it. Oral arguments and a ruling are
due in the court's next term, which starts in
October and ends in June 2014.
The case is Northwest v. Ginsberg, U.S.
Supreme Court, No. 12-462.
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“Supreme Court To Hear Case Of Frequent Flier Dropped For Complaining
Too Much”
International Business Times
Mark Johanson
May 20, 2013
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed Monday to
hear the case of Binyomin Ginsberg, the
rabbi who was allegedly kicked out of a
frequent-flier program for complaining too
much about the service. The court case
could potentially define what liberties
airlines have to set and enforce their own
policies under the Airline Deregulation Act.

Northwest pointed to a paragraph in the fine
print of its WorldPerks Program that said
abuse “may result in cancellation of the
member’s
account
and
future
disqualification from program participation,
forfeiture of all mileage accrued and
cancellation of previously issued but unused
awards.”

Ginsberg sued Northwest Airlines for a
breach of contract after the carrier, which
was absorbed by Delta Air Lines in a 2008
merger, said he had abused his privileges by
repeatedly filing complaints for upgrades
and
other
benefits.
According
to
Northwest’s written arguments, the carrier
revoked Ginsberg’s membership in the
WorldPerks Platinum Elite program in June
2008 after he had complained 24 times in
eight months about the carrier’s service.

Ginsberg is dean of Torah Academy in
Minneapolis and claims he travels as much
as 75 times per year for lectures. He joined
Northwest’s WorldPerks program in 1999
and reached Platinum Elite status in 2005,
three years before the troubles began. His
lawyers said the complaints to Northwest’s
customer care that year amounted to just 10
percent of his trips. After he was dropped
“without cause” and lost his unused miles,
Ginsberg filed a federal class-action lawsuit
in 2009 (on behalf of others who might have
been treated in the same way) seeking $5
million.

“You have continually asked for
compensation over and above our
guidelines,” Northwest said in a letter sent to
Ginsberg, according to court papers. “We
have awarded you $1,925 in travel credit
vouchers, 78,500 WorldPerks bonus miles, a
voucher extension for your son, and $491 in
cash reimbursements. Due to our past
generosity, we must respectfully advise that
we will no longer be awarding you
compensation each time you contact us.”

"Rabbi Ginsberg appealed solely with
respect to the claim for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing,"
Ginsberg's written argument alleged.
Northwest has countered that the Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978 prevents any
lawsuit governing “price, route or service of
an air carrier.” After a U.S. District Court
dismissed Ginsberg’s case, the Ninth U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals reinstated it. Now,
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Northwest wants the Supreme Court to
define how much freedom airlines have to
set their own policies under the 1978
act. The case -- Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg

(12-462) -- will make its way to the
Supreme Court in the fall term, which
begins this October.
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“Supreme Court to Hear Frequent-Flier Complaint”
CNN
Bill Mears
May 20, 2013
The Supreme Court will hear the case of a
frequent flier labeled a frequent complainer
by one airline.
Rabbi Binyomin Ginsberg claims his
WorldPerks Platinum Elite membership was
revoked after being told he had "abused" his
privileges, repeatedly filing complaints for
upgrades and other benefits.
Northwest Airlines, which was consumed by
Delta Air Lines in a 2008 merger, said it had
"sole judgment" over the program's general
terms and conditions to make such
determinations.
At issue is whether Ginsberg has a right
under state law to bring his case or whether
it is preempted by the 1970s-era law that
deregulated the airline industry.
That law prohibits parties from bringing
similar state claims against airlines relating
to a "price, route, or service" of the carrier.
Ginsberg is dean of Torah Academy in
Minneapolis and travels frequently to lecture
and teach.
He joined Northwest's WorldPerks frequent
flier program in 1999 and reached Platinum
Elite status in 2005.
But in June of 2008, Ginsberg claimed a
Northwest representative called him and told
him his status was being revoked on grounds

that he "abused" the program, according to
court papers.
Ginsberg said the airline also took away the
hundreds of thousands of miles accumulated
in his account.
"It didn't make sense. Initially, when they
contacted me on the phone I thought it was a
prank call," Ginsberg told CNN. "When I
pushed for a reason and clarification, they
told me it was because I was complaining
too much."
A month after that call, Northwest sent the
rabbi a letter noting that he had made 24
complaints in the past eight months,
including nine incidents of his bag arriving
late at the luggage carousel, according to
court papers.
"You
have
continually asked
for
compensation over and above our
guidelines. We have awarded you $1,925 in
travel credit vouchers, 78,500 WorldPerks
bonus miles, a voucher extension for your
son, and $491 in cash reimbursements," the
letter said, according to court papers.
"Due to our past generosity, we must
respectfully advise that we will no longer be
awarding you compensation each time you
contact us."
Ginsberg's lawyers countered the rabbi and
his wife had been averaging about 75 flights
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on Northwest each year, and that Ginsberg
estimated that only about 10 percent of the
trips had resulted in a call to Northwest's
customer care.
"I don't think I was a frequent complainer,"
Ginsberg said. "They should have taken
their time and analyzed: Were my
complaints legitimate? Should they be doing
something to improve their service and
quality of product? Instead of worrying,
we've got to shut up somebody who is
complaining too much."
Later that fall, Northwest sent Ginsberg an
e-mail, in which the airline quoted a
paragraph from the fine print of the
WorldPerks Program.
It stated that Northwest could determine "in
its sole judgment" whether a passenger has
abused the program, and that abuse "may
result in cancellation of the member's
account and future disqualification from
program participation, forfeiture of all
mileage accrued and cancellation of
previously issued but unused awards."
Ginsberg sued for $5 million over a breach
of contract in January 2009, but a federal
judge in San Diego dismissed the class
action suit, agreeing with Northwest that the
Airline Deregulation Act preempted his
claim.

The airline's lawyers also argued that the
WorldPerks general terms and conditions
did not require Northwest to provide
frequent fliers with lengthy explanations or
reasons for its decision to terminate or
demote a member's status in the program.
But in 2011, a federal appeals court in San
Francisco reversed, ordered it to reconsider
Ginsberg's class action claims. It said that
when Congress passed the deregulation law,
it did not intend to "immunize the airline
industry from liability for common law
contract claims."
There was no immediate comment from
Delta to the high court accepting its appeal.
Ginsberg -- who is still a frequent flier, but
is no longer loyal to any one airline -- said
he is hoping to get his miles back, have his
status reinstated, and get fair compensation
for what he's gone through.
"To me, it's outright fraud. You can't take
somebody's mileage away when they've
accumulated it," he said. "We live in a
country that was built on freedom and this to
me is a tremendous abuse of freedom."
The case is Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg (12462).
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Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice*
12-79
Ruling Below: Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503 (5th Cir. 2012), cert granted, 133 S.Ct. 977
(2013).
Investors brought two class actions in Louisiana court against investment company and others,
asserting contract and other claims arising from alleged Ponzi scheme. Actions were removed to
federal court and transferred by Multi–District Litigation (MDL) Panel to the Northern District
of Texas. Latin American investors brought separate class actions against Antiguan bank's
insurance brokers and Antiguan bank's attorneys under Texas law, asserting claims for, inter alia,
violations of Texas Securities Act, arising from same alleged scheme. The United States District
Court for the Northern District of Texas denied Louisiana investors' motion to remand to state
court and dismissed their actions, and dismissed Latin American investors' actions. Louisiana
and Latin American investors appealed, and appeals were consolidated. The Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded.
Question Presented: (1) Whether the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA)
precludes a state-law class action alleging a scheme of fraud that involves misrepresentations
about transactions in SLUSA-covered securities; (2) whether SLUSA precludes class actions
asserting that defendants aided and abetted SLUSA-covered securities fraud when the defendants
themselves did not make misrepresentations about the purchase or sale of SLUSA-covered
securities; and (3) whether a covered state law class action complaint that unquestionably alleges
“a” misrepresentation “in connection with” the purchase or sale of a security covered by the
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act nonetheless can escape the application of SLUSA
by including other allegations that are farther removed from a covered securities transaction.
*Consolidated with Willis of Colorado Inc. v. Troice and Proskauer Rose LLP v. Troice

James ROLAND; Michael J. Giambrone; Thomas E. Bowden, Individually and on Behalf
of Thomas E. Bowden S.E.P. I.R.A.; T.E. Bowden, Sr., Ret. Trust; G. Kendall Forbes,
Individually and on Behalf of G. Kendall Forbes I.R.A.; et al., Plaintiffs–Appellants,
v.
Jason GREEN; Charles Jantzi; Tiffany Angelle; James Fontenot; Thomas Newland; Grady
Layfield; Hank Mills; John Schwab; Russ Newton; Jim Weller; SEI Investments
Company; Certain Underwriters at Lloyds London, in Syndicates 2987, 1866, 1084, 1274,
4000 & 1183; et al., Defendants–Appellees.
Leah Farr; et al., Plaintiffs–Appellants,
v.
Jason Green; Dirk Harris; Timothy E. Parsons; Charles Jantzi; Tiffany Angelle; Grady
Layfield; Hank Mills; John Schwab; Russ Newton; Jim Weller; SEI Investments
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Company; Certain Underwriters at Lloyds London, in Syndicates 2987, 1866, 1084, 1274,
4000 & 1183; et al., Defendants–Appellees.
Samuel Troice; Horacio Mendez; Annalisa Mendez; Punga Punga Financial, Limited,
individually and on behalf of a class of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs–Appellants,
v.
Proskauer Rose, L.L.P.; Thomas V. Sjoblom; P. Mauricio Alvarado; Chadbourne and
Parke, L.L.P., Defendants–Appellees.
Samuel Troice; Martha Diaz; Paula Gilly–Flores; Punga Punga Financial, Limited,
Individually and on behalf of a class of all others similarly situated; Promotora Villa
Marino, CA; Daniel Gomez Ferreiro; Manuel Canabal, Plaintiffs–Appellants,
v.
Willis of Colorado Incorporated; Willis Group Holdings Limited; Amy S. Baranoucky;
Robert S. Winter; Bowen, Miclette & Britt, Incorporated; Willis Limited, Defendants–
Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
Decided on March 19, 2012
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
PRADO, Circuit Judge
This consolidated appeal arises out of an
alleged multi-billion dollar Ponzi scheme
perpetrated by R. Allen Stanford through his
various corporate entities. These three cases
deal with the scope of the preclusion
provision of the Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act (“SLUSA”). That
provision states: “No covered class action
based upon the statutory or common law of
any State or subdivision thereof may be
maintained in any State or Federal court by
any
private
party
alleging
a
misrepresentation or omission of a material
fact in connection with the purchase or sale
of a covered security.” All three cases seek
to use state class-action devices to attempt to
recover damages for losses resulting from
the Stanford Ponzi scheme. Because we find
that the purchase or sale of securities (or
representations about the purchase or sale of
securities) is only tangentially related to the
fraudulent schemes alleged by the

Appellants, we hold that SLUSA does not
preclude the Appellants from using state
class actions to pursue their recovery and
REVERSE.
I
A
In 1995, because of “perceived abuses of the
class-action vehicle in litigation involving
nationally traded securities,” Congress
passed the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act (“PSLRA”). “Its provisions
limit recoverable damages and attorney's
fees, provide a ‘safe harbor’ for forwardlooking statements, impose new restrictions
on the selection of (and compensation
awarded to) lead plaintiffs, mandate
imposition of sanctions for frivolous
litigation, and authorize a stay of discovery
pending resolution of any motion to
dismiss.” These reforms were enacted to
combat the “rampant” “nuisance filings,
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targeting of deep-pocket defendants,
vexatious
discovery
requests,”
and
manipulation of clients by class counsel in
securities litigation. Perhaps the most
consequential reform, however, was that the
PSLRA “impose[d] heightened pleading
requirements in actions brought pursuant to
§ 10(b) [of the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934] and Rule 10b–5.”

security.” To effectuate this, SLUSA
mandates: “Any covered class action
brought in any State court involving a
covered security ... shall be removable to the
Federal district court for the district in which
the action is pending” and subject to
dismissal.

The reforms had their intended effect, “[b]ut
the effort also had an unintended
consequence: It prompted at least some
members of the plaintiffs' bar to avoid the
federal forum altogether.” “[R]ather than
confronting the restrictive conditions set
forth by the PSLRA, plaintiffs began filing
class-action securities lawsuits under state
law, often in state court.” “To stem this
shift from Federal to State courts and
prevent certain State private securities class
action lawsuits alleging fraud from being
used to frustrate the objectives of the
[PSLRA], Congress enacted SLUSA.”

In February 2009, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) brought suit
against the Stanford Group Company, along
with various other Stanford corporate
entities, including the Antigua-based
Stanford International Bank (“SIB”), for
allegedly perpetrating a massive Ponzi
scheme.

“The stated purpose of SLUSA is ‘to
prevent certain State private securities class
action lawsuits alleging fraud from being
used to frustrate the objectives' of the
PSLRA ... [by advancing] ‘the congressional
preference for national standards for
securities class action lawsuits involving
nationally traded securities.’ Specifically,
the “core provision,” provides that “[n]o
covered class action based upon the
statutory or common law of any State or
subdivision thereof may be maintained in
any State or Federal court by any private
party alleging a misrepresentation or
omission of a material fact in connection
with the purchase or sale of a covered

B

According to the SEC, the companies' core
objective was to sell certificates of deposit
(“CDs”) issued by SIB. Stanford achieved
and maintained a high volume of CD sales
by promising above-market returns and
falsely assuring investors that the CDs were
backed by safe, liquid investments. For
almost 15 years, SIB represented that it
consistently earned high returns on its
investment of CD sales proceeds .... In fact,
however, SIB had to use new CD sales
proceeds to make interest and redemption
payments on pre-existing CDs, because it
did not have sufficient assets, reserves and
investments to cover its liabilities.
... At the SEC's request, the district court
issued a temporary order restraining the
payment or expenditure of funds belonging
to the Stanford parties. The district court
also appointed [a] Receiver for the Stanford
interests and granted him the power to
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conserve, hold, manage, and preserve the
value of the receivership estate.

Two groups of Louisiana investors,
represented by the same counsel, filed
separate lawsuits in the 19th Judicial District
Court, East Baton Rouge Parish on August
19, 2009—Roland v. Green and Farr v.
Green. In those actions, each set of plaintiffs
sued the SEI Investments Company (“SEI”),
the Stanford Trust Company (the “Trust”),
the Trust's employees, and the Trust's
investment advisors (collectively, the “SEI
Defendants”) for their alleged role in the
Stanford Ponzi scheme. The plaintiffs
alleged violations of Louisiana law
including breach of contract, negligent
representation, breach of fiduciary duty,
unfair trade practices, and violations of the
Louisiana Securities Act.

using their IRA funds to invest in the CDs.
Specifically, the plaintiffs allege that the SEI
Defendants represented to them that the CDs
were a good investment because (1) they
could be “readily liquidated”; (2) SEI had
evaluated SIB as being “competent and
proficient”; (3) SIB “employed a sizeable
team of skilled and experienced analysts to
monitor and manage [its] portfolio”; (4)
“independent” auditors “verified” the value
of SIB's assets; (5) the SEI Defendants had
“knowledge” about the companies that SIB
invested in and that those companies were
adequately capitalized; (6) the Antiguan
government regularly “examined” SIB; (7)
the CDs were a “safe investment vehicle
suitable for long term investment with little
or no risk”; (8) SIB had “retained legal
counsel” that ensured that the investments
were structured so as to comply with state
and federal law; (9) the CDs would produce
“consistent, double-digit returns”; and (10)
SIB's assets were “invested in a welldiversified portfolio of highly marketable
securities issued by stable national
governments,
strong
multinational
companies, and major international banks.”

The plaintiffs in the Roland and Farr actions
(the “Roland Plaintiffs”) allege that SIB sold
CDs to the Trust (located in Baton Rouge,
Louisiana), which in turn served as the
custodian for all individual retirement
account (“IRA”) purchases of CDs.
According to the plaintiffs, the Trust
contracted with SEI to have SEI be the
administrator of the Trust, thereby making
SEI responsible for reporting the value of
the
CDs. Plaintiffs
finally
allege
misrepresentations by SEI induced them into

The SEI Defendants sought removal to the
United States District Court for the Middle
District of Louisiana on the basis that
SLUSA precluded the state court from
entertaining the suits. The Multi–District
Litigation (“MDL”) Panel subsequently
transferred the case to the Northern District
of Texas (Judge Godbey) where the
separate Roland and Farr suits
were
consolidated. The Roland Plaintiffs then
filed a motion to remand their cases back to
the Louisiana state court.

Lastly, the district court in the SEC action
entered a case management order requiring
all lawsuits against SIB's service providers
or third parties to be filed as ancillary
proceedings to the SEC action.
1
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2
The Roland action has been consolidated on
appeal with two other actions. In these
cases, a group of Latin American investors
(the “Troice Plaintiffs”) brought two
separate class actions against, respectively,
SIB's insurance brokers (the “Willis
Defendants”) and SIB's lawyers (the
“Proskauer
Defendants”).
The Troice Plaintiffs brought claims under
Texas law—specifically, violations of the
Texas Securities Act, aiding and abetting
these violations, and civil conspiracy.
Similar
to
the Roland Plaintiffs,
the Troice Plaintiffs allege that the Willis
Defendants represented to them that the CDs
were a good investment because (1) SIB was
based in the United States and “regulated by
the U.S. Government”; (2) SIB was “insured
by Lloyd's”; (3) SIB was “regulated by the
Antiguan banking regulatory commission”;
(4) SIB was “subjected to regular stringent
risk management evaluations” conducted by
“an outside audit firm”; (5) the CDs were
safe and secure; (6) SIB's portfolio produced
“consistent, double-digit returns”; (7) the
CDs' “high return rates ... greatly exceed
those offered by commercial banks in the
United States”; and (8) SIB's assets were
“invested in a well-diversified portfolio of
highly marketable securities issued by stable
national governments, strong multinational
companies, and major international banks.”
The Troice Plaintiffs only alleged aiding and
abetting violations of the Texas Securities
Act and civil conspiracy against the
Proskauer Defendants. That is to say that
the Troice Plaintiffs did not allege that the
Proskauer
Defendants
made
any
(mis)representations to them.

The Troice Plaintiffs sued the Willis
Defendants and Proskauer Defendants in
separate suits in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Texas,
invoking that court's jurisdiction under the
Class Action Fairness Act. Both suits were
assigned to Judge Godbey pursuant to the
MDL order. The Willis and Proskauer
Defendants moved to dismiss the suits
pursuant to SLUSA.
C
Judge Godbey, due to the “multitude of
Stanford-related cases” pending before him
with similar issues, decided to “select one
case initially in which to address the
applicability of [SLUSA].” The case the
district court chose was Roland v. Green. On
August 31, 2010, the district court issued its
opinion on the applicability of SLUSA
preclusion to the Stanford litigation.
In that opinion, after briefly discussing the
history and purpose of SLUSA, the district
court turned to the central question of
“whether the plaintiff alleges the use of
misrepresentations, omission, or deceptive
devices ‘in connection with the purchase or
sale of a covered security.’ ” First, the
district court concluded that the SIB CDs
themselves were not “covered securities”
within the meaning of SLUSA because SIB
never registered the CDs, nor were they
traded on a national exchange….
Noting that the Supreme Court has urged a “
‘broad interpretation[ ]’ of the ‘in
connection with’ [requirement] ... in order to
further the PSLRA's goals,” the district court
stated that “the strength of the nexus
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between an allegedly fraudulent scheme and
the securities transactions serves as the
primary thread tying the caselaw together.”
Given the “melange” of other circuit courts'
formulations of the test to determine what
connection between a fraud and transactions
in covered securities is required for SLUSA
preclusion to apply and the “apparent
absence of controlling Fifth Circuit
authority,” the district court decided to
employ the Eleventh Circuit's approach
from Instituto De Prevision Militar v.
Merrill Lynch (“IPM”).
Applying the Eleventh Circuit's test, the
district court found that the Roland Plaintiffs
had alleged two distinct factual bases
connecting the fraud to transactions in
covered securities. First, the district court
found that “[t]he [Roland] Plaintiffs'
purchases of SIB CDs were ‘induced’ by the
misrepresentation that SIB invested in a
portfolio
including
SLUSA-covered
securities.” It noted that the CDs'
promotional material touted that the bank's
portfolio of assets was invested in “highly
marketable securities issued by stable
governments,
strong
multinational
companies and major international banks.”
The district court also found that the
purported investment of the bank's portfolio
in SLUSA-covered securities gave its CDs
certain qualities that induced Plaintiffs'
purchases. The instruments were labeled
CDs “to create the impression ... that the
SIB CDs had the same degree of risk as
certificates of deposit issued by commercial
banks regulated by the FDIC and Federal
Reserve.” However, they were advertised to
function “[l]ike well-performing equities”
by offering “liquidity combined with the

potential for high investment returns.” This
was supposedly made possible by “the
consistent, double-digit returns on the bank's
investment portfolio,” which stemmed, in
part, from the presence of SLUSA-covered
securities. The Roland Plaintiffs allege in
their petition that had they “been aware of
the truth” that SIB's “portfolio consisted
primarily of illiquid investments or no
investments at all,” they “would not have
purchased the SIB CDs.” The district court
therefore found that the Roland Plaintiffs
sufficiently alleged that their “CD purchases
were induced by a belief that the SIB CDs
were backed in part by investments in
SLUSA-covered securities.”
Additionally, the district court found
the Roland Plaintiffs'
“allegations
...
reasonably imply that the Stanford scheme
coincided with and depended upon the
[Roland] Plaintiffs' sale of SLUSA-covered
securities to finance SIB CD purchases.” It
noted that the Roland Plaintiffs claim that
the fraud was a scheme targeting recent
retirees who were urged to roll the funds in
their retirement account into an IRA
administered by SEI, of which the Trust was
the custodian and which was fully invested
in the CDs. The district court noted that
“retirement funds come in a variety of forms
that might not all involve SLUSA-covered
securities,” but that “stocks, bonds, mutual
funds, and other SLUSA-covered securities
commonly comprise
IRA
investment
portfolios.” From this, the court stated “that
at least one of the [Roland] Plaintiffs
acquired SIB CDs with the proceeds of
selling SLUSA-covered securities in their
IRA portfolios,” and therefore, this “modest
finding” independently supported the district
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court's ruling that the Roland Plaintiffs'
claims were precluded by SLUSA.
Accordingly, the district court denied
the Roland Plaintiffs' motion for remand and
dismissed the action pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §
78bb(f)(1)(A).
In a separate order, the district court
considered the Willis Defendants' and the
Proskauer Defendants' motions to dismiss.
Stating “[b]ecause [the Troice] Plaintiffs
bring class claims ‘based upon the statutory
or common law of’ Texas and ‘alleging ... a
misrepresentation or omission of a material
fact in connection with the purchase or sale
of a covered security,’ ” the discussion in
the district court's order in Roland v.
Green compels the finding that SLUSA
precludes the Troice Plaintiffs' action, and
therefore it must be dismissed.
The Roland and Troice Plaintiffs
timely
appealed their dismissals, which this court
consolidated for the purposes of oral
argument and disposition.
II
The Roland case is before us from a denial
of a motion to remand, and the Troice cases
are before us on motions to dismiss. On each
procedural posture, our review is the same—
de novo.
III
A
Though the question of the scope of the “in
connection with” language under SLUSA is
one of first impression in this circuit, we do
not write on a blank slate. The Supreme
Court directly addressed the issue of what

constitutes “in connection with the purchase
or sale of a covered security” in Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Dabit. In that case, a former broker joined
with customers of Merrill Lynch in a class
action against the firm for breaches of
fiduciary duty and contract, alleging that
Merrill Lynch had issued biased research
and investment recommendations. These
misrepresentations, according to Dabit's
complaint, harmed the class members in two
ways. First, as to the customers, the
misrepresentations allegedly “caused them
to hold onto overvalued securities.” Second,
as to the brokers, the misrepresentations
allegedly caused them to “los[e] commission
fees when their clients, now aware that they
had made poor investments, took their
business elsewhere.” The district court
dismissed all of the claims based on
SLUSA. The Second Circuit affirmed as to
the claims of buyers and sellers, but said
SLUSA did not preclude the claims of
“holders,” those who had not purchased or
sold a security but suffered merely by
retaining or “holding” their existing shares
in reliance on Merrill Lynch's allegedly
fraudulent research. The central question
in Dabit, therefore, was whether the holders'
claims were precluded given SLUSA's
requirement that a fraud alleged be “in
connection with the purchase or sale of a
covered security.”
After discussing the purposes of Section
10(b) and the history of Rule 10b–5
litigation, the Court noted that the reason it
had barred holders from asserting a private
right of action under Rule 10b–5 in Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores was
“policy considerations,” including the
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special danger that “ ‘vexatious[ ] ...
litigation’ ” posed in the realm of
securities. The same policy considerations
that led to that limitation on Rule 10b–5's
private right of action, motivated Congress
in its passage of the PSRLA and SLUSA. In
using the “in connection with” language that
had been the focus of so much litigation in
the Rule 10b–5 context, the Court found that
“Congress can hardly have been unaware of
the broad construction adopted by both this
Court and the SEC.” It also found that by
using the exact same language—“in
connection with the purchase or sale of
[covered] securities”—Congress intended to
incorporate the judicial interpretations given
to that phrase into SLUSA as well.
Since Congress intended “in connection
with” to mean the same thing in SLUSA as
it does in Section 10(b), “it is enough that
the fraud alleged ‘coincide’ with a securities
transaction—whether by the plaintiff or by
someone else. The requisite showing, in
other words, is ‘deception “in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security,”
not deception of an identifiable purchaser or
seller.’ ” From these principles, the Court
held that SLUSA precludes state-law holder
class actions like Dabit's.
B
Since Dabit, six of our sister circuit courts
have tried to give dimension to the
“coincide” requirement announced in SEC v.
Zandford and brought into the SLUSA
scheme in Dabit. Romano v. Kazacos; Segal
v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A.; Madden v. Cowen
& Co.; Instituto De Prevision Militar v.
Merrill Lynch; Siepel v. Bank of Am.,

N.A.; Gavin v. AT&T Corp. To be sure, we
are only bound by decisions of the Supreme
Court, which has stated that “in connection
with” must be interpreted broadly. But the
test it has offered—whether or not “the
fraud alleged ‘coincide[s]’ with a securities
transaction,”—is
not
particularly
descriptive. Moreover, when the Court first
set forth the “coincide” requirement, it
cautioned that “the statute must not be
construed so broadly as to convert every
common-law
fraud
that happens
to
involve [covered] securities into a violation
of § 10(b).” In light of this tension,
consideration of how our sister circuits have
construed and applied this “coincide”
requirement is helpful in deciding how best
to approach our present case.
In our consideration, we find most
persuasive the decisions from the Second,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits. The
cases from the other circuits do not attempt
to define the “coincide” requirement, but
merely discuss what connection above and
beyond “coincide” is sufficient. For
example, in Segal, the Sixth Circuit noted
that fraud allegations that “depend on”
transactions in covered securities meet the
“coincide” requirement, but it does not state
that for a fraud to “coincide” requires that
the fraud “depend on” transactions in
covered securities. It narrowly holds that
where fraud depends on transactions in
covered securities, the fraud will also
coincide with transactions in covered
securities.
The Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits
have, however, attempted to give dimension
to
what
is
sufficiently
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connected/coincidental to a transaction in
covered securities to trigger SLUSA
preclusion. The Eleventh Circuit in Instituto
De
Prevision
Militar
v.
Merrill
Lynch(“IPM”) dealt with claims brought by
a Guatemalan government agency that
administered a pension fund for Guatemalan
military veterans, which invested in Pension
Fund of America (“PFA”), and other Latin
American PFA investors against Merrill
Lynch. According to their complaint, Merrill
Lynch “actively promot [ed] PFA and
vouch[ed] for the character of PFA's
principals.” After determining that the class
met SLUSA's definition of a “covered class
action,” the Eleventh Circuit turned to the
“coincide” requirement. It held that
requirement met if either “fraud ... induced
[plaintiffs] to invest with [the defendant(s)]”
or “a fraudulent scheme ... coincided and
depended upon the purchase or sale of
[covered] securities.” The court found that
“IPM is complaining about fraud that
induced it to invest with PFA, which means
that its claims are ‘in connection with the
purchase or sale’ of a security under
SLUSA.”
The Ninth Circuit articulated its test for the
“coincide” requirement slightly differently
in its Madden v. Cowen & Co. opinion. That
case involved shareholders of two medical
care providers that were looking to merge
with a larger company. In attempting to
merge these two medical care providers, the
shareholders retained an investment bank,
Cowen, “to look for prospective buyers, give
advice regarding the structure of any
potential sale, and render a fairness opinion
regarding any proposed transaction.” Two
suitors stepped up—one closely-held

corporation and another publicly-traded
company. Cowen recommended to the
shareholders that they accept the bid from
the publicly-traded company. After the
merger was complete, the stock price of the
publicly-traded company tumbled. The
shareholders then brought suit against
Cowen for “negligent misrepresentation and
professional negligence under California
law.” Based on Dabit's statement that “in
connection with” must be interpreted the
same way under SLUSA as it is under
Section 10(b), the Ninth Circuit looked to its
prior precedent and held fraud is “ ‘in
connection with’ the purchase or sale of
securities if there is ‘a relationship in which
the fraud and the stock sale coincide or are
more than tangentially related.’ ” Applying
the “more than tangentially related” test,
the court found that “the misrepresentations
and omissions alleged in the complaint are
more than tangentially related to [the
shareholders'] purchase of the [publiclytraded company's] securities.”
The most recent circuit to consider the scope
of the “coincide” requirement postDabit was the Second Circuit in Romano v.
Kazacos.
Romano dealt
with
two
consolidated cases—one brought by Xerox
retirees and one by Kodak retirees—alleging
that Morgan Stanley “misrepresented that if
appellants were to retire early, their
investment savings would be sufficient to
support them through retirement.” Based on
these alleged misrepresentations, the retirees
“deposited their retirement savings into
Morgan Stanley IRA accounts, where
covered securities were purchased on their
behalf.” In discussing the “coincide”
requirement, the Second Circuit stated that
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“SLUSA's ‘in connection with’ standard is
met where plaintiff's claims turn on injuries
caused by acting on misleading investment
advice—that is, where plaintiff's claims
necessarily allege, necessarily involve, or
rest on the purchase or sale of securities ....
[Additionally,] the more exacting induced
standard satisfies § 10(b)'s ‘in connection
with’ requirement.”
Each of the circuits that has tried to
contextualize the “coincide” requirement has
come up with a slightly different articulation
of the requisite connection between the
fraud alleged and the purchase or sale of
securities (or representations about the
purchase or sale of securities. Beyond these
various interpretations, we also think it
useful before our standard to consider cases
more factually analogous to ours
than Dabit and much of its progeny. That is,
cases where the fraud alleged was centered
around the purchase or sale of an uncovered
security, like the CDs at issue in this appeal.
C
The preclusion analysis under SLUSA is
slightly more complex in cases where the
fraudulent scheme alleged involves a multilayered transaction, like the one at issue in
our case. In these cases, the plaintiffs often
are fraudulently induced into investing in
some kind of uncovered security, like a CD
or a share in a “feeder fund,” which has
some relationship either through the
financial product's management company or
through the financial product itself to
transactions (real or purported) in covered
securities, such as stocks. Some of the more
analogous cases arise out of the slew of

recent suits stemming from the Bernie
Madoff Ponzi scheme, especially the socalled “feeder fund” cases. From our reading
of these uncovered securities cases, we
glean three approaches: (1) focus the
analysis on whether the financial product
purchased was a covered security (the
“product approach”); (2) focus on the
“separation” between the investment in the
financial product and the subsequent
transactions (real or purported) in covered
securities (the “separation approach”); and
(3) focus on the “purpose(s)” of the
investment (the “purposes approach”).
1
Courts that take the product approach focus
their analysis on the type of financial
product upon which the alleged fraudulent
scheme centers. In doing so, the crux of the
analysis is not whether or not the “coincide”
requirement of SLUSA is met, but rather
whether the financial product qualifies as a
“covered security” under 15 U.S.C. §
78bb(f)(5)(E). In Ring v. AXA Financial,
Inc., the Second Circuit held that claims of
fraud relating to the sale of an interest in a
term life insurance policy, a Children's Term
Rider (“CTR”) (a “classic insurance
product” and an uncovered security) were
not SLUSA-precluded merely because the
insurance company held covered securities
in its portfolio, which in turn backed the
plaintiffs' interest in the CTR. It likewise
found the fact that the CTR was attached to
a variable life insurance policy, which is a
covered security under SLUSA, was
insufficient to preclude all claims relating to
the CTR because “the CTR and the policy to
which it is appended must be considered
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separately.” Similarly, in Brehm v. Capital
Growth Financial, the district court held that
“private placement securities or debentures”
were not covered securities. Moreover, it
found that allegations that the defendants
were also going to invest in “securities and
other intangible instruments that are traded
in the public markets or issued privately”
were insufficient to bring the case within
SLUSA's preclusive ambit.
The most-cited case using this approach
is Pension Committee of the University of
Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of America
Securities, LLC. That case was an “action to
recover losses stemming from the
liquidation of two British Virgin Islands
based hedge funds ... in which [the
plaintiffs]
held
shares.” The Montreal
Pension court
held,
“Because
plaintiffs purchased shares in hedge funds,
rather than covered securities, SLUSA does
not preempt plaintiffs' state-law claims.” It
went on to discuss Dabit and distinguished it
by stating,
The interpretation of SLUSA urged by
the [Defendants] stretches the statute
beyond its plain meaning. There are no
grounds
on
which
to
justify
applying Dabit to statements made by
the [Defendants] concerning uncovered
hedge funds—even when a portion of the
assets in those funds include covered
securities. This outcome is required
because the alleged fraud relates to those
hedge funds rather than to the covered
securities in the portfolios.
Lastly, using some language more
characteristic of the purpose and separation
approaches, the court also distinguished its
case from the Madoff feeder fund cases

where SLUSA preclusion was found. It
noted that the feeder funds in those cases
were “nothing but ghost entities—easily
pierced,” and that those funds essentially
“did not exist and had no assets. Thus,” it
found, the plaintiffs in those cases “could
claim that they deposited their money [in the
funds] for the purpose of purchasing covered
securities.” None of those conditions were
present in the funds purchased by the
plaintiffs; therefore, it concluded, “covered
securities are not ‘at the heart’ of this case.”
2
The separation approach considers the
degree of separation between the fraud
inducing the plaintiffs to buy the uncovered
securities and the downstream transactions
in covered securities. This focus is
somewhat like Montreal Pension's concern
about what is at the “heart” of the case. The
most cited case using the separation
approach is Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich
Ltd. (Anwar II). Anwar II dealt with a feeder
fund to invest in Madoff's funds. The
district court in Anwar II, however, found
distinct differences in how the funds at issue
in that case operated and the usual way
Madoff feeder funds operated. Finding that
the funds at issue were “not ... cursory, passthrough entit[ies],” the Anwar IIcourt held
that “[t]hough the [c]ourt must broadly
construe SLUSA's ‘in connection with’
phrasing, stretching SLUSA to cover this
chain of investment—from [p]laintiffs'
initial investment in the [f]unds, the [f]unds'
reinvestment with Madoff, Madoff's
supposed purchases of covered securities, to
Madoff's sale of those securities and
purchases of Treasury bills—snaps even the
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most flexible rubber band.” Therefore, the
court found that the “coincide” requirement
was not met because “[t]he allegations in
[that] case present[ed] multiple layers of
separation between whatever phantom
securities Madoff purported to be
purchasing and the financial interests
[p]laintiffs actually purchased.”
3
The third and most widely adopted approach
is the purpose approach, which primarily
concerns itself with what the purpose of the
investment was. The clearest articulation of
this approach asks whether the uncovered
securities (feeder funds) “were created for
the purpose of investing in [covered]
securities.”
In ascertaining the purpose of the
investment, these courts have considered
what the fraud “at the heart of the case”
was. They have also looked to the centrality
of transactions in covered securities to the
fraud. Finally, some courts have considered
the “nature of the parties' relationship, and
whether it necessarily involved the purchase
or sale of securities.”
D
Given the Supreme Court's express reliance
on
“policy
considerations”
in
its
determination of the scope of the “in
connection with” language in Section
10(b), we find it useful to consider such
arguments in our formulation of the
standard. Specifically, we find persuasive
Congress's explicit concern about the
distinction between national, covered
securities and other, uncovered securities.

As we have stated previously, “SLUSA
advances ‘the congressional preference for
national standards for securities class action
lawsuits
involving nationally traded
securities.’ ” The rationale for this
preference is clear: Because
companies can not control where their
securities are traded after an initial
public offering ..., companies with
publicly-traded securities can not choose
to avoid jurisdictions which present
unreasonable litigation costs. Thus, a
single state can impose the risks and
costs of its peculiar litigation system on
all national issuers. The solution to this
problem is to make Federal court the
exclusive venue for most securities fraud
class
action
litigation
involving
nationally traded securities.
Such concerns are unique to the world of
national securities. That SLUSA would be
applied only to transactions involving
national securities appears to be Congress's
intent: “[T]he securities governed by this
bill—and it is important to emphasize this
point—are by definition trading on national
exchanges. As we all know, securities traded
on national exchanges are bought and sold
by investors in every State, and those
investors rely on information distributed on
a national basis.
Exempting non-national securities from
SLUSA's preclusive scope does not render
them unregulated. When enacting SLUSA,
Congress recognized the importance of
maintaining the vital role of state law in
regulating non-national securities. Congress
found “that in order to avoid ... thwarting ...
the purpose of the [PSLRA], national
standards for nationally traded securities
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must be enacted, while preserving the
appropriate enforcement powers of state
regulators, and the right of individuals to
bring suit.” Notably, state common law
breach of fiduciary duty actions provide an
important remedy not available under
federal law. In addition to fiduciary duty
actions, over-extension of SLUSA also
threatens state creditor-debtor regimes,
which we have held are likely available to
the Appellants. The differences between the
federal and state remedies have led our
colleagues on the Eleventh Circuit to note
that “[s]ince not every instance of financial
unfairness or breach of fiduciary duty will
constitute a fraudulent activity under § 10(b)
or Rule 10b–5, federal courts should be
wary of foreclosing common law breach of
fiduciary duty actions which supplement
existing federal or state statutes.” This
wariness is echoed by the members of
Congress appearing as amici on behalf of
the Appellants: “The interpretation of
SLUSA and the ‘in connection with’
requirement adopted by the District Court ...
could potentially subsume any consumer
claims involving the exchange of money or
alleging fraud against a bank, without regard
to the product that was being peddled.” As
they point out, every bank and almost every
company owns some covered securities in
its portfolio, and every debt instrument
issued by these banks and companies is
backed by this portfolio in the same way the
CDs here were ultimately backed by the
assets in SIB's portfolio. Precluding any
group claim against any such debt issue
merely because the issuer advertises that it
owns these assets in its portfolio would be a
major change in the scope of SLUSA.

IV
It is against this backdrop that we must go
about formulating our standard for judging
the connection of claims like the Appellants'
to the purchase or sale of covered securities.
As noted previously, there is tension in the
law between following the Supreme Court's
command that “in connection with” must be
interpreted
broadly, Zandford and
its
concurrent instruction that the same
language “must not be construed so broadly
as to convert every common-law fraud that
happens to involve [covered] securities into
a violation of § 10(b).”
The Eleventh Circuit's test from IPM,
employed by the district court, is a good
starting point because it identifies the two
different perspectives from which to
approach
the
question
of
connectivity. IPM held that the “coincide”
requirement is met if either “fraud
...induced [plaintiffs] to invest with [the
defendant(s)]” or “a fraudulent scheme ...
coincided and depended upon the purchase
or sale of [covered] securities.” The
“induced” prong examines the allegations
from the plaintiffs' perspective by asking
essentially whether the plaintiffs thought
they were investing in covered securities or
investing because of (representations about)
transactions in covered securities. The
“depended upon” prong views the
allegations from the opposite perspective,
the defendants', essentially asking whether
the defendants' fraudulent scheme would
have been successful without the
(representations about) transactions in
covered
securities.
These
two
perspectives—plaintiffs' and defendants'—
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are also seen in the various uncovered
securities cases in the district courts.
Viewing the allegations from the plaintiffs'
perspective, however, asks the wrong
question. By tying the “coincide”
requirement
to
“inducement,”
it
unnecessarily imports causation into a test
whose language (“coincide”) specifically
disclaims it. The defendant-oriented
perspective, like IPM's “depends upon”
prong, is more faithful to the Court's
statement that “[t]he requisite showing ... is
deception in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security, not deception of an
identifiable
purchaser
or
seller.”
Dabit's formulation focuses the analysis on
the relationship between the defendants'
fraud and the covered securities transaction
without regard to the fraud's effect on the
plaintiffs. Additionally, IPM's “depended
upon” prong appears very similar to the
Second Circuit's test from Romano, which
found SLUSA preclusion is appropriate
where “plaintiff's claims ‘necessarily
allege,’ ‘necessarily involve,’ or ‘rest on’ the
purchase or sale of securities.”
Though the defendant-oriented perspective
is the proper point of view from which to
consider the allegations, the problem we see
with the test from that perspective as
articulated by the Second and Eleventh
Circuits is that it is too stringent a standard.
Specifically, a reading of the opinions of the
Sixth and Eighth Circuits on SLUSA
preclusion suggests that those courts would
find the “depended upon” standard to be too
high
a
bar.
The
Sixth
Circuit
in Segal seemed to suggest that while a
claim that “depended on” a securities

transaction was sufficient, there were other
connections that would also meet the
“coincide”
requirement.
In Siepel, the
Eighth Circuit found that the “coincide”
requirement is less stringent than a standard
requiring the fraud “relate to” transactions in
covered securities.
In light of this, we find Ninth Circuit's test
from Madden, which
is
that
“a misrepresentation is ‘in connection with’
the purchase or sale of securities if there is a
relationship in which the fraud and the stock
sale coincide or are more than tangentially
related,” to be the best articulation of the
“coincide” requirement. This articulation
nicely deals with the Court-expressed
tension in Zandford that the requirement
“must not be construed so broadly as to
[encompass] every common-law fraud that
happens to involve [covered] securities.” It
also heeds the Seventh Circuit's advice that “
‘the “connection” requirement must be taken
seriously.’ ” Lastly, it incorporates the
significant policy and legislative intent
considerations, all of which militate against
an overbroad formulation. Therefore, we
adopt the Ninth Circuit's test. Accordingly,
if Appellants' allegations regarding the fraud
are more than tangentially related to (real or
purported) transactions in covered securities,
then they are properly removable and also
precluded.
V
Having established the standard by which
the Appellants' allegations will be judged,
we
turn
now
to
the Roland and
Troice complaints. “The plaintiff is ‘the
master of her complaint,’ and, as such, a
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determination that a cause of action presents
a federal question depends upon the
allegations of the plaintiff's well-pleaded
complaint.” The artful pleading doctrine is
an independent corollary to the well-pleaded
complaint rule: “[u]nder this principle, even
though the plaintiff has artfully avoided any
suggestion of a federal issue, removal is not
defeated by the plaintiff's pleading skills in
hiding [a] federal question.” We have stated
previously that the artful pleading doctrine
“applies only where state law is subject to
complete preemption.” However, as the
Second Circuit has noted, there is another
situation where the artful pleading doctrine
applies: “when Congress has ... expressly
provided for the removal of particular
actions asserting state law claims in state
court.”
Application of the first prong is a bit tricky
because SLUSA is a statute of preclusion,
rather than preemption. But its effect is the
same: where plaintiffs proceed as a class of
fifty or more, state law securities claims are
no longer available to them and federal law,
which compels the dismissal of those
claims, controls. Application of the second
prong is straightforward. Since SLUSA
expressly provides for the removal of
covered class actions, it falls under the
“removal” exception to the well-pleaded
complaint rule. Consequently, we are free to
look beyond the face of the amended
complaints to determine whether they allege
securities fraud in connection with the
purchase or sale of covered securities.
Because of the need to examine the
actualities of the alleged schemes, we find
the product approach taken by some district

courts, which focuses its analysis on the type
of financial product upon which the alleged
fraudulent scheme centers, to be too rigid.
Our conclusion, in accord with the district
court, that the CDs were uncovered
securities therefore does not end our inquiry.
We must instead closely examine the
schemes and purposes of the frauds alleged
by the Appellants.
A
With respect to the claims against the SEI
Defendants and the Willis Defendants, we
find the Appellants' allegations to be
substantially similar such that they can be
analyzed together.
1
The district court found that Appellants'
claims were precluded because Appellants
invested in the CDs, at least in part, because
they were backed by “covered securities.”
To be sure, the CDs' promotional material
touted that SIB's portfolio of assets was
invested in “highly marketable securities
issued by stable governments, strong
multinational
companies
and
major
international banks.” This is, however, but
one of a host of (mis)representations made
to the Appellants in an attempt to lure them
into buying the worthless CDs. Viewing the
allegations, as we must, from how the
advisors at SEI and Willis allegedly
structured their fraudulent scheme, we find
the references to SIB's portfolio being
backed by “covered securities” to be merely
tangentially related to the “heart,” “crux,” or
“gravamen” of the defendants' fraud.
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When we look over the complaints against
the SEI Defendants and the Willis
Defendants, we find that the heart, crux, and
gravamen of their allegedly fraudulent
scheme was representing to the Appellants
that the CDs were a “safe and secure”
investment that was preferable to other
investments for many reasons. For example,
as alleged by the Roland Plaintiffs, the CDs
were principally promoted as being
preferable to other investments because of
their liquidity, consistently high rates of
return, and the fact that SEI and other
regulators were keeping a watchful eye on
SIB. Similarly, the so-called “safety and
soundness letters” sent by the Willis
Defendants
focused
on
the
“professionalism” of SIB and the “stringent”
reviews. That the CDs were marketed with
some vague references to SIB's portfolio
containing instruments that might be
SLUSA-covered securities seems tangential
to the schemes advanced by the SEI and
Willis Defendants.
Our conclusion that the allegations do not
amount to being “in connection with”
transactions in covered securities is
bolstered by the distinction between the
present cases and the Madoff feeder fund
cases. Comparing the allegations in the
uncovered securities cases we surveyed, we
find the most similarity with the allegations
in the Montreal Pension case. The CDs, like
the uncovered hedge funds in Montreal
Pension, were not mere “ghost entities” or
“cursory pass-through vehicles” to invest in
covered securities. The CDs were debt
assets that promised a fixed rate of return
not tied to the success of any of SIB's
purported investments in the “highly

marketable securities issued by stable
national governments, strong multinational
companies, and major international banks.”
Unlike in the Madoff feeder fund cases,
“plaintiffs could [not] claim that they
deposited their money in the bank for the
purpose of purchasing covered securities.”
Finally, as was the case in Anwar II, there
are “multiple layers of separation” between
the CDs and any security purchased by SIB.
Therefore, we find that the fraudulent
schemes of the SEI Defendants and the
Willis Defendants, as alleged by the
Appellants, are not more than tangentially
related to the purchase or sale of covered
securities and are therefore not sufficiently
connected to such purchases or sales to
trigger SLUSA preclusion.
2
The district court also justified its decision
based on the fact that “at least one of the
[Roland] Plaintiffs acquired SIB CDs with
the proceeds of selling SLUSA-covered
securities in their IRA portfolios” and that
those transactions brought the action within
the ambit of SLUSA preclusion. While we
do not quarrel with the district court's
finding that some plaintiffs sold covered
securities to buy the CDs, we think that the
way the district court approached this
alleged connection was incorrect. The
appropriate inquiry under SLUSA is
whether the fraudulent scheme, as alleged
by the Appellants, was connected with a
transaction in a covered security. While the
fact that covered securities were in fact
traded as a part of the fraud is evidence of
the defendants' intent, it is not dispositive.
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Appellants argue that “[t]he source of funds
used to buy uncovered securities is
irrelevant.” In response, the defendants posit
that this cannot be the case in light of the
Supreme Court's decisions in Superintendent
of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty
Co. andZandford. In Bankers Life, the Court
dealt with a company president who
allegedly conspired to acquire the company's
stock using the company's assets and caused
the company to liquidate its bond portfolio
and to invest the proceeds in a worthless
certificate of deposit. The Court held that
the scheme was “in connection with” the
purchase or sale of securities such that suits
by defrauded investors of the company
could be maintained under Section
10(b). In Zandford, the Court found that
where a broker took over a customer's
portfolio to purportedly manage and invest
the assets but in fact, liquidated covered
securities in order to steal the customer's
funds, the fraud was “in connection with”
transactions in securities because “[t]he
securities sales and respondent's fraudulent
practices were not independent events” and
“each sale was made to further respondent's
fraudulent scheme.”
Based on our reading of the allegations in
the Appellants' complaints, the connection
between the fraud and sales of covered
securities is not met here. Unlike Bankers
Life and Zandford, where the entirety of the
fraud depended upon the tortfeasor
convincing the victims of those fraudulent
schemes to sell their covered securities in
order for the fraud to be accomplished, the
allegations here are not so tied with the sale
of covered securities. To be sure, it was
necessary for fraud for the defendants to

have the Appellants invest their assets into
the CDs, but based on the allegations, there
is
no
similar
focus
to Bankers
Life and Zandford on the sale of covered
securities. Therefore, we find that the fact
that some of the plaintiffs sold some
“covered securities” in order to put their
money in the CDs was not more than
tangentially related to the fraudulent scheme
and accordingly, provides no basis for
SLUSA preclusion.
B
We view the claims against the Proskauer
Defendants as different from those alleged
against the other defendants. Unlike the
claims against the SEI Defendants and the
Willis Defendants, the Troice Plaintiffs'
claims against the Proskauer Defendants are
solely for aiding and abetting the Stanford
Ponzi scheme. That is to say, the allegations
against the SEI and Willis Defendants
were, inter
alia, that
they
made
misrepresentations to the Appellants about
the liquidity, soundness, and safety of
investing
in
the
CDs
whereas
the Troice Plaintiffs do not allege that the
Proskauer
Defendants
made any misrepresentations to them. The
core allegation is that without the aid of the
Proskauer Defendants the Stanford Ponzi
could
not have
been
accomplished.
However, when we examine the substance
of the claims against the Proskauer
Defendants, it is clear that there are
misrepresentations involved.
Specifically, the Proskauer Defendants
allegedly misrepresented to the SEC the
Commission's ability to exercise its
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oversight over Stanford and SIB. By telling
the SEC that it could not investigate the
operations of Stanford and SIB, the
Proskauer Defendants obstructed any
chance of an SEC investigation uncovering
the fraud, thereby allowing it to continue
and harm the Troice Plaintiffs to occur.
These alleged misrepresentations were one
level removed from the misrepresentations
made by SIB or the SEI and Willis
Defendants. The connection that the
Proskauer Defendants would have us find is
that the misrepresentations to the SEC about
its regulatory authority allowed SIB to
recruit the Willis Defendants to sell CDs,
who
in
turn
misrepresented
to
the Troice Plaintiffs a host of things in order
to convince them that the CDs were good
investments, including vague references to

SIB's portfolio containing instruments that
might be SLUSA-covered securities. Like
with the SEI and Willis Defendants, the
misrepresentations made by the Proskauer
Defendants are not more than tangentially
related to the purchase or sale of covered
securities and therefore, SLUSA preclusion
does not apply.
VI
For the foregoing reasons, the judgments are
REVERSED.
The Troice cases
are
remanded to the district court, and
the Roland case is remanded to the state
court.
REVERSED.
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“U.S. Supreme Court To Review Fifth Circuit’s SLUSA Decision in Stanford
Ponzi Scheme Case”
JD Supra Law News
Shawn Hough & Frank Oliva
January 28, 2013
The
Supreme
Court
recently
granted certiorari to examine the “in
connection with” requirement of the
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act
(“SLUSA”) in Chadbourne & Parke LLP v.
Troice, No. 12-79. SLUSA generally
precludes state law securities class actions
when there is a misrepresentation or
omission “in connection with the purchase
or sale of a covered security”:
No covered class action based upon the
statutory or common law of any State or
subdivision thereof may be maintained in
any State or Federal Court by any private
party alleging a misrepresentation or
omission of a material fact in connection
with the purchase or sale of a covered
security.
In light of a seeming disagreement among
the Circuits, this case could have a
significant impact on which cases are
precluded under SLUSA.
The case stems from a Ponzi scheme
perpetrated by R. Allen Stanford, which
unraveled in 2009. Stanford purported to sell
certificates of deposit (“CDs”) that
generated above-market returns. Purchasers
of Stanford’s fraudulent CDs were led to
believe that the CD’s were backed by
SLUSA-covered securities. The United
States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas held that the lawsuit was

precluded by SLUSA. The district court
reasoned that the Supreme Court urged a
broad interpretation of the “in connection
with” requirement in order to further
SLUSA’s goals, and that plaintiffs’
allegations sufficiently connected the fraud
to transactions in covered securities, thus
triggering the protections of SLUSA against
class actions based on state law.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit disagreed and
held that SLUSA did not preclude various
Stanford suits from moving forward because
plaintiffs’
allegations
were
only
“tangentially related” to securities trades
covered by SLUSA. The Fifth Circuit
adopted the Ninth Circuit’s approach to
determine whether allegations of fraud are
sufficiently connected to covered securities
to trigger SLUSA preclusion. Under the
Ninth Circuit standard, state law fraud
allegations trigger the protections of SLUSA
if they are more than tangentially related to
real or purported transactions in covered
securities. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that
the claim that the proceeds from the sale of
CDs were invested in a portfolio including
SLUSA-covered securities was but one of a
host of misrepresentations made to plaintiffs
in the attempt to lure them into buying the
worthless CDs. The real focus of the fraud,
according to the court, was that the CDs
were said to be a safe and secure investment.
In addition, the Fifth Circuit found that the
sale of covered securities by plaintiffs to
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finance the purchase of CDs only created a
tangential relationship between the fraud
and covered securities because Stanford did
not convince the victims to sell the
securities.

While each case is arguably fact-specific,
the Chadbourne case could potentially shed
light on a legal standard that has proved
slippery for the courts.
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“Ponzi Scheme Victims and SLUSA: The Supreme Court to Decide What
Claims Can Proceed”
LexisNexis
Kathy Bazoian Phelps
February 6, 2013
Defrauded investors in a Ponzi scheme have
a few choices when the scheme goes bust.
They can wait for a distribution from the
insolvency proceeding, or they can take
matters into their own hands and form a
class to sue third parties for their damages.
However, the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act ("SLUSA") can impose a
formidable barrier for those types of class
action suits.
SLUSA states, "No covered class action
based upon the statutory or common law of
any State or subdivision thereof may be
maintained in any State or Federal court by
any
private
party
alleging
a
misrepresentation or omission of a material
fact in connection with the purchase or sale
of a covered security."
The Supreme Court has agreed to hear an
appeal in three related cases in the Allen
Stanford Ponzi scheme case on the
significant question of when SLUSA
precludes investors' state law claims for
relief against third parties.
The decision that the Supreme Court will
review is the Fifth Circuit's decision
in Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503 (5th Cir.
2012). The district court had before it three
state class actions to recover damages. In
these suits, investors asserted a range of
claims under Texas and Louisiana law
against a number of third party defendants,

including two law firms, Proskauer Rose
and Chadbourne & Parke, as well as an
insurance brokerage, Willis of Colorado,
Inc. These are the parties that eventually
petitioned the Supreme Court to hear the
case.
In their complaints, the plaintiffs claimed
that they were misled into buying Stanford's
International Bank's certificates of deposit
by several misrepresentations, including that
SIB's assets were "invested in a welldiversified portfolio of highly marketable
securities issued by stable national
governments,
strong
multinational
companies, and major international banks."
The plaintiffs alleged that law firms aided
and abetted Stanford's fraud.
The defendants moved to dismiss under
SLUSA, asserting that the plaintiffs were
claiming misrepresentations of material facts
in connection with the purchase of a
"covered security." The district court agreed
and dismissed.
What Does "In Connection With" a
"Covered Security" Mean?
The district court found that the SIB CDs
themselves were not "covered securities"
within the meaning of SLUSA because SIB
never registered the CDs, nor were they
traded on a national exchange. Nevertheless,
it held that the alleged misrepresentations
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were "in connection with" the purchase of a
"covered security," finding that:


The plaintiffs' "purchases of SIB CDs were
'induced' by the misrepresentation that SIB
invested in a portfolio including SLUSAcovered securities"; and



The plaintiffs' allegations "reasonably imply
that the Stanford scheme coincided with and
depended upon the Plaintiffs' sale of
SLUSA-covered securities to finance SIB
CD purchases."
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed and
reinstated the plaintiffs' state law-based class
action suits. Roland, 675 F.3d at 520. It
reviewed the substantial conflicts in the
standards that the other courts of appeals
had adopted on the issue of when a
misrepresentation is "in connection with the
purchase or sale of a covered security." The
Fifth Circuit agreed with the standard that
the Ninth Circuit had adopted in Madden v.
Cowen & Co., 576 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2009):
"Accordingly, if Appellants' allegations
regarding the fraud are more than
tangentially related to (real or purported)
transactions in covered securities, then they
are
properly
removable
and
also
precluded." Roland, at 520.
Applying that standard, the Fifth Circuit
concluded that the plaintiffs' "references to
SIB's portfolio being backed by 'covered
securities' to be merely tangentially related
to the 'heart,' 'crux,' or 'gravamen' of the
defendants' fraud." Rather, the court found
that the "heart, crux, and gravamen of their
allegedly
fraudulent
scheme
was
representing to the Appellants that the CDs

were a 'safe and secure' investment that was
preferable to other investments for many
reasons." Id. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit
rejected the district court's rationale that the
plaintiffs' purchases of SIB's CDs were
induced by the misrepresentation that SIB
invested in a portfolio that included SLUSAcovered securities.
The district court had also concluded that
the claimed fraud was "in connection with"
the sale of a security because to fund their
investments in SIB's fraudulent CDs, some
plaintiffs had sold their existing, unrelated
securities. The Fifth Circuit also rejected
that rationale, finding that Stanford's scheme
was focused not on persuading the plaintiffs
to sell their securities, but on selling the
fraudulent CDs.
The Split in the Circuits
The standard adopted by the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits - the "more than tangentially
related" test - is a narrow test, which results
in the dismissal of smaller group of these
class action suits against third parties in
Ponzi scheme and other fraud cases.
On the other hand, the tests adopted by the
Second, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits are
broader and require the dismissal of a larger
group of these cases. Although these courts
articulate their tests slightly differently, each
certainly would require the dismissal of the
three cases in Roland v. Green.
In Romano v. Kazacos, 609 F.3d 512, 522
(2d Cir. 2010), the Second Circuit held that
the SLUSA requirement is met "where
plaintiff's claims 'necessarily allege,'
'necessarily involve,' or 'rest on' the purchase
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or sale of securities." (This was the test on
which the district court relied in dismissing
Roland v. Green.)
In Segal v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A., 581 F.3d
305, 310 (6th Cir. 2009), the Sixth Circuit
held that SLUSA's "in connection with"
requirement is satisfied when the fraud
"coincide[s] with" or "depend[s] upon"
securities transactions. The Sixth Circuit
further held that SLUSA "does not ask
whether the complaint makes 'material' or
'dependent' allegations of misrepresentations
in connection with buying or selling
securities." It only "asks whether the
complaint includes these types of
allegations, pure and simple."
In Instituto De Prevision Militar v. Merrill
Lynch, 546 F.3d 1340, 1349 (11th Cir.
2008), the Eleventh Circuit held that a
misrepresentation is made "in connection
with" a covered securities transaction so
long as either an alleged misrepresentation
about a covered securities transaction
"induced [plaintiff] to invest with
[defendant]," or the misrepresentation
"coincided and depended upon the purchase
or sale of securities."
Supreme Court Precedent
The Supreme Court's decision will likely
turn on its interpretation of its own
precedent in SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813,
824 (2002), and Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71
(2006).
In Zandford the issue was when a
misrepresentation is "in connection with" a
securities sale, as required to state a claim

under § 10(b). The Court held that it is
sufficient
if
the
misrepresentation
"coincides" with the sale or purchase of a
covered security. However, the Court
cautioned that "the statute must not be
construed so broadly as to convert every
common-law fraud that happens to involve
[covered] securities into a violation of §
10(b)."
In Dabit, the Court addressed the SLUSA
issue - when is a plaintiff's claim of a
misrepresentation "in connection with the
purchase or sale" of a covered security? In
that case, the plaintiffs alleged in their state
law fraud suit that the defendants'
misrepresentations induced them to hold
their securities. They had neither purchased
nor sold a security as a consequence of the
alleged misrepresentations. The Supreme
Court nevertheless held that SLUSA bars
their claims. It held that the SLUSA phrase
"in connection with the purchase or sale of a
covered security" must be given the same
"broad construction" as the nearly identical
"in connection with" language in § 10(b)
itself, which requires only that the "fraud
alleged 'coincide' with a securities
transaction-whether by the plaintiff or by
someone else."
Significance of the Outcome of Roland v.
Green
The outcome of Roland v. Green in the
Supreme Court will directly impact the
availability of investors' remedies in many
Ponzi scheme cases, where the perpetrator's
promise to invest in securities turns out to be
wholly illusory. For example, as we
know, Bernard Madoff also falsely
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promised securities investments. Madoff
investors have the additional issue that many
of Madoff's victims invested not with him

directly, but with feeder funds who in turn
invested with Madoff.
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“Fifth Circuit Finds SLUSA Does Not Preclude Stanford Investors' State
Claims”
Securities Law Professor Blog
March 20, 2012
The Fifth Circuit recently held that SLUSA
did not preclude state law class actions
seeking to recover damages for losses
resulting from the Stanford ponzi scheme,
because the purchase or sale of securities (or
representations about the purchase or sale of
securities) was "only tangentially related" to
the ponzi scheme. Roland v. Green (5th Cir.
Mar. 19, 2012).
In that case Louisiana investors sued the SEI
Investments Company (SEI), the Stanford
Trust Company, the Trust's employees and
the Trust's investment advisers alleging
violations of Louisiana law. According to
the plaintiffs, the Antigua-based Stanford
International Bank (SIB) sold CDs to the
Trust, which served as the custodian
for individual IRA purchases of the
CDs. The Trust, in turn, contracted with
SEI to administer the Trust, making SEI
responsible for reporting the value of the
CDs.
Plaintiffs
allege
that
misrepresentations by SEI induced them to
use their IRA funds to purchase the CDs,
including that the CDs were a safe
investment because SIB was "competent and
efficient," that
independent
auditors
"verified" the value of SIB's assets, and that
SIB's assets were invested in a "welldiversified portfolio of highly marketable
securities." The defendants sought removal
to district court on the basis of SLUSA
preclusion. (Roland was consolidated with
two similar class actions.)

The district court, in holding that SLUSA
precluded the class actions, acknowledged
that the SIB CDs were not themselves
"covered securities" under the statute, but
determined that this did not end the
inquiry. It found that the requisite
connection existed because (1) the plaintiffs'
purchases of the CDs were allegedly
induced by the representation that SIB
invested in a portfolio of "covered
securities" and (2) at least one plaintiff's
purchases of the CDs were allegedly funded
by sales of covered securities.
Though the question of the scope of the "in
connection with" requirement under SLUSA
was one of first impression in the Fifth
Circuit, the appeals court noted that six
circuits have addressed the issue. The Fifth
Circuit initially found the decisions from the
Second, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits most
useful, because they attempted to give
dimension to what is sufficiently
connected/coincidental to a transaction in
covered securities to trigger SLUSA
preclusion. However, because each of these
Circuits stated the requisite connection in a
slightly different formulation, the Fifth
Circuit looked to cases where the facts were
closer to the allegations in this case, i.e.,
where the alleged fraud was centered around
the purchase or sale of an uncovered
security
like
the
CDs
in
this
case. Accordingly, the court turned its
attention to the "feeder fund" cases arising
from the Madoff ponzi scheme and
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described three different approaches used by
the courts: (1) whether the financial product
purchased was a covered security (the
product approach), (2) what was the
separation between the investment in the
financial product and the subsequent
transactions in covered securities (the
separation approach), (3) what were the
purposes of the investment (the purposes
approach).
Next, the Fifth Circuit returned to the
"policy consideration" that the U.S.
Supreme Court relied on in Dabit in
determining the scope of the in connection
with requirement and found persuasive
Congress's explicit concern about the
distinction between national, covered
securities
and
other,
uncovered
securities. "That SLUSA would be applied
only to transactions involving national
securitiess appears to be Congress's
intent." It also recognizes that "state
common law breach of fiduciary duty
actions provide an important remedy not
available under federal law." The court also
acknowledged the concern expressed by
some members of Congress who filed an
amicus brief: "The interpretation of SLUSA
and the 'in connection with' requirement
adopted by the District Court ... could
potentially subsume any consumer claims
involving the exchange of money or alleging
fraud against a bank, without regard to the
product that was being peddled."

Eleventh Circuits were too stringent and
adopted the Ninth Circuit test -- a
misrepresentation is "in connection with"
the purchase or sale of securities if there is a
relationship in which the fraud and the stock
sale coincide or are more than tangentially
related.
In applying the test, the Fifth Circuit agreed
with the district court that the fact that the
CDs were uncovered securities did not end
the inquiry and that it must closely examine
the schemes and purposes of the frauds
alleged by the plaintiffs. It disagreed with
the district court, however, about the
importance of the representation that SIB's
assets were invested in marketable securities
because that was only one of many
representations made to induce plaintiffs to
purchase the CDs. Rather, the "heart, crux
and gravamen" of the fraudulent scheme
was the representation that the CDs were a
"safe and secure" investment. It also
dismissed the significance placed by the
district court on the fact that at least one
plaintiff sold covered securities to finance
the purchase of CDs, because the fraud did
not depend upon the defendant convincing
the victims to sell their covered
securities. Accordingly, in both instances,
the representations were no more than
"tangentially related" to the purchase or sale
of covered securities.

Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit concluded that
the standards articulated by the Second and
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“Supreme Court to Decide Scope of Preemption of State-Law Securities Class
Actions by SLUSA”
Lexology
Joshua D. Yount
January 23, 2013
On Friday, the Supreme Court granted
review
in
three
consolidated
cases: Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice,
No. 12-79, Willis of Colorado v. Troice, No.
12-86, and Proskauer Rose LLP v. Troice,
No. 12-88. The Court’s decision will clarify
when the federal Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act (“SLUSA”)
preempts state-law securities class actions.

SLUSA barred the plaintiffs’ state-law
claims because (1) plaintiffs had alleged that
a representation that the CDs were backed
by a diversified portfolio of marketable
securities helped induce the CD purchases
and (2) some buyers sold covered securities
to fund their CD purchases.

After Congress tightened the pleading and
proof requirements for class actions under
the federal securities laws in 1996 in the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act,
plaintiffs fled to state court and started
bringing securities class actions under state
law. In response to this evasion, Congress
enacted SLUSA, which precludes most
state-law class action claims that allege “a
misrepresentation or omission of a material
fact in connection with the purchase or sale
of” securities covered by the statute. In the
three Troice cases, the Supreme Court will
determine when a misrepresentation is “in
connection with” a securities transaction.

The district court agreed with the
defendants,
but
the
Fifth
Circuit
reversed. Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503
(5th Cir. 2012). Adopting a Ninth Circuit
test, the Fifth Circuit ruled that there had to
be “a relationship in which the fraud and the
stock sale coincide or are more than
tangentially satisfied.” That test was not
satisfied, the Fifth Circuit concluded,
because the allegation that the CD issuer’s
portfolio was backed by covered securities
was merely “tangentially related” to the
“gravamen” of the alleged fraud that the
CDs were a safe and secure investment.
Several other circuits have taken different
approaches, under some of which the
plaintiffs’ claims would be preempted.

All three cases arise out of the Ponzi scheme
that R. Allen Stanford allegedly operated.
The plaintiffs had bought certificates of
deposit from entities controlled by Stanford.
CDs are not “covered securities” for SLUSA
purposes. But the defendants argued that

We intend to keep our eye on this case,
which could have big implications for the
wide variety of investment vehicles that may
not be covered securities themselves but
arguably benefit from the performance of
covered securities.
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Unite Here Local 355 v. Mulhall
12-99
Ruling Below: Mulhall v. Unite Here Local 355, 667 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 2012), cert granted,
133 S.Ct. 2849 (2013).
Employee brought action against his employer and local labor union, seeking to enjoin
enforcement of neutrality and cooperation agreement executed by employer and union on
grounds that agreement allegedly violated the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). After
the district court dismissed action for lack of standing, employee appealed. The Court of Appeals
reversed and remanded. On remand, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida dismissed complaint for failure to state a claim. Employee appealed. Addressing issues
of first impression for the court, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that
intangible organizing assistance offered by an employer to a labor union may be a “thing of
value” that, if demanded or given as payment, could constitute a violation of the section of the
LMRA making it unlawful for an employer to give or for a union to receive any “thing of
value,”; and here, employee's allegations were sufficient to state a cause of action under the
subject section of the LMRA.
Question Presented: Whether an employer and union may violate Section 302 of the LaborManagement Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186, by entering into an agreement under which the
employer exercises its freedom of speech by promising to remain neutral to union organizing, its
property rights by granting union representatives limited access to the employer’s property and
employees, and its freedom of contract by obtaining the union’s promise to forego its rights to
picket, boycott, or otherwise put pressure on the employer’s business.

Martin MULHALL, Plaintiff–Appellant,
v.
UNITE HERE LOCAL 355, Hollywood Greyhound Track, Inc., doing business as Mardi
Gras Gaming, Defendants–Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
Decided on January 18, 2012
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
WILSON, Circuit Judge
On this appeal, we decide whether
organizing assistance offered by an
employer to a labor union can be a “thing of

value” contemplated under § 302 of the
Labor
Management
Relations
Act
(“LMRA”). Section 302 makes it unlawful
for an employer to give or for a union to
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receive any “thing of value,” subject to
limited exceptions. We hold that organizing
assistance can be a thing of value that, if
demanded or given as payment, could
constitute a violation of § 302. Because the
dismissal of Martin Mulhall's complaint was
based on a contrary conclusion, we reverse.
I. BACKGROUND
Hollywood Greyhound Track, Inc., d/b/a
Mardi Gras Gaming (“Mardi Gras”), and
UNITE HERE Local 355 (“Unite”), a labor
union, entered into a memorandum of
agreement (“Agreement”) on August 23,
2004. In the Agreement, Mardi Gras
promised
to
(1)
provide
union
representatives access to non-public work
premises to organize employees during nonwork hours; (2) provide the union a list of
employees, their job classifications,
departments, and addresses; and (3) remain
neutral to the unionization of employees. In
return, Unite promised to lend financial
support to a ballot initiative regarding casino
gaming. Ultimately, Unite spent more than
$100,000 campaigning for the ballot
initiative. Additionally, if recognized as the
exclusive bargaining agent for Mardi Gras's
employees, Unite promised to refrain from
picketing,
boycotting,
striking,
or
undertaking other economic activity against
Mardi Gras.
Mulhall is a Mardi Gras employee opposed
to being unionized. His complaint seeks to
enjoin enforcement of the Agreement,
contending that it violated § 302. The
district court dismissed the complaint for
failure to state a claim because it found that
the assistance promised in the Agreement

cannot constitute a “thing of value” under §
302.
This is not the first time this case has been
before us on appeal. In a previous appeal
addressing Mulhall's standing to bring the
case, we stated that Mulhall “adequately
alleged that the organizing assistance
promised by Mardi Gras in the [Agreement]
is valuable, and indeed essential, to Unite's
effort to gain recognition.”
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
An order granting a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim is subject to de novo
review.
III. DISCUSSION
Congress enacted the LMRA, commonly
known as the Taft–Hartley Act, to curb
abuses “inimical to the integrity of the
collective bargaining process.” With certain
exceptions, § 302 makes it unlawful for
any employer ... to pay, lend, or deliver,
any money or other thing of value ... to
any labor organization, or any officer or
employee thereof, which represents,
seeks to represent, or would admit to
membership, any of the employees of
such employer....
Additionally, a person cannot request or
demand a payment, loan, or delivery of
money or other thing of value. As the Ninth
Circuit explained, “The dominant purpose of
§ 302 is to prevent employers from
tampering with the loyalty of union officials
and to prevent union officials from extorting
tribute from employers.”
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In the context of § 302, the Eleventh Circuit
has not addressed the meaning of the phrase
“thing of value,” but it has commented on
the phrase as it is used in various other
criminal statutes. In United States v. Nilsen,
the Court stated, “Congress' frequent use of
‘thing of value’ in various criminal statutes
has evolved the phrase into a term of art
which the courts generally construe to
envelop[ ] both tangibles and intangibles.”
Reasoning that “monetary worth is not the
sole measure of value,” we held the
expected testimony of a key government
witness is a thing of value.
The Fourth and Third Circuits have
addressed challenges to neutrality and
cooperation agreements under § 302, and
both courts found the assistance was not a
thing of value. In Adcock, the plaintiff
challenged an agreement in which the
employer (1) granted the union access to
private property, (2) promised neutrality
during organizing campaigns, and (3)
required some employees to attend union
presentations on paid company time. The
Fourth Circuit concluded the organizing
assistance had no ascertainable value, and
therefore the plaintiff had failed to state a §
302 claim. The court explained that the
reading of § 302 was consistent with the
purpose of the statute because the agreement
could not be construed as a bribe or corrupt
practice.
The Third Circuit reviewed a neutrality
agreement and held that, regardless of
whether the agreement benefitted an
employer and a union, there was no § 302
violation because the organizing assistance
does not qualify as a payment, loan, or

delivery. The court also reasoned that any
benefit “inherent in a more efficient
resolution of recognition disputes does not
constitute a ‘thing of value’ within the
meaning of the statute.” Moreover, the
court expressed concern that invalidating the
suspect agreement for a § 302 violation
would upset the balance of laws governing
the recognition of unions.
No other circuit has published an opinion
involving the precise facts presented on this
appeal, but several have addressed what the
term “thing of value” means in the § 302
context. The Sixth Circuit rejected the
argument that under § 302 “a thing of value”
is restricted to things of monetary value. In
that case, General Motors gave high paying
jobs to non-qualified relatives of union
officials. The court found a violation of the
statute occurred even though the thing of
value was not money or some other tangible
thing.
The Second Circuit commented on the scope
of the phrase “thing of value” when it
explained that “[v]alue is usually set by the
desire to have the ‘thing’ and depends upon
the individual and the circumstances.” It
recommended that common sense should
inform determinations of whether an
improper benefit has been conferred.
[I]t may be argued that a five-dollar
Christmas tie is a “thing of value” and a
Christmas present hopefully is to create
good will in the recipient towards the donor.
Countless hypothetical cases can be put,
each on its facts approaching that evanescent
borderline between the proper and the
improper. No calculating machine has yet
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been invented to make these determinations
with certainty. In the meantime the courts
must rely upon the less mechanical
judgment and common sense which under
the present system is, and of necessity must
be, lodged in judges and juries.
We are inclined to agree that, in
circumstances like these where we search
for the line between the proper and the
improper, we must rely upon our common
sense.
It seems apparent that organizing assistance
can be a thing of value, but an employer
does not risk criminal sanctions simply
because benefits extended to a labor union
can be considered valuable. Violations of §
302 only involve payments, loans, or
deliveries, and every benefit is not
necessarily a payment, loan, or delivery. For
example, intangible organizing assistance
cannot be loaned or delivered because the
actions “lend” and “deliver” contemplate the
transfer of tangible items.
Yet, a violation of § 302 cannot be ruled out
merely because intangible assistance cannot
be loaned or delivered. Section 302 also
prohibits payment of a thing of value, and
intangible
services,
privileges,
or
concessions can be paid or operate as
payment. Whether something qualifies as a
payment depends not on whether it is
tangible or has monetary value, but on
whether its performance fulfills an
obligation. If employers offer organizing
assistance with the intention of improperly
influencing a union, then the policy
concerns in § 302—curbing bribery and
extortion—are implicated.

It is too broad to hold that all neutrality and
cooperation agreements are exempt from the
prohibitions in § 302. Employers and unions
may set ground rules for an organizing
campaign, even if the employer and union
benefit from the agreement. But innocuous
ground rules can become illegal payments if
used as valuable consideration in a scheme
to corrupt a union or to extort a benefit from
an employer.
We need not address whether we require a
“thing of value” to have monetary value.
Here, Mulhall alleged and a jury could find
that Mardi Gras's assistance had monetary
value. As evidence of the value, Mulhall
points to the $100,000 Unite spent on the
ballot initiative that was consideration for
the
organizing
assistance.
Mulhall's
allegations are sufficient to support a § 302
claim.
We also are unpersuaded by arguments that
either the rule of lenity or concerns about
constitutionally protected speech counsel
against allowing neutrality agreements to be
covered by § 302. The rule of lenity applies
only when a statute is ambiguous, and here,
the plain language of the statute is clear. The
protected speech concerns arise out of a
mistaken understanding that employers will
be required to actively oppose unionization
in order to avoid criminal sanctions under §
302. As we see it, an employer's decision to
remain neutral or cooperate during an
organizing campaign does not constitute a §
302 violation unless the assistance is an
improper payment. If the assistance is not an
improper payment, an employer's speech is
not limited, and it may choose to oppose
unionization.
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Consequently, we find that Mulhall has
stated a claim for relief, and we remand so
that the district court can consider the § 302
claim and determine the reason why Unite
and Mardi Gras agreed to cooperate with
one another.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
RESTANI, Judge, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I conclude that the
reasoning of our sister circuits is correct.
Therefore, I would affirm the dismissal
granted by the District Court.
I also write because I do not agree that an
improper intent on behalf of the union or
employer in demanding or offering the types
of concessions at issue here transforms an
otherwise “innocuous” concession into a
bribe or constitutes extortion in violation of
§ 302 of the Labor Management Relations
Act (“LMRA”). Mulhall has not alleged that
Mardi Gras offered these concessions as a
bribe. Thus, I put this issue aside and focus
on whether a union that demands these types
of concessions with an improper intent
commits extortion and thereby runs afoul of
§ 302.
Adding the element of intent is a non-starter
because to do so conflicts with the purpose
of the LMRA regardless of whether the
focus is the concessions or the intent behind
them. Unions demand these types of
concessions, and may threaten to cause
disruptions if the concessions are not given.
The purpose is to make it easier to achieve
collective bargaining rights on behalf of the
target employees. The LMRA is designed to
promote both labor peace and collective

bargaining. The LMRA cannot promote
collective bargaining and, at the same time,
penalize unions that are attempting to
achieve greater collective bargaining rights.
Even if the union has some other aim
besides achieving collective bargaining
rights (such as obtaining more members and
dues without ever promoting the interest of
the employees), such conduct implicates the
union's duty to its members, not the
collective bargaining process between the
employer and the union. In such a situation,
employees can decline to join the union and
union members can leave the union or seek
their own judicial remedies. We should not,
however, turn § 302 upside down to protect
against possible disadvantages resulting
from some union actions.
Moreover, under the majority's holding, §
302 is not implicated unless the concessions
at issue are “used as valuable consideration
in a scheme to corrupt a union or to extort a
benefit from an employer.” Thus, at the
pleading stage, the complaint must contain
sufficient factual allegations showing the
union demanded these concessions as
extortion or were offered by the employer as
a bribe, and not just as regular ground rules
of organizing.
Here, Mulhall's complaint makes no
allegations of wrongdoing relating to the
formation of the Agreement or Unite's
motives at the time of contracting. Mulhall
merely alleges that unions, in general, have
or may have improper motives when
negotiating for these concessions. Such
general allegations are insufficient under our
pleading standards. Thus, even under the
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majority's theory, Mulhall's complaint fails
to state a cause of action and should be

dismissed.
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“U.S. Supreme Court Will Review Neutrality Agreements and Promises
Between Employers and Unions”
Labor Relations Counsel
Tracy Scott Pyles
July 9, 2013
The U.S. Supreme Court announced that it
will review the U.S Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Mulhall v.
UNITE HERE Local 355, a significant
decision in which the court revived an
employee’s claim that a neutrality
agreement between his employer and Local
355 was unlawful.
In Mulhall, Mardi Gras Gaming and Local
355 had entered a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) in which the company
agreed to provide Local 355 with employee
information, allow the union access to
company property for organizing purposes,
remain neutral during the union’s organizing
effort and conduct a card-check in lieu of a
secret-ballot election. In the MOA, the union
also promised that it would refrain from
striking,
picketing,
boycotting
or
undertaking other economic pressure against
the company, and would give approximately
$100,000 in support of a slot machine ballot
initiative benefitting the company. Assisted
by the National Right to Work Foundation,
an employee filed a lawsuit seeking to
enjoin the MOA.
Mulhall concerns Section 302 of the LaborManagement Relations Act (the anti-bribery
provision), which makes it illegal for an
employer to deliver to a union, or for a
union to receive from an employer, any
“thing of value” (there are exceptions not
relevant to this dispute). The issue is

whether a “thing of value” extends to
promises employers make in neutrality
agreements. The district court concluded
that while the LMRA provides an individual
with a private right of action, the employee
did not have standing to sue because the
types of assistance promised in the MOA
were not a “thing of value” under the
LMRA.
A divided Eleventh Circuit disagreed, ruling
that a “thing of value” could extend to the
promises an employer makes in a neutrality
agreement. The court explained:
“a violation of § 302 cannot be ruled out
merely because intangible assistance
cannot be loaned or delivered. Section
302 also prohibits payment of a thing of
value,
and
intangible
services,
privileges, or concessions can be paid or
operate as payment. Whether something
qualifies as a payment depends not on
whether it is tangible or has monetary
value, but on whether its performance
fulfills an obligation. If employers offer
organizing assistance with the intention
of improperly influencing a union, then
the policy concerns in § 302—curbing
bribery and extortion—are implicated.”
The Eleventh Circuit remanded the case and
instructed the district court to consider what
motivated the cooperation between the
company and Local 355. The Eleventh
Circuit further clarified that an agreement
setting ground rules is permissible, but
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Section 302 may be violated if the company
was wrongfully attempting to influence the
union in its representation duties.
Local 355 challenged the Eleventh Circuit’s
decision. The issue for the U.S. Supreme
Court is whether a neutrality agreement
violates Section 302 – that is, do promises
by an employer that it will remain neutral
and provide the union with access to
employees and facilities during an
organizing drive, and, in exchange, promises
by the union to not boycott or picket that
employer, violate Section 302?
The U.S. Supreme Court has never before
agreed to review a decision that so closely
implicates neutrality agreements. The
Supreme Court’s decision to address
Mulhall during its October 2013 term puts

the use of neutrality agreements in a state of
flux. If the Supreme Court endorses
neutrality agreements, they will likely
become even more commonly used as an
organizing strategy. Neutrality agreements
are already a powerful tool in corporate
campaigns, where companies are pressured
to cooperate with a union or face negative
publicity and regulatory pressure. On the
other hand, the Supreme Court could affirm
the Eleventh Circuit’s decision and curtail
the use of neutrality agreements, thereby
weakening unions’ corporate campaign
arsenals. Employers and labor practitioners
will be closely watching for clarification
from the Supreme Court about what is a
“thing of value” under the LMRA’s antibribery provision.
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“High Court to Review Sweetheart Deals Between Unions, Management”
Washington Examiner
Sean Higgins
July 2, 2013
Unite Here Local 355 approached Mardi
Gras Gaming, owner of a Florida dog track
and gambling casino, in 2004 with a
proposition: It would run ads in favor of a
local gambling ballot initiative the company
wanted to pass. In exchange, the company
would make it as easy as possible for the
union to organize its workers.
To further sweeten the deal, Unite Here
promised "labor peace" to the company. In
other words, it vowed not to strike, protest,
picket or otherwise disrupt the company's
business. It was a win-win deal for everyone
— except the employees.
Last week, the Supreme Court announced
that it would take up the case of Unite Here
Local 355 v. Mulhall. In its own way, this
case may be as important as the Voting
Right Act or gay-marriage decisions. It
could potentially hobble a major union
organizing practice: striking deals with
management before they try to organize
workers.
The case specifically deals with the question
of what constitutes a bribe or similar
inducement in labor union organizing cases.
Can it extend to something non-monetary,
like employee contact information? That's
what the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled.

Unions were eager to appeal that ruling.
"The theory is implausible on its face. No
employer would think to bribe a union by
making it easier for the union to organize,"
Unite Here said in a statement last week.
Well, an employer might if the deal was as
sweet as the one Unite Here struck with
Mardi Gras Gaming. And that's why the
case is important.
The classic image of workplace organizing
from movies like Norma Rae is of an upfrom-the-grassroots effort by ordinary
people. But a lot of organizing is done in the
opposite way: with outside labor organizers
striking "top down" deals with the
management first, then trying to get the
workers on board. Unite Here has used it in
dozens of cases involving casinos.
The union's deal with Mardi Gras required
the company to turn over employee contact
information, allow union officials onto
company property and not counter the
union's effort to organize its workplace in
any way. Employees would only hear what
the union told them without anyone from the
company to contradict them.
Once the union claimed it had a majority of
employees signed up, Mardi Gras would
then waive its right to contest the election to
the National Labor Relations Board.
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This wasn't a bad deal for Mardi Gras. Its
workers might get unionized but the union
wouldn't be able to strike, giving the
company plenty of leverage in contract
negotiations.
Martin Mulhall, a 40-year Mardi Gras
employee, realized he could wake up one
morning to find he suddenly was represented
by a union that wouldn't do much for him.
With the help of the National Right to Work
Legal Defense Foundation, he challenged
the deal.
The Appeals Court ruled that the employee
contact list Unite Here got constituted a
"thing of value" to the union and therefore
violated the anti-bribery sections of federal
labor law.
This was a novel reading of the law. The
dissenting judge wrote: "Even if the union
has some other aim besides achieving
collective bargaining rights (such as

obtaining more members and dues without
ever promoting the interest of the
employees), such conduct implicates the
union's duty to its members, not the
collective bargaining process between the
employer and the union."
In others words, it may be wrong but it isn't
illegal. That is essentially the position of
Unite Here too.
"The aspects of the agreement attacked by
Mulhall ... have been regular features of
labor relations since Taft-Hartley was
passed (in 1947)," it said. To change this
now would "wreak havoc" with labor law.
The Supreme Court will now determine
whose interest the collective bargaining
process is meant to promote: the workers' or
the union's.
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“Supreme Court Scrutiny of ‘Neutrality’ Pacts Could Be Another Blow to
Unions”
In These Times
Bruce Vail
June 27, 2013
The U.S. Supreme Court announced this
week that it will accept a case for review
next year on the use of labor-management
“neutrality” agreements in union organizing
campaigns. An anti-union decision from the
high court would make labor organizing
more difficult
and
threaten labor
organizations at a national level, labor
experts say.
At issue are the so-called neutrality
agreements between unions and employers
in which the employer agrees beforehand
not to actively oppose the union organizing
process at a specific workplace. Typically,
such agreements specify that both sides
refrain from inflammatory or divisive
tactics, and that the workers be allowed to
choose or oppose union representation free
from any pressure or intimidation from
either side.
Such agreements have been an essential part
of some high-profile victories for union
organizing campaigns in recent years, says
veteran union organizer Stewart Acuff.
The International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
the United Auto Workers (UAW), UNITE
HERE, the Service Employees International
Union (SEIU) and the Communications
Workers of America (CWA) have all
successfully employed neutrality agreements
in big victories over the last ten years, the
former director of the AFL-CIO organizing
department says.

The case that will come before the Supreme
Court next year, Mulhall v UNITE HERE
Local 355, has its origins in a 2004
neutrality agreement between the hospitality
workers union and Mardi Gras Gaming, the
operator of a dog racing track and gambling
casino in Hallandale Beach, Fla., according
to court documents available at the on-line
news site SCOTUSblog. That agreement
specified that the company would not
actively oppose UNITE HERE’s organizing
efforts and that Mardi Gras would provide
the union with useful information about its
employees, including the home addresses
and phone numbers of workers.
One Mardi Gras worker who opposed
unionization was Martin Mulhall. He was so
strongly opposed that in 2008 he brought a
lawsuit against UNITE HERE with the
assistance of the anti-union group National
Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation.
According to a statement this week from
Foundation President Mark Mix, the legal
argument was that the neutrality agreement
caused Mardi Gras to provide “money or
other thing of value” to the union in
violation of the anti-corruption provisions of
Taft-Hartley Act.
After some complicated legal maneuvering,
the case reached the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the 11th Circuit in Atlanta. In 2012, the
circuit court ruled in favor of Mulhall,
prompting UNITE HERE to appeal the
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decision to the Supreme Court. According to
a statement this week from UNITE HERE
General Counsel Robert G. McCracken:
UNITE HERE is very pleased the
Supreme Court granted its petition to
review the 11th Circuit Court of
Appeals’ decision....The 11th Circuit’s
decision is out of step with all of the
other courts that have considered the
theory advanced by the plaintiff in
Mulhall...The plaintiff’s theory is that
organizing agreements such as the one
between the plaintiff’s employer (Mardi
Gras casino in Florida) and UNITE
HERE Local 355 violate the ant-bribery
part of the Taft-Hartley Act passed in
1947. The theory is implausible on its
face. No employer would think to bribe a
union by making it easier for the union
to organize.
The Right to Work Foundation is also
pleased that the case will get Supreme Court
review, but for reasons quite different than
UNITE HERE. Mix’s statement explained
that the group believes that “the 11th
Circuit’s decision was too narrowly
tailored” in restricting unions and
employers. “We hope the Supreme Court
will expand upon the 11th Circuit’s
landmark ruling and ensure that union
organizers can’t cut backroom deals with
management,” he stated. In other words, to
sharply limit or prohibit neutrality
agreements.
That’s a danger that should not be taken
lightly, says Acuff. The anti-democratic
tendencies of the current members of the
Supreme Court were sharply highlighted this

week, in its decision to invalidate a section
of the Voting Rights Act, he said.
"Since 1935, the National Labor Relations
Act has said it shall be the policy of the
United States to encourage collective
bargaining, and that the right to form unions
is essential to collective bargaining," Acuff
says. "Neutrality agreements are simply
following the letter and the spirit of the law.
... It takes right-wing intellectual gymnastics
of Olympian proportions to conclude that is
illegal for a company to respect the rights of
its workers,” by entering in to neutrality
agreements.
It is the practical success of neutrality
agreements that has attracted the opposition
of the Right to Work Foundation, Acuff
adds, not any legalistic argument based on
Taft-Hartley. The Teamsters, for example,
were able to organize some 10,000 truck
drivers in 2007 at the United Parcel Service
freight division based on a neutrality
agreement. Some 8,000 hospital workers
became members of the SEIU under a
neutrality agreement with Tenet Healthcare
Corp. at about the same time [PDF]. And
UNITE HERE has successfully used such
agreements in dozens of hotel and casino
organizing campaigns over the last decade,
most recently at a Caesar’s casino under
construction in Baltimore. There are many
other examples, Acuff concludes, and any
new Supreme Court restrictions on such
agreements
would
certainly
hinder
organized labor’s attempt to rebuild
membership.
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“Supreme Court to Decide Legality of Neutrality Agreements, Dynamics of
Union Organizing Hang in the Balance”
Labor Relations Today
Brennan W. Bolt
June 27, 2013
The Supreme Court agreed earlier this week
to consider whether the Labor-Management
Relations Act's prohibition on employers
from providing a union with any "thing of
value" extends to the promises an employer
makes in a neutrality agreement. Section
302 of the Labor-Management Relations
Act, the federal labor anti-bribery statute,
makes it unlawful for an employer "to pay,
lend, or deliver...any money or other thing
of value" to a labor union that seeks to
represent its employees, and prohibits the
labor union from receiving the same.
Neutrality agreements set ground rules for
union organizing campaigns and typically
include employer promises to remain neutral
and recognize the union upon a showing of
majority support (often with a card check) as
well as to provide the union access to
information and employees, and union
promises to forego the rights to picket,
boycott, or otherwise put pressure on the
employer's business. Accordingly, if the
Supreme Court holds that such promises are
unlawful under § 302, unions' ability to
engage in "top-down" organizing through
corporate campaigns will suffer a serious
blow.
The Third and Fourth Circuits have held that
neutrality agreements and the promises
typically included therein are not "payment"
of "things of value" proscribed by § 302.
However, in Mulhall v. Unite Here Local
355, 667 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 2012), the

Eleventh Circuit disagreed and held that
"organizing assistance can be a thing of
value that, if demanded or given as payment,
could constitute a violation of § 302."
In Mulhall, the employer and a labor union
entered into an agreement where the
employer promised to:
(1) provide union representatives access to
non-public work premises to organize
employees during non-work hours; (2)
provide the union a list of employees, their
job classifications, departments, and
addresses; and (3) remain neutral to the
unionization of employees.
In return, the union promised to lend
substantial financial support to a ballot
initiative favoring the employer and to
refrain from picketing, boycotting, striking
or undertaking other economic activity
against the employer.
The Eleventh Circuit's decision focused on
what constitutes a "thing of value," and
stated that it "must rely upon our common
sense" to answer that question. As such, the
Eleventh Circuit held that "intangible
services, privileges, or concessions can be
paid or operate as payment," and thus
implicate the policy concerns in § 302:
It is too broad to hold that all neutrality and
cooperation agreements are exempt from the
prohibitions in § 302. Employers and unions
253

may set ground rules for an organizing
campaign, even if the employer and union
benefit from the agreement. But innocuous
ground rules can become illegal payments if
used as valuable consideration in a scheme
to corrupt a union or to extort a benefit from
an employer.
How the Supreme Court resolves this circuit
split will have serious ramifications for both
employers and unions regarding how
employees are unionized. If the Supreme
Court agrees with the Third and Fourth
Circuits, unions could be emboldened and
would likely increase their use of corporate
campaigns to secure neutrality agreements.
On the other hand, if the Supreme Court
finds that the types of employer promises
generally seen in neutrality agreements are
considered unlawful payments under § 302,
then unions' ability to engage in "top down"

organizing will be severely limited. While
that will not spell the end of corporate
campaigns, it will likely undermine their
effectiveness and force unions to focus
much more on traditional "grass roots"
organizing strategies. One such strategy
could be to ramp up efforts to exploit the
Board's decision in Specialty Healthcare, in
which the Board signaled that it now
believes that smaller units--such as units that
consist of only one department or even one
job classification--should be permitted.
Under that scenario, unions would likely
target an employer by first organizing a very
small group of employees (i.e., a 'micro
union') to gain access and market
themselves to other groups of employees at
that employer.
The case before the Supreme Court is Unite
Here Local 355 v. Mulhall, Case No. 12-99.
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DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman
11-965
Ruling Below: Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2011), cert granted,
133 S.Ct. 1995 (2013).
Argentinian residents brought suit against German corporation under the Alien Tort Statute
(ATS), and the Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA), alleging that its wholly-owned
Argentinian subsidiary collaborated with state security forces to kidnap, detain, torture, and kill
the plaintiffs and/or their relatives during Argentina's “Dirty War.” The United States District
Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction,
and plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that (1) wholly-owned
United States subsidiary, which served as the general distributor of German manufacturer's
automobiles in the United States, was manufacturer's agent for general jurisdictional purposes;
and (2) exercising personal jurisdiction over German automobile manufacturer comported with
fair play and substantial justice.
Question Presented: Whether it violates due process for a court to exercise general personal
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation based solely on the fact that an indirect corporate
subsidiary performs services on behalf of the defendant in the forum state.

Barbara BAUMAN; Gregory Grieco; Josefina Nunez; Gabriele Nunez; Miriam Nunez;
Silvia Nunez; Emilio Guillermo Pesce; Mirta Haydee Arenas; Graciela Gigena; Guillermo
Alberto Gigena; Nuria Gigena; Amelia Schiaffo; Elba Leichner; Anunciacion Spaltro De
Belmonte; Hector Ratto; Eduardo Olasiregui; Ricardo Martin Hoffman; Eduardo
Estiville; Alfredo Manuel Martin; Juan Jose Martin; Jose Barreiro; Alejandro Daer,
Plaintiffs–Appellants,
v.
DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION; DaimlerChrysler AG, Defendants–Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
Decided on May 18, 2011
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
REINHARDT, Circuit Judge
I.
Plaintiffs–Appellants (the “plaintiffs”),
twenty-two Argentinian residents, bring suit
against DaimlerChrysler Aktiengesellschaft

(DCAG) alleging that one of DCAG's
subsidiaries, Mercedes–Benz Argentina
(MBA) collaborated with state security
forces to kidnap, detain, torture, and kill the
plaintiffs and/or their relatives during
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Argentina's “Dirty War.” Some of the
plaintiffs are themselves former employees
of MBA and the victims of the kidnapping,
detention, and torture, while others are close
relatives of MBA workers who were
“disappeared” and are presumed to have
been murdered. The only question before us
is whether the district court had personal
jurisdiction over DCAG. The district court
granted DCAG's motion to dismiss the case
for lack of such jurisdiction. We conclude,
however, that DCAG was subject to
personal jurisdiction in California through
the contacts of its subsidiary Mercedes–
Benz USA (MBUSA). We hold that
MBUSA was DCAG's agent, at least for
personal jurisdictional purposes, and that
exercise of personal jurisdiction was
reasonable under the circumstances of this
case.
II.
A.
The plaintiffs here were workers or relatives
of workers at the Gonzalez–Catan plant of
Mercedes–Benz Argentina (MBA), a wholly
owned-subsidiary of DaimlerChrysler AG's
predecessor-in-interest. The plaintiffs allege
that MBA sought to brutally punish plant
workers whom MBA viewed as union
agitators, and that MBA collaborated with
the Argentinian military and police forces in
doing so. They also allege that MBA had
knowledge that the result of this
collaboration would be the kidnapping,
torture, detention and murder of those
workers, and that the plan was implemented,
in part, in the following manner. First, MBA
labeled the appellants as “subversives” and
“agitators” and passed on this information to

the state security forces. Second, MBA “had
members of the military and police forces
stationed within” the Gonzalez–Catan plant.
Third, MBA opened the plant to periodic
raids by those forces. Fourth, MBA hired
Ruben Lavallen, the police station chief who
had been behind much of the reign of terror
and installed him as Chief of Security,
providing legal representation to him when
he was “accused of human rights abuses.”
The plaintiffs further allege that MBA was
pleased with the results of the raids and
detentions because those actions helped to
end a strike, restoring maximum production
at the plant.
B.
Plaintiffs brought suit against DCAG in the
District Court for the Northern District of
California under the Alien Tort Statute
(“ATS”), and the Torture Victims Protection
Act of 1991 (“TVPA”). After attempting to
serve process at one of DCAG's
headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, they
learned that DCAG purported to maintain an
operational headquarters in Auburn Hills,
Michigan. They then attempted to serve
DCAG
in
Michigan. Bauman
v.
DaimlerChrysler AG (Bauman I). DCAG
moved to quash service and to dismiss the
case for lack of personal jurisdiction. In
support of its opposition to these motions,
the plaintiffs submitted DCAG's proxy
statement which stated that, following the
merger of Daimler–Benz and Chrysler,
DCAG would “maintain two operational
headquarters—one located at the current
Chrysler headquarters, 1000 Chrysler Drive,
Auburn Hills, Michigan 48326–2766, and
one located at the current Daimler–Benz
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headquarters, Epplestrasse
225,
70567
Stuttgart, Germany.” The language referring
to dual operational headquarters was
repeated four times in the proxy statement.
The plaintiffs also submitted a document
from DCAG's website, entitled “Investor
Questions and Answers.” This document
also discussed the “dual operational
headquarters” and went on to note that the
Co–Chairmen and Co–Chief Executive
Officers of DCAG, Jurgen E. Schrempp
(former Chairman of Daimler–Benz AG)
and Robert J. Eaton (former Chairman and
CEO of Chrysler Corporation) both had
“offices and staff in both locations.” After
this evidence was submitted, DCAG
withdrew its motion to quash service.
C.
As discussed in more detail below, the
District Court for the Northern District of
California did not hold an evidentiary
hearing when it ruled on DCAG's motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction;
therefore,
the
plaintiffs
“need only demonstrate facts that if true
would support jurisdiction over the
defendant.”
DCAG was a German stock company, but
according to DCAG, sales of its vehicles in
the United States “accounted for 1% of the
nation's Gross Domestic Product (GDP).” In
the annual report DCAG filed with the SEC
in 2006, DCAG further admits that “a
significant portion of our business, primarily
in the case of the Mercedes Car Group,
depends in part on export sales to the United
States.” Mercedes–Benz USA, LLC
(“MBUSA”) was a Delaware limited

liability company with its principal place of
business in New Jersey. MBUSA was a
wholly-owned subsidiary of the holding
company DaimlerChrysler North America
Holding Corporation, which was, in turn, a
wholly-owned
subsidiary
of
DCAG. MBUSA was the single largest
supplier of luxury vehicles to the California
market; according to DCAG's figures,
MBUSA's sales in California alone
accounted for 2.4% of DCAG's total
worldwide sales.
MBUSA had a regional office in Costa
Mesa, California, a Vehicle Preparation
Center in Carson, California, and a Classic
Center in Irving, California. Because of
MBUSA's
extensive
contacts
with
California, DCAG does not dispute that
MBUSA is subject to general jurisdiction in
California.
DCAG manufactured Mercedes–Benz motor
vehicles and parts primarily at factories in
Germany. MBUSA purchased Mercedes–
Benz vehicles from DCAG in Germany for
distribution in the United States….
The final subsidiary that is relevant to this
case is the DaimlerChrysler Corporation
(DCC). As the district court noted, when the
Chrysler Corporation and Daimler–Benz AG
merged, they both became wholly-owned
subsidiaries of DCAG. At that point,
Chrysler Corporation changed its name to
DaimlerChrysler Corporation.
D.
The relationship between DCAG and
MBUSA is governed by a General
Distributor Agreement (“the Agreement”)
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which establishes extensive requirements for
MBUSA as the general distributor of
Mercedes–Benz cars in the U.S. Because the
Agreement is the critical legal document that
defines DCAG's relationship with MBUSA,
we will discuss its provisions at some
length.
Sales Figures
According to the Agreement, DCAG and
MBUSA agree every year upon a set of
quantitative and qualitative objectives, that
can include a “minimum or specific number
of Vehicles to be sold by [MBUSA] and its
Authorized Resellers to end users ... [and] a
minimum or a specific market share in
defined vehicle segments” in the United
States.
Sales Network
DCAG has extensive oversight over
MBUSA's
network
of
Authorized
Resellers. MBUSA must “consult” with
DCAG before establishing its sales and
service network of Authorized Resellers,
and before making any adjustments to that
sales and service network. MBUSA must
make “any changes or adjustments” to that
network requested by DCAG. MBUSA must
receive approval from DCAG before
entering into an agreement with any
Authorized Reseller….

Business Systems
DCAG must approve of the accounting,
order, inventory control and warranty claim
processing systems used by MBUSA and its
Authorized Resellers. DCAG must also
approve of the “electronic data storage,
transmission and communication system”
used by MBUSA and its Authorized
Resellers. MBUSA must further observe all
of DCAG's “rules, terms and conditions”
relating to the use of these business systems.
Customer Information
DCAG dictates what customer information
is to be collected by MBUSA….
Management Personnel
According to the Agreement, MBUSA must
employ a “General Manager, a Parts
Manager, a Service Manager, and a Sales
Manager.” MBUSA cannot combine these
positions without the “prior consent” of
DCAG. These employees “shall not, without
the prior consent of [DCAG], engage or
participate in operating, selling or servicing,
as the case may be, of any brand of vehicles
other than” Mercedes–Benz vehicles. …It is
significant also that the Chairman of DCAG,
Dieter Zetsche, was simultaneously the
Chairman of MBUSA. Zetsche was also the
head of the Mercedes Car Group at
DCAG….

Standards
Service
MBUSA must also comply with all
Dealership Standards promulgated by
DCAG. MBUSA cannot appoint an
Authorized Reseller who does not agree to
comply with the Dealership Standards….

DCAG sets the standards and requirements
for the vehicle servicing conducted by
MBUSA and its Authorized Resellers. The
servicing must comply with DCAG's
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Dealership Standards as well as DCAG's
“requirements
and
other
manuals,
guidelines, or materials.”…

right to approve or disapprove of each sign's
type, design and size.”…
Prices

Warranty
DCAG sets the warranty terms applicable to
MBUSA. MBUSA may not provide
additional warranties without the prior
consent of DCAG….
Vehicle Alteration
MBUSA cannot “alter or modify” any
Vehicle without DCAG's “prior approval
and then only in the manner [DCAG]
authorizes,” unless the vehicle has been
ordered and the modification specifically
requested by an end user.
Technical Publications
MBUSA and its Authorized Resellers must
each maintain an “organized library of
[DCAG's] technical service publications.”
Promotion and Advertising
The Agreement requires MBUSA to
“actively market” the Mercedes–Benz
vehicles. The Agreement gives DCAG the
discretionary power to conduct a yearly
review of MBUSA's “comprehensive
advertising and marketing plan.” If DCAG
exercises this right of review, MBUSA
cannot pursue the advertising and marketing
strategy without the approval of DCAG. …
Signage
MBUSA and its Authorized Resellers must
display “appropriate signs and fascia” to
identify each facility. DCAG “reserves the

Although the sales volume is set yearly by
agreement between DCAG and MBUSA,
DCAG has the authority to unilaterally set
and change prices. DCAG simply must
“notify” MBUSA “from time to time of the
prices and charges for Contract Goods.”
Even though the Agreement locks MBUSA
into a precise sales amount on an annual
basis, DCAG may change the prices “at any
time, and make the changes effective
immediately.”…
MBUSA's Authority and Ownership
MBUSA must request the approval of
DCAG before it changes its management
control or ownership interests, the name or
form of its legal entity, or the location of its
principal place of business.
Working Capital
MBUSA and its Authorized Resellers must
maintain a “working capital level and
financing capability” level that is
“acceptable” to DCAG. In fact, “[a]t no time
may [MBUSA's] working capital dedicated
to its operations related to the Contract
Goods be less than the amount specified by
[DCAG] from time to time.”…
Sales Numbers
DCAG requires MBUSA to “make all
reasonable efforts” to limit the amount of
Mercedes–Benz vehicles sold by any
Authorized Reseller or group of Resellers to
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15% of the total sales of Mercedes–Benz
vehicles in the United States….
Related Agreements
DCAG can require MBUSA and its
Authorized Resellers to execute “any
agreement relating to ... any other matter
related to this Agreement in the form from
time to time adopted by [DCAG]” as long as
those Agreements are not an “unreasonable
burden” on MBUSA.
E.
On November 22, 2005, the district court
issued an order “tentatively granting
defendant's motion to dismiss” for lack of
personal jurisdiction. The district court
applied the two part test for general
jurisdiction developed in Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall: 1)
whether defendant had “systematic and
continuous” contacts with California, and 2)
whether the assertion of general jurisdiction
was reasonable. The district court found that
it did not have general jurisdiction over
DCAG because DCAG did not have
“systematic and continuous contacts” with
California, the court found that DCAG itself
did not have such contacts and, moreover,
that the plaintiffs had failed to show that
MBUSA was DCAG's agent such that
MBUSA's contacts could be imputed to
DCAG.
The district court acknowledged that
“without MBUSA or another distributor,
DCAG would not be able to sell Mercedes–
Benz vehicles in California.” In deciding
that there was no agency relationship,
however, the district court relied heavily on

its conclusion that “it is not clear that
[DCAG] would be required to perform such
functions itself to avail itself of the
California, luxury-vehicle market.” The
district court admitted that the agency
question was a “close question,” but found
that MBUSA's contacts should not be
imputed to the defendant.
In its tentative order, the district court also
found that personal jurisdiction over DCAG
would not be reasonable, although it made a
number of factual findings that caused it to
question the correctness of that finding. It
found that DCAG had purposefully
interjected itself into California by
“initiating lawsuits in California courts to
challenge the state's clean air laws and to
protect DCAG's patents and other business
interests.” Moreover, it found that the sale
of DCAG's vehicles in California “is not an
isolated occurrence but arises from the
efforts of DCAG to serve the California
market.” The district court recognized that
DCAG would be slightly burdened if it was
forced to litigate the case in the United
States; but, it found that the burden would
be “minimal”…The district court concluded
“that California has at least an abstract
interest in adjudicating plaintiffs' dispute,”
but found that California had “little direct
interest” in adjudicating the case…. The
district court tentatively held that exercise of
personal jurisdiction would be unreasonable,
however, primarily because it found that
Argentina was available as an alternative
forum. Because the question was a close
one, the district court did not issue a final
decision; instead, it allowed for limited
jurisdictional discovery regarding the
agency relationship between DCAG and
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MBUSA and the availability of Argentina
and Germany as alternative fora.
On February 12, 2007, following the limited
jurisdictional discovery, the district court
issued its final order granting DCAG's
motion to dismiss….
The appellants timely appealed, asserting
that the district court erred in finding that it
lacked jurisdiction over DCAG.
III.
DCAG argued in the district court that the
court did not have personal jurisdiction over
DCAG or subject matter jurisdiction over
plaintiffs' claims. The district court chose to
resolve the personal jurisdiction question
first. The district court's discretionary
decision to do so was proper. Therefore, the
only question before us is whether the
district court had personal jurisdiction over
DCAG.
We review a dismissal for lack of personal
jurisdiction de novo. In doing so, we apply
the following rule: “[w]hen a district court
acts on a ... motion to dismiss [for lack of
personal jurisdiction] without holding an
evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need make
only a prima facie showing of jurisdictional
facts to withstand the motion.” In other
words, when as here, the district court did
not hold an evidentiary hearing, the
plaintiffs “need only demonstrate facts that if
true would support jurisdiction over the
defendant.”
IV.

In evaluating the appropriateness of personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant,
we ordinarily examine whether such
jurisdiction satisfies the “requirements of the
applicable state long-arm statute” and
“comport[s]
with
federal
due
process.” Because California “permits the
exercise of personal jurisdiction to the full
extent permitted by due process,” we need
only determine whether jurisdiction over
DCAG comports with due process….
We [] turn to an examination of whether
general jurisdiction over DCAG in
California comports with due process; in
doing so, we conduct a two-part inquiry.
First, we examine whether “the defendant
ha[d] the requisite contacts with the forum
state to render it subject to the forum's
jurisdiction.” Second, if it did, we then turn
to an examination of whether the assertion
of jurisdiction is fair and reasonable.
A. Requisite Contacts
In determining the requisite contacts of a
defendant, we look to whether its activities
in the forum are “ ‘substantial’ or
‘continuous and systematic,’ even if the
cause of action is unrelated to those
activities.” … Here, there is no doubt that
MBUSA has the requisite contacts. The
question is whether MBUSA's extensive
contacts with California warrant the exercise
of general jurisdiction over DCAG.
Under the controlling law, if one of
two separate tests is satisfied, we may find
the necessary contacts to support the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over a
foreign parent company by virtue of its
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relationship to a subsidiary that has
continual operations in the forum. The first
test, not directly at issue here, is the “alter
ego” test. It is predicated upon a showing of
parental control over the subsidiary….
The second test, which is applicable here, is
the “agency” test. That test is predicated
upon a showing of the special importance of
the services performed by the subsidiary:
The agency test is satisfied by a showing
that the subsidiary functions as the parent
corporation's representative in that it
performs services that are sufficiently
important to the foreign corporation that if it
did not have a representative to perform
them, the corporation's own officials would
undertake to perform substantially similar
services.
For the agency test, we ask: Are the services
provided by MBUSA sufficiently important
to DCAG that, if MBUSA went out of
business, DCAG would continue selling cars
in this vast market either by selling them
itself, or alternatively by selling them
through a new representative? We answer
this question in the affirmative. In addition,
this test requires the plaintiffs to show an
element of control, albeit not as much
control as is required to satisfy the “alter
ego” test. We conclude that DCAG has more
than enough control to meet the agency test,
because DCAG has the right to control
nearly every aspect of MBUSA's operations.
Application of the Agency Test
1. Sufficient Importance
… The purpose of examining sufficient
importance is to determine whether the

actions of the subsidiary can be understood
as a manifestation of the parent's
presence….
Our starting point for the sufficient
importance prong is that a subsidiary acts as
an agent if the parent would undertake to
perform the services itself if it had no
representative at all to perform them. As
the Second Circuit explained, a court “may
assert
jurisdiction over
a
foreign
corporation” when it affiliates itself with a
local entity whose services “are sufficiently
important to the foreign entity that the
corporation itself would perform equivalent
services if no agent were available.”
Selling Mercedes–Benz vehicles is a critical
aspect of DCAG's business operations;
DCAG's charter defines its goals as the
“development, manufacture, and sales of
products.” When this suit was filed, the
United States market accounted for 19% of
the sales of Mercedes–Benz vehicles
worldwide, and MBUSA's sales in
California alone accounted for 2.4% of
DCAG's total worldwide sales. DCAG
simply could not afford to be without a U.S.
distribution system.
The services that MBUSA currently
performs are sufficiently important to
DCAG that they would almost certainly be
performed by other means if MBUSA did
not exist, whether by DCAG performing
those services itself or by DCAG entering
into an agreement with a new subsidiary or a
non-subsidiary national distributor for the
performance of those services…. contractors
may be considered representatives, and
contracting with an independent contractor
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to achieve the same end—distributing cars
in the United States—means, in practice,
obtaining a “representative” to “undertake ...
substantially similar services.”
Therefore, the plaintiffs have established the
importance to DCAG of the services
performed by MBUSA and met the
sufficiently important test, because even if
DCAG were to replace MBUSA with an
independent entity, that entity would still be
considered a representative for purposes of
that test.
2. Control
We turn now to an examination of the
element of control. As we have stated, the
principal focus of our agency test for
purposes of personal jurisdiction is the
importance of the services provided to the
parent corporation. In Unocal, we conducted
a thorough analysis of a potential agency
relationship and based our decision solely on
the failure to meet the sufficient importance
test. We then added that control alone was
insufficient to overcome that failure.
Control nevertheless plays a role in
determining whether personal jurisdiction is
established because control is a traditional
element of agency under common law
principles. DCAG contends that a right to
control is not sufficient, and that the parent
must actually exercise control over the
operations of its subsidiary on a day-to-day
basis in order to meet the agency test. This
argument is in error because it conflates the
agency and alter ego tests. We have
previously explained that these two tests are
distinct and involve considerations of

distinct factors. As explained
Restatement (Third) of Agency:

in

the

A principal's right to control the agent is
a constant across relationships of
agency, but the content or specific
meaning of the right varies. Thus, a
person may be an agent although the
principal lacks the right to control the
full range of the agent's activities, how
the agent uses time, or the agent's
exercise of professional judgment. A
principal's failure to exercise the right of
control does not eliminate it, nor is it
eliminated by physical distance between
the agent and principal....
As we recently held, “[t]o form an agency
relationship, both the principal and the agent
must manifest assent to the principal's right
to control the agent.” We went on to make
clear that actual control was not necessary
by noting that a principal must either
“actually control[ ]” the agent, or the
principal and the agent must agree that the
principal has the right to do so. We can
think of no clearer manifestation of assent to
the principal's right to control than the
comprehensive written agreement between
DCAG and MBUSA….
We must remember that we are considering
the contours of the test for agency to be
applied in the context of personal
jurisdiction. We are not examining the rules
governing the test for vicarious liability, or
for holding DCAG financially liable for the
actions of MBUSA. Moreover, when we
consider control here, it is as part of a test
that primarily considers whether the services
are of “sufficient importance.” …
3. DCAG's Right to Control
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The degree of control that DCAG exercises
over MBUSA is more than sufficient for the
purpose of establishing personal jurisdiction.
To repeat, we must take plaintiffs' alleged
facts as true, because plaintiffs need make
only a prima facie showing of personal
jurisdiction here.
DCAG contends that the General
Distributor's Agreement is evidence of an
“arms-length” relationship with MBUSA.
We do not read the agreement as DCAG
appears to. DCAG has the right to control
nearly all aspects of MBUSA's operations…
MBUSA must comply with all of DCAG's
current requirements and all future
requirements that may be set forth in any
future document promulgated by DCAG….
Because
MBUSA's
services
were
sufficiently important to DCAG and because
DCAG had the right to substantially control
MBUSA's activities, we conclude that
MBUSA was DCAG's agent for general
jurisdictional purposes.
B. Reasonableness
Because we hold that there is ample
evidence of an agency relationship between
DCAG and MBUSA, and, thus, that
MBUSA's contacts with California may be
imputed to DCAG, we now must turn to the
second part of our test: whether the assertion
of jurisdiction is “reasonable.”
Once plaintiffs have made the requisite
showing of minimum contacts in the forum
state, “[t]he burden ... shifts to the defendant
to present a compelling case that jurisdiction
would be unreasonable.” We weigh seven
factors in resolving this question:

the extent of purposeful interjection; the
burden on the defendant; the extent of
conflict with sovereignty of the
defendant's state; the forum state's
interest in adjudicating the suit; the most
efficient judicial resolution of the dispute;
the convenience and effectiveness of
relief for the plaintiff; and the existence
of an alternative forum.
No one factor is dispositive; nor is the
answer dictated by whether the majority of
factors favors one side or the other. Rather
we take into consideration all seven factors
and then conduct an overall evaluation of
the question.
1. The Extent of Purposeful Interjection
DCAG has purposefully and extensively
interjected itself into the California market
through MBUSA. The district court found
that DCAG had purposely availed itself of
the California market, primarily through its
design of cars to meet California's air quality
standards, its manufacture of a fuel cell for
the California Fuel Cell Partnership, and the
fact that DCAG built a prototype fuel cell
vehicle specifically for the United Parcel
Service (“UPS”) to use in California. The
district court also found that DCAG had
purposefully interjected itself into California
by “initiating lawsuits in California courts to
challenge the state's clean air laws and to
protect DCAG's patents and other business
interests.” … In addition, we note that
DCAG
established
DaimlerChrysler
Research and Technology North America
and headquartered the company in “the heart
of Silicon Valley.”…
The district court also found it relevant that
DCAG has retained permanent counsel in
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California and is listed on the Pacific Stock
Exchange
located
in
San
Francisco. … Finally, according to DCAG's
own figures, MBUSA's sales in California
alone account for 2.4% of DCAG's total
worldwide sales.
The first factor, therefore, weighs heavily in
favor of “reasonableness,” as a corporation
that “has continuously and deliberately
exploited the [California] market ... must
reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there....”
2. The Burden on the Defendant
The burden on the defendant, a large
international corporation, to litigate the case
in California is not so weighty as to preclude
jurisdiction—particularly since “modern
advances
in
communications
and
transportation have significantly reduced the
burden of litigating in another country.” …
Here, the burden on the defendant of
producing records and witnesses in
California, when the events in question took
place in Argentina, would be no greater than
if the case were instead litigated in
Germany. Moreover, DCAG's official
language is English, so it will not be
disadvantaged in that respect by litigating in
the forum selected by the plaintiffs.
This factor weighs slightly in DCAG's favor,
because there is some burden in having to
litigate in a foreign country. It is not,
however, a particularly significant factor, in
part because the burden for an international
corporation is ordinarily slight, and in part
because “the Supreme Court has preferred

non-jurisdictional methods of lessening the
inconvenience faced by defendants.”
3. The Extent of Conflict with Sovereignty
of the Defendant's State
Third, we have held that the extent of the
conflict with the sovereignty of the
defendant's state “is not dispositive because,
if given controlling weight, it would always
prevent suit against a foreign national in a
United States court.” Although it is true that
“[g]reat care and reserve should be exercised
when extending our notions of personal
jurisdiction into the international field,” that
same consideration will always be present in
claims under the ATS and the TVPA.
Although German courts have expressed
some concern that this suit may impinge
upon German sovereignty, we do not agree.
In applying this factor, we examine “the
presence or absence of connections to the
United States in general, not just to the
forum state.” …
DCAG has “manifested an intent to serve
and to benefit from the United States
market.” It has chosen to place itself at risk
of litigation by engaging in extensive
business in the United States through the
operations of its agent MBUSA and its asset
DCC. We do not violate Germany's
sovereignty by exercising jurisdiction to
hear this suit, even though it involves a
German citizen corporation. This factor
again weighs only slightly in DCAG's favor.
4. The Forum State's
Adjudicating the Suit

Interest

in
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Fourth, although the events at issue did not
take place in California and although the
plaintiffs are not California residents, the
forum state does have a significant interest
in adjudicating the suit. California partakes
in “the shared interest of the several States
in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies.” Here, as the claims are predicated
upon the ATS and TVPA, that policy is
providing a forum to redress violations of
international law by defendants who have
enough connections with the United States
to be brought to trial on our shores, even
though the injury is to aliens and occurs
outside our borders—“a small but important
step in the fulfillment of the ageless dream
to
free
all
people
from
brutal
violence.” American federal courts, be they
in California or any other state, have a
strong interest in adjudicating and redressing
international human rights abuses. As the
Second Circuit held shortly after the turn of
the century:
The new formulations of the Torture
Victim Protection Act convey the
message that torture committed under
color of law of a foreign nation in
violation of international law is our
business, as such conduct not only
violates the standards of international
law but also as a consequence violates
our domestic law. In the legislative
history of the TVPA, Congress noted
that universal condemnation of human
rights abuses provide[s] scant comfort to
the numerous victims of gross violations
if they are without a forum to remedy the
wrong. This passage supports plaintiffs'
contention that in passing the Torture
Victim Prevention Act, Congress has
expressed a policy of U.S. law favoring

the adjudication of such suits in U.S.
courts.
We
agree
and
have
previously
cited Wiwa with approval for this exact
point. The policy of the TVPA is that these
“suits should not be facilely dismissed on
the assumption that the ostensibly foreign
controversy is not our business.” In light of
the important interest we have recognized,
this factor weighs in favor of the
reasonableness of exercising personal
jurisdiction.
5. The Most Efficient Judicial Resolution
of the Dispute
The fifth factor, which examines which
forum is most efficient, “involves a
comparison of alternative forums.” Because
we have primarily looked to where the
witnesses and evidence are located in order
to determine the most efficient forum, there
is no difference between the United States
and Germany insofar as this factor is
concerned. Here, the witnesses and evidence
are located primarily in Argentina.
Therefore, if that forum were an available
alternative forum as discussed below, it
would likely be the most efficient. … In the
end, the factor is a draw; there is no
difference insofar as the efficiency factor is
concerned between the United States and
Germany, and Argentina is not a truly
available forum as discussed below.
6 & 7. The Convenience and Effectiveness
of Relief for the Plaintiff; and the
Existence of an Alternative Forum
We have traditionally evaluated the sixth
and seventh factors together. The plaintiffs
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contend that Germany does not recognize
human rights suits against corporate
defendants and will not allow equitable
tolling. Argentinian courts, the plaintiffs
assert, provide no means of redress against
corporations
that
collaborated
with
Argentine security forces in carrying out the
Dirty War, and would bar this suit on
account of the statute of limitations. Most
important for our purposes is whether
Argentina would be an adequate forum, as
that country, where the events at issue in this
lawsuit took place, would be the most
natural location in which to litigate the case,
were all other factors equal. The plaintiff
“bears the burden of proving the
unavailability
of
an
alternative
forum,” although as mentioned earlier, the
overall
burden
with
respect
to
reasonableness lies with the defendants.
The plaintiffs' arguments that Argentina
would not be a fully adequate forum—if it is
a forum at all—are persuasive, at this stage
of the litigation. A recent Supreme Court
case in Argentina has held that human rights
civil cases arising out of the Dirty War are
subject to a two-year and three-month
statute of limitations. This suit would, for
that reason, be barred—which makes
Argentina unavailable as an alternative
forum.
As to Germany, there is conflicting expert
testimony about whether equitable tolling, or
an equivalent within the German legal
system, would allow the suit to proceed. The
answer is not clear; indeed, the district court
concluded that “it appears that plaintiffs'
claims, which are based on events that
occurred in 1976 and 1977, would

not necessarily be time-barred.” DCAG
argues that Germany does allow human
rights suits against corporate defendants, and
that plaintiffs are incorrect when they assert
a contrary position. Plaintiffs argue,
however, that when DCAG was arguing
before the German courts about the need to
stay the plaintiffs' service of process, DCAG
argued that plaintiffs could not allege a
cause of action in the German courts.
Furthermore,
in Harris
Rutsky, we
considered the defendant's amenability to
service of process in the alleged alternative
forum in deciding whether that forum was
truly an alternative. Given the concerns
discussed above, and the issues that have
already arisen with respect to plaintiffs'
efforts to serve DCAG in Germany, we
cannot say that Germany is an adequate
forum such that personal jurisdiction
elsewhere should be defeated…. For the
reasons stated above, factors six and seven
weigh in favor of the plaintiffs with respect
to Argentina, but the answer is unclear as to
Germany or possibly, because of the burden
of proof applicable to the evaluation of this
factor, the balance should be struck in favor
of Germany.
Even if Argentina and Germany were, as
DCAG argues, both adequate fora for
redressing any alleged wrongs, the
availability of an alternative forum is not the
deciding factor in the personal jurisdiction
analysis….
Overall Evaluation of the Factors
The question before us is ultimately whether
exercising personal jurisdiction over DCAG
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comports with fair play and substantial
justice. We find that it does. As the Second
Circuit held in evaluating the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over the Royal
Dutch/Shell Group:

reasonable to exercise jurisdiction over
DCAG in California, a state that has itself
become a major hub for world commerce
and attracts business not only from all over
Europe, but from all over Asia as well.

While it is true that certain factors normally
used to assess the reasonableness of
subjection to jurisdiction do favor the
defendants (they are foreign corporations
that face something of a burden if they
litigate here, and the events in question did
not occur in New York), litigation in New
York City would not represent any great
inconvenience to the defendants. The
defendants control a vast, wealthy, and farflung business empire which operates in
most parts of the globe. They have a
physical presence in the forum state
[through their agent], have access to
enormous resources, face little or no
language barrier, have litigated in this
country on previous occasions, have a fourdecade long relationship with one of the
nation's leading law firms, and are the parent
companies of one of America's largest
corporations, which has a very significant
presence in New York. New York City,
furthermore, where the trial would be held,
is a major world capital which offers central
location, easy access, and extensive facilities
of all kinds. We conclude that the
inconvenience to the defendants involved in
litigating in New York City would not be
great and that nothing in the Due Process
Clause precludes New York from exercising
jurisdiction over the defendants.

In Harris Rutsky, we found that jurisdiction
was reasonable even though there was an
“obvious alternative forum” and the balance
of the seven factors was essentially a
wash, “since some of the reasonableness
factors weigh in favor of [the defendant], but
others weigh against it.” Here, the
defendants present a far less compelling case
than did the defendants in Harris
Rutsky. Most important, DCAG's contacts
with California and with the U.S.
are far more extensive than the defendant's
contacts in Harris Rutsky....

Many or all of those considerations apply
with equal force in this case. For much the
same reasons, we conclude that it is

In light of DCAG's pervasive contacts with
the forum state through MBUSA, including
the extensive business operations of that
subsidiary, the interest of California in
adjudicating important questions of human
rights, our substantial doubt as to the
adequacy of Argentina as an alternative
forum, and the various issues discussed
above with respect to Germany, we hold that
DCAG “has not met its burden of
presenting a compelling case that the
exercise of jurisdiction would not comport
with fair play and substantial justice.”
V. Conclusion
At the time this suit was filed, MBUSA's
business was sufficiently important to
DCAG that without MBUSA or another
representative,
DCAG
would
have
performed those services itself. Moreover,
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DCAG had the right to control to one extent
or another nearly every aspect of MBUSA's
business. Therefore, we conclude that, at
least for the limited purpose of determining
general jurisdiction, MBUSA was DCAG's
agent.
The Supreme Court “long ago rejected the
notion that personal jurisdiction might turn
on ‘mechanical’ tests” that fail to take
account of reality. The reality is that in an
increasingly complex and globalized
economy, international corporations such as
DCAG reap enormous profits from the sale
of their goods in the United States. The sales
are achieved through the use of major
distributors, frequently in the form of
subsidiaries. Many international companies
organize their corporate structure and
establish subsidiaries for the sole purpose of
obtaining the maximum benefit from the
American market. To the ordinary
American, and certainly to us, it would seem
odd, indeed, if the manufacturer of
Mercedes–Benz vehicles, which are sold in
California in vast numbers by its American
subsidiary, for use on the state's streets and
highways, could not be required to appear in
the federal courts of that state. Mercedes–
Benz cars are ubiquitous in California, and
Mercedes–Benz dealerships, required to

display the signage mandated by DCAG,
have a highly visible presence.
The numbers bear out our perception. At the
time that this suit was filed, MBUSA's sales
in California alone accounted for 2.4% of
DCAG's total worldwide sales. Moreover,
when considering burdens on the defendant
and the issue of state sovereignty, we cannot
overlook the fact that when this suit was
filed, nearly 50% of DCAG's overall
revenue came from the United States, and
that in order to make this income, DCAG
created
a
wholly-owned
subsidiary,
MBUSA, to sell Mercedes–Benz vehicles in
the United States.
Our test for personal jurisdiction must take
these realities into account in determining
whether it is reasonable to subject a parent
company to the jurisdiction of the courts of
this nation on the basis of the acts of its
agent. After applying this test, we have no
doubt that DCAG is subject to personal
jurisdiction in California, and that the
exercise of such jurisdiction is not only
reasonable, but fair and just. Therefore we
reverse and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
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“Supreme Court to Review Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler”
Opinio Juris
Kenneth Anderson
July 17, 2013
About the same time (April 2013) that the
US Supreme Court released its opinion in
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, the Court
also granted review of a Ninth Circuit case,
Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler. Just ahead of
the July 4th weekend, the Obama
administration submitted what John
Bellinger, in a lucid post over at Lawfare,
describes as a “remarkably strong” amicus
brief urging the Court to
reverse the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler. The Justice
Department argued that the Ninth
Circuit’s 2011 decision finding personal
jurisdiction in California over Daimler
AG, a German company, for the actions
of a subsidiary in Argentina, was
“seriously flawed” and contrary to the
Supreme Court’s subsequent 2011
decision in Goodyear. The brief faults
the Ninth Circuit for trying to hold a
foreign corporation with few contacts to
California to “answer in that State for any
claim against it, arising anytime,
anywhere in the world.”
The
background
to
Bauman
v.
DaimlerChrysler, Bellinger explains, is that
in May 2011 a Ninth Circuit panel
held that that Daimler AG, a German
parent company with no operations or
employees in the United States, could be
sued under the Alien Tort Statute and the
Torture Victim Protection Act (as well
as common law and state law) by a
group of Argentine nationals for human
rights abuses allegedly committed by an

Argentine subsidiary in collaborating
with the Argentine government during
the “Dirty War” in the 1970s, solely on
the basis that a different U.S. subsidiary
now distributes Mercedes Benz vehicles
in the United States. Applying an
agency theory, the panel concluded that
Daimler AG had sufficient contacts with
the state of California by virtue of the
actions of its subsidiary Mercedes Benz
USA to give California personal
jurisdiction over the German parent ,
even though Mercedes Benz USA had
no involvement with the alleged facts in
Argentina.
I agree with Bellinger that the likelihood,
following Kiobel, is that the Court is moving
to restrain jurisdictional assertions by
Federal courts, and is pushing back toward
stricter grounding in the traditional bases of
jurisdiction by national courts. My own
larger, political view is that this is connected
to a perception that although broad
assertions of US jurisdiction through such
vehicles as the Alien Tort Statute over
foreign parties for acts on foreign territory
can certainly be framed as enforcing
universal international law through national
courts, it is better understood as assertions of
something quite different – what I’ve
sometimes called the “law of the hegemon.”
That is an increasingly contested position as
a matter of international politics spilling
over into international law, and between the
rise of new great powers and the Obama
administration’s political embrace of
decline, it seems to me unsurprising that the
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Obama administration would embrace a
more traditional, much more restrictive
understanding of jurisdiction.
But it also seems the Court is also generally
on board with this pull-back. As Bellinger
says, many observers (me included) believe
that
the Court would not have accepted the
case unless it plans to reverse the Ninth
Circuit. Conservative justices are loathe
to miss an opportunity to try to curb the
Ninth Circuit’s consistent efforts to be a
world court, and the more liberal justices
may have wanted to demonstrate (as
Justice Breyer argued in his concurrence
in Kiobel) that the extraterritorial reach
of the Alien Tort Statute can be limited
by other jurisdictional restrictions.
I agree. Despite the obvious clash of
approaches between the Roberts majority
and the Breyer minority in Kiobel, they do
have an important common ground – an
intention to limit extraterritorial jurisdiction
through a stricter application of the
traditional bases of jurisdiction.
The DaimlerChrysler case gives Justice
Breyer an opportunity to put sharper teeth, if
that’s his inclination, into the third
alternative test for finding jurisdiction that
he proposed in Kiobel – an interest of the
United States, including its interest in not
harboring persons or assets of the “common
enemies of mankind.” Over at Volokh, I
suggest that this reproduces the same basic
problem as the Sosa test for restricting
causes of action: the test is impeccable in
theory, but unhelpful in practice. Why?

On either Sosa’s restrictive test (norms of
same content and specificity as would have
obtained in 1789) or Breyer’s new test (US
interests, including not shielding the persons
or assets of common enemies of mankind),
the problem lies in how – or whether – such
formulations prevent a lower court from
applying them in ever broader ways. The
Ninth Circuit has lived happily with the
Sosa limits for a decade; it simply views so
many, many things as being as well
established today as the equivalent 1789
norms. It is very hard for me to see that the
same thing won’t happen with Breyer’s
formulation of US interests. But potentially
the DaimlerChrysler case gives him an
opportunity to do so. And it’s not, by the
way, that I think the Roberts’ way of reining
things in is perfect, either – the presumption
against extraterritoriality is finally merely a
presumption, and the Ninth Circuit would
presumably have not much greater trouble
batting it away than it would dealing with
the Breyer restriction. It’s telling that the
Roberts’ opinion feels obliged, after stating
that
the
presumption
against
extraterritoriality applies to the ATS, to
conclude by adding that mere corporate
presence is not enough to turn something
extraterritorial into something territorial
(which tees up DaimlerChrysler as well).
There are many questions left open
regarding the involvement of US courts
extraterritorially. One is structural: Kiobel
has the effect of favoring economic activity
abroad by foreign corporations and
disfavoring US corporations. Of course US
corporations should have to respond
somewhere – the problem is that it is a very
uneven playing field, and Kiobel has made it
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more uneven, rather than less. I assume this
will arise quite quickly in some case in
which a US corporation continues to assert
in court the proposition that Kiobel did not
finally address – corporate liability and
aiding and abetting liability. I don’t see how
the Court will avoid finally having to

address this. In addition, there is the
consideration that OJ’s Kiobel discussions
have raised several times – a shift in these
claims from Federal to state court. The
twists and turns of extraterritoriality are not
over.
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“Supreme Court Could Redraw The Reach Of America's Courts”
Forbes
Michael Bobelian
April 29, 2013
A few days after issuing the Kiobel
ruling restricting the scope of the Alien Tort
Statute (ATS), the Supreme Court has
agreed to hear another case dealing with the
ambiguous law often used to bring civil
actions for human rights violations
committed abroad.
In many ATS cases, both the underlying
facts and litigants have few connections to
the United States. That was the case
in Kiobel, which involved Nigerian plaintiffs
suing a Nigerian subsidiary of the oil giant
Shell for alleged actions taking place in
Nigeria.
In Kiobel, the Court held that there was a
strong
presumption
against
the
extraterritorial application of American law
to actions taking place outside of the
nation’s borders. This presumption, the
opinion authored by Chief Justice John
Roberts Jr. held, barred an American court
from establishing jurisdiction over Shell.
DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman, which the
Court will hear in its next term, asks the
Court to resolve a different but related
question: can an American court exercise
jurisdiction “over a foreign corporation
based solely on the fact that an indirect
corporate subsidiary performs services on
behalf of the defendant” in the United
States? The plaintiffs in the case have
accused an Argentinean subsidiary of

DaimlerChrysler (the auto companies were
still together when the case was filed) of
collaborating with Argentinean officials in
kidnapping, torturing, and killing former
employees of the subsidiary. They sued
DaimlerChrysler, a German company, in
California by obtaining jurisdiction through
the automaker’s American subsidiary.
On the surface, it looks like another ATS
case. Perhaps the Court, as Justice Anthony
Kennedy suggested in his concurring
opinion in Kiobel, will provide further
guidance on the scope and reach of the
statute. The Court may do just that. The
case also provides the Court with an opening
to change the law far beyond the ATS,
which only saw about a dozen new cases a
year, by redefining the contours of the reach
of America’s courts.
The series of facts that led to a lawsuit in a
federal court in California for actions
committed thousands of miles away is
typical of the complexities that arise in
establishing jurisdiction, which tends to be
among the trickiest areas of the
law. Generally, a court can establish
jurisdiction over a person that has
connections to the court’s locale. It makes
little sense, for instance, to try a case in
Missouri of two New Yorkers who get into a
car accident in New York: neither the parties
nor the dispute in this example have any
connections to the Show-Me state.
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With corporations, however, the issue of
jurisdiction
gets
more
complicated. Multinational corporations
rely upon a host of subsidiaries, jointventures, and other business partnerships to
run their global operations: Daimler listed
557 subsidiaries and other related entities
across the world in 2011. Should an act by
one of these units allow a court to establish
jurisdiction with any of its sister
organizations or the parent in charge of the
entire enterprise?
In earlier rounds of the case, the plaintiffs
pointed out that Daimler conducted a
significant amount of business in the United
States
–
and
California
in
particular. Daimler’s American operations
also included a regional office in Costa
Mesa, California and a vehicle preparation
center about 30 miles away. After a lengthy
but typical analysis, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals found that a district court in
California could establish jurisdiction over
Daimler, the parent corporation, through its
American subsidiary’s extensive and
continuous activities in the U.S.
It’s not clear what the Court will do
in Bauman at this point. The justices have
left some hints along the way,
however. During Kiobel‘s first round of oral
arguments last February, Justice Samuel
Alito questioned the applicability of

American law to the lawsuit:”What does a
case like that have in the courts of the
United States?” Before the council
responded to his question, the justice
answered: “There’s no connection to the
United States whatsoever.”
Justice Stephen Breyer also provided some
potential insight on the issue in his
separate opinion in Kiobel. He argued for a
different application of the ATS – one not
based on the concept of extraterritorial
application. Yet, the looser standard he
recommended would have led to the same
result reached by the majority ruling. A
small corporate presence, Justice Breyer
explained, referring to the connection of the
Shell parent companies based in Europe to
the United States, were insufficient to
establish jurisdiction.
In Kiobel, the plaintiffs tried to establish
jurisdiction over Shell in much the same
way as Baumann: through the connection of
two separate subsidiaries – one in the U.S.,
one abroad – to a company headquartered in
Europe. At first glance, that similarity
points to an identical and straightforward
result for the Court. On the other hand, the
justices could use the case as an opportunity
to redefine the jurisdictional reach of
American
courts
over
large-scale
corporations.
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“Daimler Must Face Argentina Abuse Lawsuit in U.S.”
Reuters
Jonathan Stempel
May 18, 2011
Daimler AG was ordered on Wednesday to
face a U.S. lawsuit alleging it participated in
the kidnapping, torture and death of
Mercedes-Benz workers in Argentina's
"Dirty War" three decades ago.
A three-judge panel of the 9th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals in San Francisco revived a
seven-year-old case brought by 22 residents
ofArgentina, including victims of violence
and relatives of former workers presumed to
have been killed.
The panel said a federal judge erred in 2007
when he decided he lacked jurisdiction, and
that the case should be brought
in Argentina or Germany, home of Stuttgartbased Daimler (DAIGn.DE). The panel sent
the case back to the federal district court in
San Jose, California.
"Daimler AG intends to appeal this
jurisdictional decision," spokesman Han
Tjan said in an email. "However, no ruling
or judgment has been made as to the
underlying allegations, which Daimler AG
steadfastly denies."
Human rights groups in Argentina have said
as many as 30,000 people were killed from
1976 to 1983 in a state-sponsored
crackdown on leftist dissent while the
country was under a military dictatorship,
following the ouster of President Isabel
Peron.

In the Daimler case, plaintiffs said
Mercedes-Benz collaborated with state
security forces in causing the detention,
kidnapping, torture or death of workers at
the Gonzalez-Catan plant near Buenos
Aires.
"Our clients were trade union leaders and
members in Argentina who were
'disappeared' by national police after the
company identified them as troublemakers,"
Terry Collingsworth, a lawyer for the
plaintiffs, said in an interview. "Now that we
have jurisdiction, we have a straight shot at
the merits."
Collingsworth said his
"substantial" damages.

clients

seek

In the 9th Circuit ruling, Judge Stephen
Reinhardt said Daimler, through its
Mercedes-Benz unit, had "pervasive"
contacts with California.
He also said Argentine courts would
conclude the plaintiffs waited too long to
sue, and that it was unclear whether German
courts would consider the plaintiffs' claims.
Daimler "has not met its burden of
presenting a compelling case that the
exercise of jurisdiction would not comport
with fair play and substantial justice," he
said.
The U.S. case was brought under the Alien
Tort Claims Act, a 1789 law sometimes used
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to sue companies in U.S. courts for acts
committed abroad.

The case is Bauman et al v.
DaimlerChrysler Corp et al, 9th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals, No. 07-15386.
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“Supreme Court Revisits (and May Rein In) Personal Jurisdiction”
Lexology
Grant J. Esposito & Brian R. Matsui
May 21, 2013
Introduction
On April 22 2013 the Supreme Court
granted review in a personal jurisdiction
case: DaimlerChrysler AG v Bauman. The
question presented in DaimlerChrysler is:
"Whether it violates due process for a
court to exercise general personal
jurisdiction
over
a
foreign
corporation based solely on the fact
that an indirect corporate subsidiary
performs services on behalf of the
defendant in the forum State".
The Supreme Court previously granted
certiorari in a specific personal jurisdiction
case: Walden
v
Fiore. The
question
presented in Walden is "[w]hether due
process permits a court to exercise personal
jurisdiction over a defendant whose sole
'contact' with the forum State is his
knowledge that the plaintiff has connections
to that State".
Both DaimlerChrysler and Walden arose
from the Ninth Circuit. They will be argued
in Autumn 2013, with a decision expected
no later than the end of June 2014.
Both of these cases are of significant interest
to businesses, as personal jurisdiction
delimits a court's ability to hail a defendant
into court and subject that defendant to the
court's power and punishment. The Supreme
Court has frequently declined to engage in
issues of personal jurisdiction. Indeed, until

this pair of decisions during the 2010 term,
the Supreme Court had not significantly
addressed personal jurisdiction since 1987,
when the court splintered in its decision
governing specific personal jurisdiction
in Asahi Metal Industry Co v Superior Court
of Cal, Solano Cty.
DaimlerChrysler addresses the standard for
general personal jurisdiction based on
imputing the contacts of in-forum
subsidiaries to foreign parent corporations.
Walden addresses what it means for a
defendant to "expressly aim" its conduct at a
forum, such that a state has specific personal
jurisdiction over an alleged intentional
tortfeasor.
These two grants follow closely on the heels
of the Supreme Court's June 2011 rulings
in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations and J
McIntyre Machinery, in which it limited the
ability of state courts to assert personal
jurisdiction over foreign defendants.
DaimlerChrysler
DaimlerChrysler addresses
the
circumstances in which an in-state
subsidiary's contacts with the forum state are
sufficient for the forum state to have general
jurisdiction over the foreign parent
corporation.
In DaimlerChrysler the
plaintiffs
are
residents of Argentina who allege human
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rights violations against them and their
relatives at the hands of Argentina's military
dictatorship during the 'dirty war' in the late
1970s and early 1980s. During that time the
plaintiffs
were
employed
by
DaimlerChrysler's subsidiary in Argentina.
The plaintiffs claimed that the Argentine
subsidiary collaborated with the Argentine
military in carrying out the alleged abuses.
DaimlerChrysler is a German company that
manufactures Mercedes-Benz automobiles
in Germany. It does not manufacture, market
or sell any products in the United States.
The plaintiffs filed suit in California,
maintaining that DaimlerChrysler was
subject to general personal jurisdiction in
California – not because it was present in
California, but rather on an agency theory by
attributing to DaimlerChrysler the California
contacts of a different, indirect subsidiary
incorporated in Delaware (Mercedes-Benz
USA LLC). The Delaware subsidiary takes
title to the luxury cars in Germany and then
distributes them in the United States,
including through dealerships in California.
The
plaintiffs
thus
argued
that
DaimlerChrysler was subject to general
jurisdiction in California based on the
contacts that its Delaware subsidiary has
with California and, as a result, the German
parent company could be forced to defend
itself in California against the human rights
violations allegedly committed by its
Argentine subsidiary in Argentina.
The district court permitted discovery into
the jurisdictional question. The court found
that there was no agency relationship and
granted DaimlerChrysler's motion to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction.

In a curious turn of events at the Ninth
Circuit, this decision was first affirmed in a
divided panel opinion and subsequently
reversed by the same panel nine months
later. DaimlerChrysler's petition for
rehearing en banc was denied, although
eight judges dissented from that denial.
In the Ninth Circuit there are two separate
tests for determining whether a subsidiary's
contacts can be imputed to a parent
corporation
for
general
jurisdiction
purposes. One test examines whether the
subsidiary is merely an alter ego of the
parent. The other test – the agency test – is
at issue in DaimlerChrysler. This test
requires two showings:


whether
the
subsidiary
was
established for, or is engaged in,
activities that the parent would have to
undertake itself but for the existence
of the subsidiary; and



whether the parent effectively controls
the subsidiary's internal affairs or dayto-day operations.

The Second Circuit generally also applies
this test. Where the foreign defendant is a
holding company that by definition does not
conduct operations itself and can do
business only through subsidiaries, the
agency test ordinarily is not satisfied. Yet in
the case at hand, the Ninth Circuit
reformulated the agency test so that, as
Judge O'Scannlain, dissenting from the
denial of rehearing en banc, explained, the
court "now seemingly rejects respect for
corporate separateness, a well-established
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'principle of corporate law deeply ingrained
in our economic and legal systems'".

DaimlerChrysler is subject to personal
jurisdiction.

At least five other circuits – the Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits –
have rejected the agency test for general
jurisdiction. Those courts require the
subsidiary to be an alter ego of the foreign
parent – in other words, due process requires
a plaintiff to show that the foreign parent
controlled and dominated the day-to-day
activities of its domestic subsidiary to the
extent that the corporate form should be
disregarded and the two should be treated as
alter egos. These circuits generally view the
following as indicia of corporate
separateness sufficient to reject imputing
jurisdictional contacts of a domestic entity to
a foreign parent:

The plaintiffs also maintained that it was not
unreasonable for DaimlerChrysler to defend
itself in California in light of:







separate books and records;
separate offices, bank accounts and
tax returns;
separate boards of directors and
employees;
observation of corporate formalities;
and
proof that the domestic entity ran the
actual day-to-day operations (eg,
marketing and sales).

The plaintiffs, now respondents before the
court, argued that the facts – specifically,
that DaimlerChrysler and its indirect, wholly
owned Delaware subsidiary have the same
chairman, sets prices for the cars sold in the
United States and has rights under a
distribution agreement to exert control over
the subsidiary's business activities, as
applied to the Ninth Circuit's agency test –
support
the
holding
below
that






the revenue that it generates from
sales in California;
the fact that it has litigated in the
California courts;
the fact that it has a research centre in
the state; and
the fact that it trades on the Pacific
Stock Exchange.

The
plaintiffs
further
noted
that
technological advancements have lessened
the traditional burdens on foreign defendants
litigating in the United States, and that
neither Argentina nor Germany provided an
adequate forum.
Walden
Walden addresses when a forum state has
specific jurisdiction over an alleged
intentional tortfeasor. In this case, the only
contact between the tortfeasor and the forum
state was its knowledge that the victims of
its tort resided in the forum state.
The plaintiffs are two professional gamblers
who were detained in Atlanta, Georgia by a
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
agent. The plaintiffs' destination was Las
Vegas, Nevada. The plaintiffs maintained
that they were residents of both Nevada and
California, but provided the DEA agent with
California identification only. The DEA
agent suspected that the significant amount
of cash that the plaintiffs had in their
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possession – approximately $97,000 – was
evidence of illegal narcotics transactions,
rather than the legitimate proceeds of legal
gambling. The DEA agent seized the money
and subsequently filed a probable cause
affidavit for forfeiture of the funds.
Ultimately, the US Attorney's Office
determined there was no probable cause for
forfeiture and returned the money to the
plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs brought suit in the US District
Court for the District of Nevada against the
DEA agent responsible for seizing the cash.
The agent moved to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction, citing his absolute
absence of contacts with the state: he had no
contact with anyone in Nevada, owned no
property there and conducted no personal
business in the state. The district court
dismissed the case for lack of personal
jurisdiction.
The Ninth Circuit reversed in a divided
opinion. The court held that Nevada had
specific jurisdiction over the DEA agent.
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the DEA
agent had purposefully directed his conduct
to the forum state (ie, Nevada) because he
knew that the plaintiffs had a connection
with Nevada at the time that the probable
cause affidavit had been filed. Specifically,
the appeal court held that the DEA agent had
committed an intentional act – the filing of a
false affidavit – expressly aimed at Nevada
(where the plaintiffs resided). The court
further concluded that the DEA agent's
intentional act had foreseeable effects in the
forum.

Eight judges of the Ninth Circuit dissented
from the denial of a petition for rehearing en
banc in two separate dissents. As Judge
McKeown's dissent explained:
"With the stroke of a pen, our circuit
returns to a discredited era of specific
personal
jurisdiction,
where
foreseeability reigns supreme and
purposeful direction is irrelevant.
That approach was, of course,
rejected in Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz; the Supreme Court was
unequivocal that 'foreseeability is not
a sufficient benchmark for exercising
personal jurisdiction.' 471 U.S. 462
(1985). Instead, the Due Process
Clause requires that before a distant
state exercises specific jurisdiction
over a defendant, the defendant must
purposefully direct activities at forum
residents resulting in injuries arising
out of or relating to those activities.
Under the majority's construct, mere
knowledge of the potential out-of-state
plaintiff's residence, along with a
wrongful act, confers specific
personal jurisdiction. This virtually
limitless expansion of personal
jurisdiction runs afoul of both due
process guarantees and Supreme
Court precedent".
As the Ninth Circuit's opinions and the
briefing at the certiorari stage suggest, the
appeal courts have divided over what it
means for a party to "expressly aim" its
conduct at a forum state. At least six circuits
have required that a defendant expressly aim
its conduct at the forum state – not merely at
a known forum resident. Meanwhile, the
Ninth Circuit and Eleventh Circuit have
embraced a seemingly broader standard
permitting specific personal jurisdiction
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where a defendant has undertaken
intentional acts with the knowledge that the
plaintiff resides in the forum state. The
Supreme Court inWalden aims to resolve
this confusion.
Next steps
Briefing
in
both DaimlerChrysler and Walden will
occur in Summer 2013 and the cases are
likely to be argued in Autumn 2013.
Decisions in the two cases will be handed
down by June 2014.
The Supreme Court has demonstrated
respect for corporate form in recent years
and this likely will shape the court's
consideration
of DaimlerChrysler.
Ultimately, if the Supreme Court reverses in
these two cases, it will further limit the
ability of state courts (and federal courts
exercising diversity jurisdiction) to assert

personal
jurisdiction
over
non-state
defendants. On the other hand, should the
court affirm the Ninth Circuit in either
decision, this would potentially open
corporate defendants to broader assertions of
jurisdiction, requiring corporate defendants
to defend against a broader range of civil
suits in more places.
Finally, because multinational companies
generally organise themselves through
separate corporations to achieve benefits
ranging from limited liability to favourable
tax treatment, those advising such
companies should pay particular attention to
the
court's
reasoning
when
it
decides DaimlerChrysler. Should the court
weaken the traditional principles of
corporate separateness in any way, the
consequences could be far broader than
merely increasing the cost and burden of
defending litigation in a foreign forum.
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